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THE DUKE LACROSSE CASE, INNOCENCE, AND 
FALSE IDENTIFICATIONS: A FUNDAMENTAL 
FAILURE TO “DO JUSTICE” 
Robert P. Mosteller* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Duke lacrosse case was a disaster—a caricature. The case, which 
involved false rape charges against three Duke University lacrosse players, 
began with gang rape allegations by an exotic dancer at a team party in 
March 2006 and ended with the declaration of their innocence in April 2007 
and the disbarment of Durham County District Attorney Mike Nifong in 
June of that year. Often a full examination of the facts of a notorious case 
reveals that events were ambiguous and the reality is not as bad as early 
reports suggested. This case does not fit that pattern; it gets worse on 
inspection. At the end of a five-day disciplinary hearing, Lane Williamson, 
chair of the North Carolina State Bar’s hearing panel, called the case a 
“fiasco”1 and reiterated the term, giving assurance that it was “not too 
strong a word.”2 He was clearly right, and could well have added  
adjectives. 
The fiasco centered around the conduct of Nifong. At the beginning of 
Williamson’s explanation of why the panel unanimously voted to disbar 
Nifong, the harshest punishment possible, he described the situation “in 
which . . . [Nifong’s] self-interest collided with a very volatile mix of race, 
sex and class, a situation that if it were applied in a John Grisham novel 
would be considered to be perhaps too contrived.”3 In April 2007, North 
Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper ended the criminal prosecution. In  
a news conference, he announced that all charges had been dropped and that 
his investigation had found that the three indicted players were innocent. 
 
 
* Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. I wish to thank Sara Beale, 
Ken Broun, Diane Dimond, Elizabeth Gibson, Paul Haagen, David Levi, Daniel Mosteller, 
Theresa Newman, Jeff Powell, Rich Rosen, Andy Taslitz, Mike Tigar, Neil Vidmar, and 
Fred Zacharias for their comments on an earlier draft and Allison Hester-Haddad for her help 
as research assistant. 
1. Statement of F. Lane Williamson, Excerpt of Transcript of Disciplinary Hearing 
Commission at 16, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n 
of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) [hereinafter Williamson Statement] (on file with 
author). 
2. Id. at 29. 
3. Id. at 17. 
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Cooper described Nifong as a “rogue prosecutor”4 who “pushed forward 
unchecked”5 and called the case “the tragic result of a rush to accuse and a 
failure to verify serious allegations.”6 
Nifong had important help from the accuser, Crystal Mangum. 
Mangum’s story of rape and kidnapping was a total fabrication—either a 
hoax or a false allegation based on delusion. Mangum’s separate conduct 
does not diminish Nifong’s responsibility as the public prosecutor 
controlling the case, and, indeed, it made his ethical duty to do justice even 
more important. Instead, Nifong either vitally aided a hoax or caused an 
unfortunate delusion to have serious societal and legal ramifications. 
A rogue district attorney and an accuser either perpetrating a hoax or 
suffering from a delusion is indeed a confluence of unusual factors.7 The 
ethics rulings resulting from this case regarding the established charges of 
improper pretrial statements by Nifong, his failure to disclose DNA 
evidence that tended to negate guilt, and his deceptive statements to the trial 
court, lawyers, and the bar are instructive.8 However, broad generalization 
from the rulings is likely to be of limited value because the factors that 
produced this disaster in combination with the clarity of proof will likely 
not be seen again soon. 
In Part I, I set out the actual events of March 13 to 14, 2006, when the 
alleged rape occurred (as found by the attorney general) and the reasons for 
which he dismissed all charges and declared the players, Reade Seligmann, 
Collin Finnerty, and Dave Evans, innocent. This narrative serves as the 
backdrop for ethics charges against Nifong and the ensuing disciplinary 
action. I then sketch the contours of the two sets of ethical violations 
charged and largely found valid against Nifong, resulting in his disbarment: 
the first set alleged improper prejudicial pretrial publicity and the second 
charged that Nifong withheld exculpatory DNA information, failed to 
 
4. Duff Wilson & David Barstow, Duke Prosecutor Throws Out Case Against Players, 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 2007, at A1. 
5. Memorandum from Roy Cooper, Att’y Gen., Comments on State v. Finnerty, Evans, 
Seligmann 2 (Apr. 11, 2007) (on file with author). 
6. Id. at 1. 
7. In cataloging the ways the case is unusual, I put at the top of the list (1) the obvious 
lack of prosecutorial merit, and (2) a clear violation of both the prohibition of prejudicial 
pretrial public statements and a well-documented, knowing violation of the prosecutor’s 
obligation to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence. Obvious lack of merit likely was a 
function of the fact that no crime occurred, as well as the high quality of defense counsel, 
which no doubt also contributed to documentation regarding Mike Nifong’s violation of the 
prosecutor’s duty to provide potentially exculpatory evidence to the defense. Although the 
clarity of proof of Nifong’s knowledge and intent in violating his duty to provide 
exculpatory information is indeed unusual, I do not find this case at all unusual with regards 
to the significance of the evidence withheld. See Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, 
Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full 
Open-File Discovery, 15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. (forthcoming Jan. 2008) (discussing cases 
where death sentences were reversed on grounds of withheld exculpatory information). 
8. See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Discipline, N.C. 
State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar 
July 31, 2007) [hereinafter Amended Nifong Bar Order] (on file with author). 
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provide required discovery, and then made deceptive statements covering 
up both those failures.9 
In Parts II and III, I reach my major focus. I examine conduct that was 
not the subject of any ethics charge or adjudication, but which largely 
occurred chronologically between the two sets of offenses described earlier. 
I first examine, in general, the prosecutor’s ethical duty to avoid charging 
and prosecuting the innocent. I contend that Nifong’s failures under this 
general duty, which is central to the role of the public prosecutor, were 
equally or more serious than his duty to provide exculpatory information. I 
then examine a specific manifestation of his failure to “do justice” in the 
form of the “all suspect” identification procedure designed by Nifong, 
which produced the bogus evidence that enabled him to charge the 
innocent. 
The North Carolina State Bar charged Nifong with violations of eleven 
different provisions of its Rules of Professional Conduct.10 In Part II, I 
 
 
9. The Disciplinary Hearing Commission found that Nifong repeatedly made such 
“misrepresentations,” “intentional misrepresentations,” “false statements,” and “intentional 
false statements” of material fact. Id. para. 72, at 13 (referring to a written discovery 
response to opposing counsel and the trial court on May 18, 2006); id. para. 75, at 13 
(referring to statements made to Judge Ronald Stephens on June 22, 2006); id. para. 80, at 14 
(referring to statements made to Judge Stephens on September 22, 2006); id. para. 88, at 15 
(referring to statements made to Judge Osmond Smith on September 22, 2006); id. para. 88, 
at 15 (referring to statements made to Judge Smith on September 22, 2006); id. para. 96, at 
17 (referring to statements made to opposing counsel and Judge Smith on December 15, 
2006); id. paras. 110, 113, at 19 (referring to statements made in response to the North 
Carolina State Bar Grievance Committee). 
Although not available to the hearing panel because the contempt trial occurred on August 
30, 2007, after the disciplinary proceedings had been completed, Judge Smith found Nifong 
guilty of criminal contempt based on his statements to the court on September 22, 2006, 
asserting that he had supplied all DNA results. Judge Smith found that at the time Nifong 
made the statements, he was aware that DNA results had not been provided and that in 
asserting that all results had been provided Nifong “willfully and intentionally made false 
statements of material fact.” Order and Judgment of Contempt and Sentence, In re Nifong, 
paras. 2–4, 6, at 3–4, No. 07 CRS 10467 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2007). 
10. In its oral finding, the panel found violations of Rules 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(c), 3.4(d), 
3.4(d)(3), 3.6(a), 3.8(d), 3.8(f), 4.1, 8.1(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) of the North Carolina State Bar 
Revised Rules of Professional Conduct and/or the North Carolina State Bar Revised Rules of 
Professional Conduct as amended (effective Nov. 16, 2006). See Williamson Statement, 
supra note 1, at 4–15. In the panel’s initial written order entered on July 10, 2007, it omitted 
reference to Rule 3.4(c). Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Discipline at 
20–22, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. 
State Bar July 31, 2007) (on file with author). In response to an e-mail I wrote to the State 
Bar pointing out the discrepancy, the oversight was corrected and the order amended. See 
Amended Nifong Bar Order, supra note 8, conclusions of law para. (b), at 20; Joseph Neff, 
Nifong Sends in His Bar License, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 15, 2007, at A1. 
This means that, while Nifong was charged with violating eleven provisions, he was found to 
have violated ten, though he violated two of those provisions both before (3.4(d) and 3.8(d)) 
and after amendment (3.4(d)(3) and 3.8(d)). The only provision of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct charged but not found is 3.4(f). Compare Amended Complaint at 29–30, N.C. State 
Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 
2007) [hereinafter Amended Nifong Bar Complaint] (on file with author), with Amended 
Nifong Bar Order, supra note 8, conclusions of law paras. (a)–(h), at 20–22. 
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focus on the fact that no charge was brought based on the prosecutor’s 
overarching duty “to do” or “to seek justice.” North Carolina adopted the 
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules provisions on the “Special 
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor” and, along with the vast majority of other 
states, its Rule 3.8(a).11 That provision sets out the single direct command 
of the responsibility not to prosecute the innocent: “refrain from  
prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable 
cause.”12 Nifong was not charged with violating this Rule, and I conclude 
that it is unclear that he could have been shown to have violated it even in 
this outrageous case. As the only embodiment of the duty not to prosecute 
the innocent, the Rule is on its face woefully inadequate and appears to be 
largely unenforceable. 
In Part III, I turn to the type of enforceable rule that would protect the 
innocent from unsubstantiated prosecution. It is not an ethical rule at all,  
but rather a set of identification procedures that are designed to ensure 
accuracy and protect innocence. I begin by carefully examining the 
photographic identification process Nifong recommended, which produced 
the “evidence” that permitted indictment and prosecution. That process did 
virtually nothing to protect innocence, facilitated the continued maintenance 
of a totally false allegation that was either hoax or delusion, and enabled the 
ensuing prosecution. 
Current constitutional doctrine under the Due Process Clause offers some 
control on suggestive identification procedures. Although somewhat more 
enforceable than the broadly phrased ethics rule, this body of law is 
practically worthless in most cases and does not serve as an effective 
guarantee against prosecuting the innocent. I describe efforts arising from 
DNA exonerations and the innocence movement to create guidelines that 
improve accuracy in identification. The result has been a set of guidelines 
designed to improve the accuracy and fairness of eyewitness identifications. 
This case demonstrates the importance of turning those guidelines into 
legally enforceable standards. 
The Duke lacrosse case is extraordinary both in the clarity of its facts and 
in the violation of the prosecutor’s fundamental duty to do justice. The 
laborious process that led to unearthing Nifong’s failure to provide 
potentially exculpatory evidence to the defense and the ensuing disciplinary 
action illustrate the difficulty of enforcing this well-recognized duty, which 
 
 
 
 
11. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2007); Revised Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct of the N.C. State Bar R. 3.8(a) (2007). The North Carolina Code and American Bar 
Association (ABA) Code are identical. In addition to North Carolina, forty states have 
adopted this provision verbatim, three have minor variations, and six follow the similar 
provisions of the predecessor Model Code, under which there is only one substantial 
variation. See infra notes 138−141 and accompanying text. 
12. Revised Rules of Prof’l Conduct of the N.C. State Bar R. 3.8(a). 
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is a relatively specific manifestation of the general duty to do justice.13 The 
case shows once again the need for concrete rules.14 Although they are  
often poor approximations of the ethical duty, such rules help describe and 
enforce a modicum of fair conduct as a guide for law enforcement and 
prosecutors during an investigation and prosecution, and they provide a 
baseline measure for retrospective review of system failures. 
In Part IV, I argue that the guidelines for conducting identification 
procedures be given the force of law backed by automatic exclusion of out- 
of-court identifications for significant violations. In appropriate cases, 
where accuracy is sufficiently undermined and conviction of the innocent 
threatened, I contend their violation should result in exclusion of all 
identification evidence. 
 
I. THE DUKE LACROSSE CASE 
 
A. The Event 
The events of the Duke lacrosse party are now clear in essential detail.15 
We are fortunate that both the North Carolina attorney general and the 
 
 
13. See Mosteller, supra note 7, pt. I.E (discussing the development of discovery 
obligations that provided the foundation upon which disclosure of Nifong’s misbehavior was 
based). 
14. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial 
Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 45, 50, 107 n.259 (1991) 
(describing the general purpose of the article as highlighting “a need for precise ethical 
directives” and explaining that while case studies suggest the “do justice” standard is taken 
seriously by many prosecutors resulting in “drastic steps to protect defendants’ rights,” the 
presence of a “high-minded but overly general ‘justice’ rule masks the difficulty of 
regulating prosecutorial” conduct); see also Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal, 
Prosecutors, Ethics, and Expert Witnesses, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1493, 1536–37 (2007) 
(suggesting the need for concrete standards for the “do justice” ethics standard in the area of 
scientific evidence); cf. Robert Aronson & Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Use and Misuse of 
High-Tech Evidence by Prosecutors: Ethical and Evidentiary Issues, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 
1453, 1492 (recognizing the need for specific guidance for prosecutors as to the use of high- 
tech evidence and stricter legislative and administrative standards while arguing principally 
for more attention by prosecutors and their peers and supervisors to their ethical duty to do 
justice). 
15. The historical record is clear that no sexual assault of any type occurred at 610 North 
Buchanan Street on the night of March 13 to 14, 2006, involving Crystal Mangum. 
Nevertheless, Mangum appears to continue to believe otherwise. Attorney General Roy 
Cooper stated in his news conference dismissing charges against the three players that 
Mangum would not be prosecuted and that his investigators “think that she may actually 
believe the many different stories that she has been telling.” Samiha Khanna, Contradictions 
Tore Case Apart, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 12, 2007, at 1A. During his 
testimony at the bar hearing, Nifong stated he believed some type of sexual misconduct 
involving Mangum occurred. See Williamson Statement, supra note 1, at 18 (taking note of 
Nifong’s testimony that he still believes in discredited facts). However, at the initial hearing 
on criminal contempt charges filed against Nifong, he acknowledged that there was no 
credible evidence that any crime was committed by the three players against Mangum. See 
Anne Blythe, Nifong Makes Unequivocal Apology for Duke Lacrosse Case, News & 
Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), July 27, 2007, at 1A. 
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North Carolina State Bar’s Disciplinary Hearing Commission prepared 
somewhat detailed written findings that a jury trial would not have 
provided. 
I include the summary, with minor editing, from the attorney general’s 
Summary of Conclusions as a factual baseline for the consideration of the 
ethics charges brought against Nifong. It is based on witness interviews  
and review of photographic, video, and documentary evidence conducted 
by prosecutors from that office. 
On March 13, 2006 a party hosted by three Duke University students took 
place at 610 N. Buchanan Blvd. in Durham, NC. The three students, Dan 
Flannery, David Evans and Matt Zash, were members of Duke’s lacrosse 
team and residents of the house. Approximately 40 other students 
attended the party; most, but not all, were also team members. 
Sometime in the afternoon on March 13, one of the party hosts, Dan 
Flannery, called an escort service. The host did not provide his real name 
nor did he tell the service that 40 people would be at the party. He asked 
for two white dancers to come to 610 N. Buchanan Blvd. at 11 p.m. to 
entertain for a small bachelor party at the house. 
The escort service arranged for two dancers, the accusing witness [Crystal 
Gail Mangum]16 and a woman who used the name “Nikki” for the escort 
service [Kim Pittman],17 to go to 610 N. Buchanan Blvd. at 11 p.m. The 
two dancers did not know each other. Neither was Caucasian. 
Pittman arrived at the house by herself shortly after 11 p.m. She was met 
by Flannery and was there for at least 30 minutes waiting for the other 
dancer, who was the accusing witness, to arrive. She did not allege that 
anything inappropriate happened to her while she was waiting during this 
time. 
Beginning at 11:10 p.m., Flannery called the escort service three times 
seeking to learn the whereabouts of the other dancer. . . . At 
approximately 11:40 p.m., Mangum was dropped off by her driver at 610 
N.  Buchanan Blvd.18   Mangum was described  as being unsteady on  her 
 
 
16. Although their identities are widely publicized, the attorney general’s report does not 
use the real names of either the “accusing witness” or “Nikki,” the other dancer. See Office 
of the Att’y Gen. of N.C., Durham County Superior Court case file Nos. 06 CRS 4332-4336, 
5582-5583, at 5 (2005) [hereinafter Attorney General’s Report] (on file with author). I 
substitute their real names throughout and omit brackets ordinarily used to show alteration. 
17. In some sources, Kim Pittman is referred to as Kim Roberts. 
18. To help establish the time of her arrival, the attorney general’s report notes that 
Mangum received four incoming calls and made one outgoing call on her cellular telephone 
from 11:11 p.m. until 11:36 p.m. and that her driver, upon leaving her at the Buchanan Street 
house, drove to a nearby gas station and paid for a drink at approximately 11:43 p.m. See 
Attorney General’s Report, supra note 16, at 5. 
The attorney general’s report used the phone call records and time-verified pictorial 
evidence for various individuals at the party in combination with other time-stamped video 
and electronic data to establish with certainty the conclusion that no protracted rape as 
initially described by the accuser was possible and to corroborate the fact that no sexual 
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feet from the time she arrived and throughout the rest of her time at the 
house. . . . 
Each of the dancers was paid $400 in cash. Flannery showed  both 
dancers to a bathroom to get ready for their dancing. Pittman was in her 
street clothes and needed to change. Mangum had arrived in an outfit she 
wore to perform. The host informed the other party attendees that the 
dancers were not Caucasian and asked if they still wanted the women to 
perform. The consensus was to have them perform. The dancers, 
meanwhile, were not expecting a 40-person party, but instead, a small 
bachelor party. However, they consented to perform. 
Sometime just before midnight, the two dancers entered the living room 
to begin their performance for the party attendees. While performing, 
Mangum appeared to be unsteady on her feet and fell to the ground. 
During the performance, there was sexual banter involving the use of sex 
toys between Pittman and some of the party attendees. This culminated in 
one of the attendees holding up a broomstick and suggesting its use as a 
sexual object for the dancers. Pittman was angered by this comment and 
the performance abruptly ended. After 12:04 a.m., the dancers left the 
room and retreated to the back of the house. 
They were followed by David Evans, Dan Flannery, and possibly others 
who tried to assuage their feelings about the broomstick comment while 
pointing out that the party attendees had paid $800 for only a brief 
performance. The dancers returned to the bathroom where they had left 
their belongings. The two women remained in the bathroom alone 
together for a period of time. 
At approximately 12:05 a.m., just after the dancing ended, Reade 
Seligmann, began using his cell phone and initiated a series of phone calls 
to his girlfriend and others. At 12:14 a.m., he called a taxi cab company  
to pick him up. He and another party attendee then walked around the 
corner and got into a cab at approximately 12:19 a.m.19 
There was a range of other activities going on by the party attendees 
during this time. In addition to Seligmann, Collin Finnerty and other 
attendees decided to leave after the dancing ended. Others stayed and 
expressed displeasure at having paid money for a short performance that 
was expected to have lasted for two hours, and wanted a refund or a 
 
 
offense at all occurred involving those accused. This use of “digital trace evidence” is one 
example of what I see as a new type of “trace evidence” that will play an increasingly 
important role in convictions and exonerations. See Robert P. Mosteller, Evidence History, 
the New Trace Evidence, and Rumblings in the Future of Proof, 3 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 523, 
534–37 (2006). 
19. The attorney general’s report recounts the basic details of Reade Seligmann’s alibi 
information, indicating that the cab driver took him and another party attendee to an 
automatic teller machine, arriving at approximately 12:24 a.m., then took them to a take-out 
restaurant, and finally back to Seligmann’s dormitory, which he entered at 12:46 a.m. See 
Attorney General’s Report, supra note 16, at 6. 
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continuation of the performance. Some party attendees were milling 
around both inside and outside the house. 
The dancers eventually left the bathroom and went to the back yard 
together. Flannery went outside to talk with them. He urged  them to 
come back into the house to continue the performance. He apologized for 
the comment that was made during the performance. The dancers went to 
Pittman’s car. David Evans and others came to the car and talked with 
them. 
Inside the house, some of the party attendees continued to express their 
displeasure with the truncated performance. Some said they had been 
cheated. Two of the attendees, while using the bathroom, noticed that one 
of the dancers had left her cosmetics bag behind in the bathroom. Each 
separately took money out of the bag and were told by Flannery and 
Evans to return the money to the bag. During this time, more attendees 
were leaving the house to go elsewhere. 
The dancers had a conversation at the car. Then they both re-entered the 
house through the back door. Once inside the house, other attendees 
apologized to the dancers for the earlier comments. The individual who 
earlier held up the broomstick then approached the dancers which caused 
Pittman to become angry again, and the dancers went back into the 
bathroom alone together and refused to come out. 
Flannery tried again to coax the dancers out of the bathroom. Zash and 
Evans began to encourage everyone else to leave. During this time, Zash 
said he wanted everyone out of the house because he was concerned that 
excessive noise would prompt neighbors to complain to police. Flannery 
continued to talk to the dancers, who were alone together in the bathroom, 
in an attempt to get them to leave the house. 
While the dancers were still at the house, Collin Finnerty walked to 1105 
Urban Street, a nearby house rented by other Duke students 20 
The dancers opened the bathroom door and left 610 N. Buchanan Blvd. 
for the second time through the back door sometime before 12:30 a.m. 
Pittman and Flannery together walked to her car parked on the street in 
front of the house. Mangum remained behind outside the house. With 
both dancers and most of the party attendees out of the house, Zash  
locked the door of the back porch of the house to prevent Mangum or 
anyone else from re-entering the house. Mangum began banging on the 
door to get in. Zash refused to open the door. 
20. The attorney general’s report also notes Collin Finnerty’s alibi information, 
indicating that at 12:22 a.m. Finnerty made a two-minute call to a fellow lacrosse player 
using his cell phone. At 12:27 a.m., another lacrosse player called Finnerty’s cell phone 
looking for him. Finnerty told the player that he was at 1105 Urban Street, and that the 
player then walked to the house and met Finnerty there. Then Finnerty called Domino’s 
Pizza at 12:30 a.m. and again at 12:33 a.m. Finnerty and three other players walked from 
1105 Urban Street to Cosmic Cantina restaurant where they ordered food and paid at 12:56 
a.m. See id. at 7. 
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At 12:26 a.m., Mangum placed a telephone call to the escort service. 
Moments later, at 12:30 a.m., she was observed and photographed outside 
the house on the back porch steps, smiling and rummaging through 
Evans’ shaving kit. Under her arm is her cosmetic bag containing an 
object that appears to be her cell phone. 
Other party attendees outside the house at the same time observed her 
behavior. She was overheard talking incoherently, apparently to no one in 
particular. In a video recorded at 12:31:26 a.m., she is talking to one of 
the party attendees saying “I’m a cop” and making other comments which 
were difficult to understand. The video also shows the difficulty she was 
experiencing with her balance as she attempted to walk from the back 
porch down the stairs, as well as her attempt to engage in a disjointed 
conversation with party attendees who were nearby. 
At 12:34 a.m., while Flannery and Pittman were in the front of 610 N. 
Buchanan Blvd. and Mangum was outside the house as previously 
described, Evans called his girlfriend and spoke with her for 
approximately 16 minutes. 
At 12:37 a.m. Mangum was observed and photographed lying in a prone 
position on the back porch. Flannery was called by other attendees from 
the rear of the house and told that there was a problem. Flannery left 
Pittman and returned to the back of the house where he observed Mangum 
lying in the position described above. Flannery then assisted Mangum in 
walking from the back porch to Pittman’s car where she was placed in the 
front seat by Flannery. Both dancers were in the car at 12:42 a.m. 
After Mangum was placed in Pittman’s car, Pittman yelled a sexually and 
racially based comment at a group of party attendees standing across the 
street near the wall to East Campus at the university. One or more of the 
party responded with racial epithets. After this exchange, Pittman drove 
away with Mangum in her car. At approximately 12:53 a.m., Pittman 
called 911 to report that a group of white men were yelling racial 
comments at passersby outside of North Buchanan Boulevard. 
The two dancers arrived at a Kroger grocery store in Durham. Mangum 
refused to get out of Pittman’s car and appeared to be unconscious. 
Pittman went in to the Kroger store and requested a security guard to 
notify the Durham Police Department. At 1:22 a.m., such a call was 
received at the 911 center.21 
The chronology then describes the first contact by Sergeant John C. 
Shelton of the Durham Police Department with the apparently unconscious 
victim and his direction to take her to Durham Center Access, an 
organization that offers, inter alia, assistance for substance abuse.22 When 
asked by a nurse there whether she had been raped, Mangum answered 
 
 
21. See id. at 5–8. 
22. Id. at 8. 
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affirmatively, the first such indication.23 After being taken to Duke 
University Medical Center emergency room, she recanted, then reasserted 
that she had been raped.24 The watch commander advised Shelton to treat it 
as a rape investigation,25 and further examinations and the investigation 
ensued. 
 
A. The Attorney General’s Declaration that the Defendants Were Innocent 
and Dismissal of Charges 
In an action that was highly unusual,26 on December 28, 2006,27 the 
North Carolina State Bar filed a disciplinary complaint against the 
prosecutor while the initial trial proceedings were  pending.28  The 
complaint alleged that Nifong made improper pretrial public statements and 
misrepresentations. The principal allegations involved his pretrial 
statements to the press. Nifong’s statements were alleged to violate 
disciplinary rules that prohibit a prosecutor from making statements before 
trial that he knows or should have known would have a substantial 
likelihood of materially prejudicing the adjudicative proceeding or of 
heightening public condemnation of the accused.29 As a result of the filing 
 
 
 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 9. 
25. See id. 
26. Lane Williamson noted both the controversial and unprecedented nature of the North 
Carolina State Bar’s decision to take disciplinary action during the pendency of the case 
given the fact that the presiding judge had coextensive disciplinary jurisdiction. Williamson 
Statement, supra note 1, at 21. Williamson appropriately credits the State Bar’s action with 
starting the alternative system of justice in this case. Id. at 20–21. 
27. Matt Dees, Nifong Broke Rules, Bar Alleges, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), 
Dec. 29, 2006, at 1A. 
28. On October 19, 2006, the sixteen-member subcommittee of the North Carolina Bar 
Grievance Committee, charged with examining Nifong’s pretrial publicity, voted 
unanimously to recommend to the full Grievance Committee that a complaint be filed 
against him. The same subcommittee then considered whether to file the complaint before 
the criminal charges were resolved against the charged defendants, or to wait until their 
conclusion. The initial vote was tied and was then broken by Chairman Jim Fox in favor of 
recommending that filing of the complaint not be delayed. Later that same day, the full forty- 
two-member Grievance Committee voted unanimously to accept both recommendations. 
Letter from Wade Smith, Lead Counsel for Collin Finnerty, to author (Nov. 13, 2007) (on 
file with author). The complaint was filed in December 2006 after it was prepared by bar 
counsel. Letter from Katherine E. Jean, Counsel, N.C. State Bar, to author 2 (Sept. 13, 2007) 
(on file with author) (explaining the general procedures of the Grievance Committee and the 
process of filing the formal complaint once the Grievance Committee finds probable cause 
and directs that a complaint be filed); see also Joseph Neff & Anne Blythe, Outcome Turned 
On Close Calls, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), June 17, 2007, at 8A (describing the 
decision by a subcommittee of the bar’s Grievance Committee on the tie-breaking vote of 
Chairman Jim Fox to file disciplinary charges, charges that forced Nifong’s recusal, but 
misreporting the timing of that vote). 
29. See Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, at 29. Some of the statements 
made to the press were also alleged to have involved dishonesty and misrepresentations of 
fact. Id. at 30. 
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of the bar complaint, Nifong asked the North Carolina attorney general’s 
office to assume responsibility for prosecuting the cases.30 
After several months and on the basis of an examination of the 
investigative files and witness interviews, special prosecutors from the 
North Carolina attorney general’s office developed the narrative set out 
above. As the report specifically states, the flow of events provided “no 
opportunity for an attack to occur for even 10 minutes, much less the 20 or 
30 minutes as alleged.”31 The attorney general’s office not only dismissed 
the charges but also concluded, “[b]ased on the significant inconsistencies 
between the evidence and the various accounts given by the accusing 
witness, the Attorney General and his prosecutors determined that the three 
individuals were innocent of the criminal charges . . . .”32 
The rest of the report describes specific and general weaknesses in the 
case. Its bullet-point summary of the list of reasons the charges were 
dismissed follows: 
• The accusing witness’s testimony regarding the alleged assault 
would have been contradicted by other evidence in the case from 
numerous sources; 
• The accusing witness’s testimony regarding the alleged assault 
and the events leading up to and following the allegations would 
have been contradicted by significantly different versions of 
events she told over the past year; 
• No testimony or physical evidence would have corroborated her 
testimony; 
• The accused individuals were identified through questionable 
photographic procedures; 
• Credible and verifiable evidence demonstrated that the accused 
individuals could not have participated in an attack during the 
time it was alleged to have occurred; 
• The accusing witness’s credibility would have been suspect 
based on previous encounters with law enforcement, her medical 
history and inconsistencies within her statements.33 
 
 
 
30. See Attorney General’s Report, supra note 16, at 3. 
31. Id. at 19. 
32. Id. at 21. 
33. Id. at 2. Under the heading “The Determination to Dismiss the Charges,” the 
attorney general’s report provides an additional summary, presented as follows: 
• The special prosecutors’ investigation revealed multiple and significant 
inconsistencies and contradictions in the case, and no evidence to 
corroborate the accusing witness’s versions of the events: 
• No DNA evidence confirmed her stories. Any DNA evidence that might 
arguably support her stories is subject to a reasonable alternative 
explanation. 
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II. ETHICS VIOLATIONS THAT WERE ALLEGED AND FOUND 
 
A. Ethics Violations Based on Improper Pretrial Publicity 
Nifong learned of the Duke lacrosse case investigation on March 23, 
2006.34 The next day he took charge of the case.35 A few days later, on 
March 27, 2006, the primary investigative officers briefed Nifong on the 
case, and within hours of that briefing, he began to make statements to the 
media that had a profound effect. 
1. Improper Pretrial Publicity and Its Impact 
In its initial ethics complaint filed on December 28, 2006, the North 
Carolina State Bar charged violations regarding forty-nine different pretrial 
statements to media. All of the statements were alleged to violate two 
ethical provisions by “hav[ing] a substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding . . . in violation of Rule 3.6(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Id. at 20. 
• No medical evidence confirmed her stories. The SANE [Sexual Assault 
Nurse Examiner] based her opinion that the exam was consistent with 
what the accusing witness was reporting largely on the accusing 
witness’s demeanor and complaints of pain rather than on objective 
evidence. 
• No other witness confirmed her stories. No one at the house that night 
has come forward to support her stories and the other dancer has given 
conflicting accounts of the evening. In one account to ABC News, [Kim 
Pittman] asserted that the accusing witness told her to put marks on her. 
Her varied accounts show her as a witness who would not be helpful to 
the prosecution. 
• The accusing witness’s accounts of the story changed significantly.  
Even in the face of facts that contradicted her stories, the accusing 
witness was unwilling to acknowledge in meetings with the special 
prosecutors that she might be mistaken about the identification of the 
defendants. 
34. Joseph Neff, Nifong’s Quest to Convict Hid a Lack of Evidence, News & Observer 
(Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 14, 2007, at 1A (describing that Nifong learned of the case on March 
23, 2006, when he found a copy of the DNA order (the nontestimonial identification order) 
on the office copy machine). The bar found that Nifong learned of the case on March 24, 
2006. See Amended Nifong Bar Order, supra note 8, para. 11, at 3. 
35. Amended Nifong Bar Order, supra note 8, para. 12, at 3; Amended Nifong Bar 
Complaint, supra note 10, para. 190, at 17; Pretrial Order, Exhibit A, Stipulated Undisputed 
Facts para. 81, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of 
the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) [hereinafter Nifong Bar Stipulations] (on file with author); 
see also Supplemental Case notes for Sgt. M.D. Gottlieb at 6, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 
06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) [hereinafter 
Sgt. Gottlieb’s Supplemental Report] (on file with author) (describing Captain Jeff Lamb’s 
instructions on March 24, 2006, to “continue with our investigation, but to go through Mr. 
Nifong for any directions as to how to conduct matters in this case”); Neff, supra note 34 
(describing Nifong telling the Durham police that he was taking over the investigation on 
March 24, 2006). 
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and . . . of heightening public condemnation of the accused in violation of 
Rule 3.8(f).”36 
Among the statements, ten were alleged to be improper commentary on 
the team members’ failure or refusal to give information to law enforcement 
authorities and their invocation of their constitutional rights.37 Another ten 
were alleged to be “improper commentary on [his] opinion about the guilt 
of the accused and/or about his opinion that a crime had occurred.”38 
Finally, the bar listed statements that particularly heightened public 
condemnation of the accused, many of which asserted a racial motivation 
for the attack.39 
Nifong began making these statements on Monday, March 27, 2006, 
within hours of receiving his initial briefing on the case from Sergeant  
Mark Gottlieb and Investigator Benjamin Himan,40 and continued in a 
particularly intense barrage for the rest of that week.41 On April 3, 2006, 
Nifong told the press that he had devoted more than forty hours to reporters 
in recent days, and that he would henceforth decline to grant interviews.42 
Nifong estimated he gave fifty to seventy interviews in that first week.43 
After that, the pace of his comments decreased, but did not cease. 
 
 
 
36. Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, charge (a), at 29. The bar also 
alleged that two of these statements, which asserted that the perpetrators may have used 
condoms, were not supported by any statements of the victim and constituted dishonesty or 
misrepresentations in violation of disciplinary Rule 8.4(c). Id. paras. 114–19, at 10–11, 
conclusions of law (b), at 30. This last charge was the only allegation concerning pretrial 
publicity that the hearing panel ruled was not proven. Williamson Statement, supra note 1, at 
5–6. 
37. Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, para. 43, at 5 (referencing paras. 
13–42, at 2–5, in the Amended Bar Complaint, which cited Nifong’s improper comments to 
the news media about the lacrosse team members’ “failure or refusal to make a statement to 
law enforcement authorities”). 
38. Id. para. 109, at 10 (referencing paras. 78–106, at 8–10, in the Amended Bar 
Complaint, which cited to Nifong’s improper comments in the news media about the guilt of 
the accused and his “opinion that a crime had occurred”). 
39. Id. para. 178, at 15 (referencing paras. 142–77, at 13–15, in the Amended Bar 
Complaint, which noted Nifong’s comments to the news media “that had a substantial 
likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused”). 
40. Amended Nifong Bar Order, supra note 8, para. 16, at 3; Amended Nifong Bar 
Complaint, supra note 10, para. 10, at 2; see Nifong Bar Stipulation, supra note 35, paras. 
19, 22. 
41. See (Second) Exhibit A, Chronological Stipulated Undisputed Facts, N.C. State Bar 
v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 
2007) (on file with author) (setting out nine statements made “on or before” March 27, 2006, 
paras. 25–33; twelve statements made “on or before” March 28, 2006, paras. 36–47; six 
statements made “on or before” March 29, 2006, paras. 49–53; twelve statements made “on 
or before” March 30, 2006, paras. 55–66; seven statements made “on or before” March 31, 
2006, paras. 67–73; and two statements made “on or before” April 1, 2006, paras. 74–75). 
42. John Stevenson, DA Halting Interviews Until Update; Nifong: No More Info on 
Alleged Rape for Now, Herald-Sun (Durham, N.C.), Apr. 4, 2006, at A1. 
43. Joseph Neff, Nifong Conduct Rebuked Early, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 
15, 2007, at 1A. 
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Statements were made to both local and national media, including 
newspapers and other print media and television.44 
Nifong defended his statements to the press that the players were not 
giving information to the police and were engaging in a conspiracy of 
silence on the ground that he was seeking information from the 
community.45 Among the statements’ effects was to offer an explanation as 
to why no incriminating information was coming from others at the party 
and to discount team members’ denials. Examples from this set of 
statements follow: 
[T]here are three people who went into the bathroom with the young lady, 
and whether the other people there knew what was going on at the time, 
they do now and have not come forward. I’m disappointed that no one  
has been enough of a man to come forward. And if they would have 
spoken up at the time, this may never have happened.46 
I would like to think that somebody who was not in the bathroom has the 
human decency to call up and say, “What am I doing covering up for a 
bunch of hooligans?” . . . I’d like to be able to think that there were some 
people in that house that were not involved in this and were as horrified 
by it as the rest of us are.47 
I would like to think that somebody [not involved in the attack] has the 
human decency to call up and say, “What am I doing covering up for a 
bunch of hooligans?”48 
[M]y guess is that some of this stonewall of silence that we have seen 
may tend to crumble once charges start to come out.49 
 
 
 
44. Nifong made statements to the following television media: WRAL News (Raleigh, 
N.C.) in March and May 2006; ABC 11 TV News (Raleigh and Durham, N.C.) in March and 
April 2006; NBC 17 News (Durham, N.C.); CNN; CBS Early Show; ESPN; and MSNBC. 
He also made statements to the following print media: The Durham Herald-Sun, The 
News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), The Charlotte Observer, The New York Times, USA 
Today, and Newsweek. 
45. Excerpt Transcript of Testimony of Michael B. Nifong at 29–33, 203–05, N.C. State 
Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 
2007) [hereinafter Nifong Transcript] (on file with author) (making this argument); Motion 
to Dismiss and Answer para. 10, at 4, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 
(Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) (on file with author) 
(arguing that his reason for making the statements was “in an effort to obtain assistance in 
receiving evidence and information necessary to further the criminal investigation”). 
46. Viv Bernstein & Joe Drape, Rape Allegation Against Athletes Is Roiling Duke, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 29, 2006, at A1; see also Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, para. 
19, at 3. 
47. Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, para. 137, at 12; Anne Blythe & 
Jane Stancill, Duke Puts Lacrosse Games On Hold, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 
29, 2006, at 1A. 
48. Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, para. 137, at 12; Benjamin Niolet, 
Spotlight New Place for Nifong, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 10, 2006, at 1A. 
49. Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, para. 16, at 3; Nifong Bar 
Stipulation, supra note 35, para. 16; Exhibit 101, 03/27/06—ABC 11–Alleged Rape—Racial 
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Other statements conveyed Nifong’s certainty that a crime occurred, 
many of which also added the particularly outrageous charge that the crime 
was racially motivated. The foreseeable impact of the racial allegation, in 
particular, was obvious. Below are some of these statements: 
[T]he thing that most of us found so abhorrent, and the reason I decided to 
take it over myself, was the combination gang-like rape activity 
accompanied by the racial slurs and general racial hostility.50 
The reason that I took this case is because this case says something about 
Durham that I’m not going to let be said . . . . I’m not going to let 
Durham’s view in the minds of the world to be a bunch of lacrosse 
players from Duke raping a black girl in Durham.51 
[T]he circumstances of the rape indicated a deep racial motivation for 
some of the things that were done. It makes a crime that is by its nature 
one of the most offensive and invasive even more so.52 
[I]n this case, where you have the act of rape—essentially a gang rape—is 
bad enough in and of itself, but when it’s made with racial epithets against 
the victim, I mean, it’s just absolutely unconscionable . . . . [T]he 
contempt that was shown for the victim, based on her race was totally 
abhorrent. It adds another layer of reprehensibleness, to a crime that is 
already reprehensible.53 
While the statements asserting racial motivation were particularly 
evocative, Nifong’s assertion of certainty had a more subtle but powerful 
impact. During his testimony before the Disciplinary Hearing Commission, 
Brad Bannon, an attorney who represented Dave Evans and who discovered 
the exculpatory DNA in the background data supplied by the prosecutor, 
stated that numerous lawyers told him that surely Nifong would not have 
made statements with such certainty if he did not have substantial 
evidence.54 Bannon said that when he heard those accusations, his first 
 
Angle, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. 
State Bar July 31, 2007) (on file with author). 
50. Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, para. 151, at 13; Nifong Bar 
Stipulation, supra note 35, para. 70; Bernstein & Drape, supra note 46. 
51. Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, para. 175, at 15; Nifong Bar 
Stipulation, supra note 35, para. 78; Benjamin Niolet, DA’s Conduct Draws Retort, News & 
Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 13, 2006, at 1A. The statement appears to have been made at 
a campaign forum sponsored by the Durham/Orange Women Attorneys and the Young 
Lawyers Division of the Durham County Bar Association. The same article stated that, “[i]n 
the early days of the investigation, Nifong said he was confident that DNA tests of the 
players would point to the guilty party. When tests showed no DNA matches, Nifong 
revealed that weeks after the attack, the woman identified one of her attackers.” Id. 
52. Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, para. 154, at 14; Nifong Bar 
Stipulation, supra note 35, para. 71; NBC TV17 News (NBC television broadcast Mar. 28, 
2006). 
53. Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, paras. 142, 145, at 13; Nifong Bar 
Stipulation, supra note 35, paras. 66, 67; Exhibit 101, supra note 49. 
54. Videotape: Testimony of Attorney Bradley Bannon (June 13, 2007), at BB1 6:15– 
6:50 (on file with author). 
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reaction was that they were outrageous, but his second reaction was, 
“‘Wow, there must have been a rape that happened at that house that 
night.’”55 
In his explanation of Nifong’s disbarment, Disciplinary Hearing 
Commission chair Williamson observed, 
[D]ue to the initial strong statements, unequivocal statements, made by 
Mr. Nifong there was a deception perpetrated upon the public, and many 
people were made to look foolish, because they simply accepted that if 
this prosecutor said it was true, it must be true. We all think back to those 
early days in the Spring of last year, and you think of how public opinion 
was so overwhelmingly against these defendants.56 
 
2. The Community Environment and Apparent Corroboration 
The fact that District Attorney Nifong himself made the statements and 
that they were strongly positive assertions of guilt had a profound impact. 
These statements had even more power initially because in some quarters of 
the community they landed on receptive ears, and they seemed in the early 
days after the media barrage to receive some indirect corroboration. 
Nothing like an alleged gang rape involving Duke students or athletes 
had occurred before, but other stories of boorish Duke student behavior had 
been in the local press, generally involving alcohol and rowdy parties.57 
Indeed, because of past complaints by community members in the area of 
 
 
55. Anne Blythe et al., Panel Presses DNA Expert, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), 
June 14, 2007, at 1A. 
56. Williamson Statement, supra note 1, at 23–24. I found Bannon’s second reaction 
particularly apt because as both a member of the community and a former public defender, it 
was my personal reaction. I had worked briefly with Nifong when I placed students with the 
district attorney’s office in Durham, and I had found him to be straightforward and 
competent. When he made the early definitive statements that three players had raped an 
exotic dancer at the party, I assumed he must have additional information beyond what was 
in the public domain. I continued to listen for that solid information of guilt, and at some 
point, I concluded that it must simply not exist. My arrival at that conclusion—that the 
charges might well be questionable and then that they were likely baseless—took some time. 
It is a path that many traveled, I believe, moving at varying speeds. Most of us, however, 
started with the point of implicit acceptance of the validity of the accusation based on 
Nifong’s unequivocal and repeated assertions, in part because he was the Durham district 
attorney. 
Statements by a prosecutor may be particularly powerful in the local community since 
even in the case of “national” stories the focus of the local media may be different and more 
carefully tailored to intensely felt concerns. See United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 
1467, 1471–72 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (describing expert testimony on differences in local media 
coverage in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing case and its impact on jurors in 
Oklahoma, which supported change of venue, despite the existence of broad national 
coverage of the case that affected every jurisdiction). 
57. See, e.g., Margie Fishman & Janell Ross, Duke Revelers Untamed, News & 
Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 30, 2005, at 1A (describing noisy parties and rude behavior, 
and conflict with neighbors over student behavior in neighborhoods near campus, and 
quoting one neighbor as saying, “They’re Duke Students. They think they’re above the 
law.”). 
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town where the alleged assault occurred, Duke University had recently 
purchased fifteen houses, including the one where the lacrosse party 
occurred,58 but had not yet secured new occupants. 
After the rape charge became public, one article in a local newspaper 
quoted Bettie Crigler, who lives behind and to the side of the 610 Buchanan 
Street house, as saying, “‘I’m sort of assuming it happened . . . because 
they’ve been such arrogant kids . . . . If you ask them to be quiet, they  
shout unpleasant things at you, and I’m white.’”59 
The case on its face involved issues of sexual violence and race. The 
alleged crime was a gang rape. The victim was a black single mother who 
attended North Carolina Central University, and the alleged perpetrators 
were white. The news accounts quickly included racial epithets as an 
explicit part of the event. According to Jason Bissey, a neighbor, one guy 
yelled, “Thank your grandpa for my nice cotton shirt.”60 On March 31, the 
local newspapers reported that a woman called police at 12:53 a.m. on 
March 14, 2006, and reported that a white man at 610 North Buchanan 
Boulevard, the address of the party, yelled a racial slur at her and a black 
friend as they passed the house.61 
On April 6, 2006, news articles noted a vile e-mail sent by one member 
of the team shortly after the alleged event that described killing and 
skinning strippers and his sexual self-gratification.62 It appeared to 
 
 
58. Andrew Davis & Galen Vaisman, Rowdy Behavior Typical of LAX Players, 
Chronicle (Duke Univ.), Apr. 17, 2006, at 1. 
59. Paul Bonner, Town-Gown Tensions Roil Trinity Park: Latent Grievances 
Resurrected as Gang-Rape Allegations Linger, Herald-Sun (Durham, N.C.), Apr. 1, 2006, 
http://www.herald-sun.com/durham/4-719619.html. In her statement, Bettie Crigler 
explicitly added that she was not saying the charges were true: “But I don’t know that. How 
can you know until the DNA has been assessed?” Id. The article notes that the latter remark 
was a reference to the victim’s statements to police that the attackers used racial slurs. Id. 
60. Samiha Khanna & Anne Blythe, Dancer Gives Details of Ordeal, News & Observer 
(Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 25, 2006, at 1A; Samiha Khanna, In Lacrosse Case, Any Charges 10 
Days Away, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 1, 2006, at 1A. 
61. Samiha Khanna, Police Arrived at a Quiet House, News & Observer (Raleigh, 
N.C.), Mar. 31, 2006, at 1A. It was later determined that the other dancer, Kim Pittman, 
made the call. See Handwritten Statement by Kim M. Pittman at 5, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, 
No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) (on file 
with author) (describing the players yelling more explicit racial slurs at the dancers and 
Pittman’s call to the police as she drove away from the house where the party occurred); Sgt. 
Gottlieb’s Supplemental Report, supra note 35, at 8 (stating in the note for March 31, 2006, 
that Pittman confirmed that she made the call). 
62. Leaving out its most sickening content, the e-mail stated, “[T]omorrow night, after 
tonights show, ive decided to have some strippers over . . . . However there will be no 
nudity. i plan on killing the bitches as soon as the walk in and proceding to cut their skin 
off.” Benjamin Niolet et al., Message Spoke of ‘Killing,’ News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), 
Apr. 6, 2006, at 1A; see also Rocky Rosen & John Stevenson, E-Mail Rocks Duke Campus; 
Coach, Player, Season Gone, Herald-Sun (Durham, N.C.), Apr. 6, 2006, at A1 (referring 
indirectly to the sexual element of the e-mail). Durham attorney Robert Ekstrand, who 
represented a number of players, described the e-mail’s language as “vile” but argued that it 
was consistent with innocence. Duff Wilson & Viv Bernstein, Duke Cancels Season and 
Begins Inquiries, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 2006, at D1. 
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corroborate the worst images of the team and, indirectly, the accusations 
themselves. 
On April 9, 2006, The Raleigh News & Observer reported that since 
1999, forty-one of the Duke lacrosse players—about thirty-one percent— 
had been charged with a variety of rowdy and drunken acts and that sixteen 
of the players on the current roster had been arrested in the past three 
years.63 On April 17, 2006, the Duke University student newspaper, The 
Chronicle, ran its version of the same article, citing in addition players’ acts 
of arrogance, public urination, kicking out a door, and turning the football 
tailgate from “a small pre-game gathering to a campus-wide drinking 
event.”64 The information that the lacrosse team had accumulated a large 
number of arrests for alcohol-related misbehavior was characterized by 
some as a stereotype of out-of-control jocks with a sense of entitlement.65 
3. Nifong’s Motivation: Taking Advantage of a Racially Charged Rape 
Allegation in the Midst of an Uphill Political Campaign? 
I suspect that at the very beginning, Nifong believed that a rape had taken 
place; no one disputed his statement that Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner 
(SANE) Tara Levicy, Investigator Benjamin Himan, and Sergeant Mark 
Gottlieb found the accuser credible.66 Announcing that belief immediately 
to the press was another matter. However, doing so had potentially  
powerful political benefits. Like in a B-grade movie, Nifong’s motivation 
appears to have been built, at least in part, upon a crass political calculation 
that led him to pursue charges without being constrained by the real 
possibility of innocence. The sequence of facts certainly supports that 
conclusion on the basis of circumstantial evidence, and hearing panel chair 
 
 
Almost three months later, news articles announced that the player who the university had 
suspended for sending the e-mail had been reinstated. The reinstatement letter explained that 
Duke administrators concluded the e-mail was a takeoff of a novel, American Psycho, and 
was in poor taste but was an attempt at humor. Anne Blythe, Player Who Sent Message Is 
Reinstated at Duke, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), June 30, 2006, at 1B. 
63. Jim Nesbitt, Benjamin Niolet & Lorenzo Perez, Team Has Swaggered for Years, 
News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 9, 2006, at 1A. 
64. Davis & Vaisman, supra note 58, at 1. 
65. A late March article that talked of a group of twenty lacrosse players downing shots 
of alcohol, chanting “Duke Lacrosse!,” and talking about how the alleged rape “‘is ruining 
our season’” appeared to demonstrate that the team members “just didn’t get it.” John 
Stevenson, Paul Bonner & Rachel Bernstein, Team’s DNA Results May Be Ready in a Week; 
District Attorney Will Handle Gang-Rape Case, Herald Sun (Durham, N.C.), Mar. 28, 2006, 
at A1. 
66. Nifong acknowledged that the initial officer to have contact with Mangum, Sergeant 
John C. Shelton, questioned her credibility and the validity of the charges. Nifong gave 
greater weight to the opinions of three others who had early contact with Mangum. See 
Nifong Transcript, supra note 45, at 53 (describing Investigator Benjamin Himan, Sergeant 
Mark Gottlieb, and SANE nurse Tara Levicy as finding the victim believable); id. at 170–71 
(noting that only Sergeant Shelton doubted the victim); id. at 304 (answering that he 
personally believed a rape took place based on the views of Himan, Gottlieb, and, through 
them, Levicy). 
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Williamson concluded as much: “[A]t that time he was facing a primary, 
and, yes, he was politically naive. But we can draw no other conclusion but 
that those initial statements that he made were to further his political 
ambition.”67 
District attorneys in North Carolina, as in many states, are elected. 
Nifong had been appointed in April 2005 to the remainder of the unexpired 
term of elected District Attorney Jim Hardin when Hardin was appointed to 
be a superior court judge.68 At the time he became involved in the 
prosecution and made the statements that the bar alleged violated ethical 
rules, Nifong was embroiled in a tough primary campaign against a former 
assistant district attorney from the same office, Freda Black.69 He  had 
asked for Black’s resignation when he had assumed the position of district 
attorney.70 The accepted reality during the bar hearing was that Nifong 
understood that if Black were elected, he would no longer have a job. 
We do not have direct knowledge of how Nifong thought the campaign 
was going when he started the media barrage. Accepted wisdom is that, 
before the lacrosse case, Freda Black was the candidate with the greatest 
name recognition, having fairly recently helped successfully prosecute 
another high profile case.71 A poll produced for the Freda Black campaign 
that coincidentally was taken on March 27, 2006, the day Nifong’s public 
statements began, supports that conventional wisdom. It showed her with a 
substantial lead, giving her 37%, 20% for Nifong, with Keith Bishop a 
distant third at 3%.72 
Nifong’s campaign manager for the primary, Jackie Brown, described 
Nifong’s discussions with her in January 2006 when she was deciding 
whether to handle the campaign. He indicated an interest in holding the 
district attorney job for one term, for economic reasons. By serving as 
district attorney for five years, which election would guarantee, he would 
qualify for an additional $15,000 per year in retirement benefits, which 
would add considerably to the regular state retirement plan for which he 
would otherwise qualify.73 
In late March, Nifong called Brown, who was out of town, to tell her he 
was going to be on the news regarding the Duke lacrosse case. She 
counseled caution until they determined how it would affect the campaign. 
Nifong appeared on several news shows that day. When Brown returned to 
 
67. Williamson Statement, supra note 1, at 17. 
68. Benjamin Niolet & Michael Biesecker, No Concession Yet in DA Race, News & 
Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), May 4, 2006, at 1A. 
69. Neff, supra note 34. 
70. Niolet & Biesecker, supra note 68. 
71. Michael Biesecker, Nifong’s Opponent Takes a Swing, News & Observer (Raleigh, 
N.C.), Apr. 19, 2006, at 14A. The case involved the prosecution and conviction of Michael 
Peterson for the murder of his wife. Id. 
72. See Dixon Black Voter Survey at 1, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 
(Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) (on file with author); 
Nifong Transcript, supra note 45, at 219–22. 
73. Neff, supra note 34. 
 1356 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
 
Durham, she found satellite trucks in the courthouse parking lot. When she 
was able to reach Nifong, she said, “You don’t have any idea what the 
impact is going to be on your campaign.” Nifong responded, “I’m getting a 
million dollars of free advertisements.”74 
Hearing panel chair Williamson suggested that having begun the 
publicity barrage, Nifong came to believe what he hoped the facts actually 
were.75 Whether or not that conclusion is true, once he started the process  
of publicity, Nifong was wedded to those facts unless he was willing to 
incur significant political damage. 
Both of his opponents, Freda Black, who is white, and Keith Bishop, who 
is African-American, criticized him for his highly public handling of the 
case. Black called it “‘unethical and improper.’”76 Bishop, who initially 
criticized Nifong’s high visibility during the case,77 complimented him for 
making good on his public promise to make arrests when indictments were 
returned against Seligmann and Finnerty.78 However, Bishop later resumed 
his criticism of the publicity: “‘He [Nifong] should not have jumped the  
gun and put the issue in the public as he did.’”79 
Nifong won the primary, which was held on May 2, 2006. He finished 
with 45.2% of the vote, compared to 41.5% for Freda Black, and 13.3% for 
Keith Bishop.80 The results showed that Nifong won his narrow victory— 
883 votes81—on the basis of strong support from the black community, 
where he commanded a plurality. Among African-American voters, Nifong 
received 44%, compared to 25.2% for Freda Black and 30.8% for Keith 
Bishop. Of other voters, Freda Black received the majority and held a small 
lead over Nifong. The breakdown of non–African-American voters was 
46.2% for Nifong, 50.6% for Freda Black, and 3.2% for Keith Bishop.82 
If Nifong’s strategy was to gain an advantage in the black community 
with his statements and with the indictment, the strategy appears to have 
 
74. Id. 
75. Williamson Statement, supra note 1, at 17–18 (“And having once [made the initial 
statements to the press], and having seen the facts as he hoped they would be, in his mind the 
facts remained that way in the face of developing evidence that that was not in fact the 
case.”). 
76. News: DA Changed Bond Status for Second Dancer, News & Observer (Raleigh, 
N.C.), Apr. 22, 2006, at 16A; see also Biesecker, supra note 71 (noting Freda Black’s 
criticism of Nifong’s divisiveness and the publicity). 
77. Niolet, supra note 51 (describing criticism by both Freda Black and Keith Bishop 
during the candidates’ forum). 
78. Michael Biesecker, Nifong’s Opponent Takes a Swing, News & Observer (Raleigh, 
N.C.), Apr. 19, 2006, at 14A. 
79. News: DA Changed Bond Status for Second Dancer, supra note 76. 
80. Michael Biesecker, Study Says Black Vote Aided Nifong, News & Observer (Raleigh, 
N.C.), May 6, 2006, at 1B. 
81. Michael Biesecker, Black Yields in DA Contest, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), 
May 7, 2006, at 3B. The 883 votes was more than three times the amount required by state 
law to avoid a recount. Id. 
82. Biesecker, supra note 80 (detailing statistical analysis conducted by Vanderbilt 
University political science professor Christian Grose based on all voting results from all 
Durham precincts and federal demographic data). 
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worked. He received strong support within the black community despite  
the Durham Committee on the Affairs of Black People endorsing Keith 
Bishop, an endorsement that typically has substantial impact.83 
Many attributed this result to his actions in the Duke lacrosse case: 
“The Duke lacrosse case was the overwhelming issue,” said Philip 
Cousin, a longtime Durham Committee member who is also a Durham 
County commissioner and the minister at St. Joseph’s AME Church. “I 
think a lot of people thought there wouldn’t be any arrests. When Nifong 
came through with the indictments, that indicated to the black community 
he would be fair.”84 
Normally, winning the Democratic primary in Durham is the equivalent 
of winning the general election. In this election, this presumption should 
have been prohibitively strong because Nifong had no Republican 
challenger.85 If political motivations had driven his actions, and if Nifong 
ever thought of backing away from his comments and commitment to 
prosecute the case after his victory in the primary, he had only a brief 
window of opportunity. By mid-June, two opponents had started petition 
campaigns to be placed on the November ballot.86 One of those, Durham 
County Commissioner Lewis Cheek, a Democrat, succeeded. He ultimately 
decided he would not serve, but his name remained on the ballot, and in 
announcing that he would ask the governor to appoint someone else if he 
were elected, Cheek served as something of a surrogate opponent along 
with others who organized write-in campaigns.87 
Despite having no formal active opponent, Nifong continued the 
campaign with a somewhat spirited tone.88 Nifong won the general election 
by 10%, although he garnered less than half the votes cast. He received  
49% of the vote, compared to 39% for Cheek, and 12% for various write-in 
candidates.89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Michel Biesecker & Stanley B. Chambers, Jr., DA Campaign May Be Reality, News 
& Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), June 30, 2006, at 1B. 
86. Anne Blythe & Benjamin Niolet, DA Petition Drives Crawl in Durham Challenge, 
News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), June 21, 2006, at 1A. 
87. Benjamin Niolet, Cheek Passes On Run for DA, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), 
July 28, 2006, at 1B. 
88. Benjamin Niolet, Voting Takes a Spirited Tone, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), 
Nov. 5, 2006, at 1B. 
89. Benjamin Niolet et al., Nifong Fends Off Two Challengers, News & Observer 
(Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 8, 2006, at 1A. 
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B. Ethics Violation Based on the Failure to Disclose Exculpatory DNA 
Evidence and Required Discovery and Misrepresentations 
Made Regarding Those Failures90 
On January 24, 2007, the North Carolina State Bar amended its  
complaint to add the following charges: Nifong failed to disclose  
potentially exculpatory information regarding male DNA on items in the 
accuser’s rape examination kit; he did not comply with discovery and 
disclosure requirements; and he made false statements to opposing counsel, 
the court, and the bar regarding the DNA.91 As damaging as the pretrial 
publicity charges were, these were far more serious charges, particularly the 
intentional deception of the trial court. 
The charges arose from DNA evidence secured from the forty-six 
Caucasian members of the team on March 23, 2006, pursuant to what in 
North Carolina is called a Nontestimonial Identification Order.92 Both 
photographs and material for DNA testing were obtained on that date. The 
DNA from the players was sent to the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) 
lab for comparison with evidence from the victim’s rape kit, which was 
collected during the examination on the morning of March 14, 2006; 
additionally, items obtained during execution of a search warrant for the 
610 North Buchanan residence on March 16, 2006, were also sent to the 
lab. Among the items seized during the search were two false fingernails, 
including one which was found in the trash can of the bathroom where the 
rape allegedly occurred.93 By March 28, 2006, the lab had determined that  
it could not find any semen, blood, or saliva on the rape kit items.94 On 
March 30, 2006, Nifong was informed of that important result in a 
telephone call,95 and he was told that those items from Mangum would not 
be subject to DNA testing, but that other evidence recovered in the search 
of the residence would be.96 
 
 
90. For a somewhat more complete treatment of the basis for the charges relating to 
Nifong’s failure to disclose potentially exculpatory DNA evidence, see Mosteller, supra note 
7, pt. III. 
91. Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, paras. 182–291, at 16–32. The 
Disciplinary Hearing Commission found that Nifong committed numerous violations related 
to the exculpatory material, but in particular the panel found that he made numerous false 
and deceptive statements denying the existence of exculpatory material or covering up his 
failure to provide the evidence. See supra note 9. 
92. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-271–15A-282 (2005); see Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, 
supra note 10, para. 188, at 16. 
93. See Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, para. 186, at 16. 
94. Id. para. 192, at 17. 
95. Amended Nifong Bar Order, supra note 8, para. 36, at 6 (finding that the State 
Bureau of Investigation (SBI) notified Nifong that it was unable to find semen, blood, or 
saliva on any items from the rape kit). 
96. See Testimony of Jennifer Leyn at 9–12, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 
(Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) [hereinafter Leyn 
Testimony] (on file with author) (describing March 30, 2006, telephone conversation with 
Nifong in which he was told that no item from the rape kit would be submitted for DNA 
testing but that cuttings from a bath towel, several swabs from the bathroom floor, and 
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In order to get more sophisticated testing on the rape kit items and to 
separate a mixture of DNA noted by the SBI lab, Nifong had the evidence 
items sent to DNA Security, Inc., (DSI) in Burlington, North Carolina 
shortly after April 5, 2006.97 On April 10, April 21, and May 12, 2006, 
Nifong, along with Durham Police Investigator Himan and Sergeant 
Gottlieb, traveled to Burlington, North Carolina, and met with Dr. Brian 
Meehan, president and director of DSI. 
Before April 10, DSI had determined that DNA from up to four different 
males had been found on items from the rape kit and that all the Duke 
lacrosse samples had been excluded as possible sources of that foreign male 
DNA.98 By April 20, 2006, further testing revealed DNA characteristics 
from additional males on another item of the rape kit and that the Duke 
players had all been excluded as possible sources of that DNA.99 The 
foreign male DNA information was potentially exculpatory, a fact that 
Nifong did not deny at the disciplinary hearing,100 and Meehan informed 
Nifong of those results when they met.101 For example, the evidence 
suggested multiple recent sexual contacts, which could explain the swelling 
found during Mangum’s medical examination. 
During one of these meetings, Nifong and Meehan agreed that only the 
results of DNA matches between the evidence items and reference 
specimens would be reported. The report prepared and presented to Nifong 
at the May 12, 2006, meeting thus included only information regarding 
three individuals. Two were matches between DNA found on two 
fingernails and the reference samples from Dave Evans, a Duke lacrosse 
player who was subsequently indicted, and another unindicted player who 
 
 
 
 
fingernails would be); Phone Logs of Conference Call on March 30, 2006, between SBI 
Technicians and Nifong, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing 
Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007); Deposition of Michael B. Nifong at 188–91, 
N.C. State Bar v. Michel B. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the 
N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) [hereinafter Nifong Deposition] (on file with author). 
97. An order allowing the transfer to DNA Security, Inc., (DSI) was secured on April 5, 
2006. Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, para. 196, at 17. 
98. Id. paras. 200–02, at 18. 
99. Id. paras. 208–09, at 18–19. 
100. See Nifong Transcript, supra note 45, at 284, 289. In his initial response to the bar, 
Nifong characterized the foreign male DNA as “non-inculpatory” rather than “specifically 
exculpatory.” Amended Nifong Bar Order, supra note 8, para. 107, at 18; Letter from 
Michael B. Nifong to Katherine E. Jean (Dec. 28, 2006) at 3, 7, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, 
No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) (on file 
with author). Nifong used some of the same qualifying language regarding the exculpatory 
nature of the DNA evidence in his testimony and only grudgingly accepted that it was 
potentially exculpatory in character, but recognized his responsibility to disclose the 
evidence under the discovery statute. He contended that at the time he heard of the evidence 
from Dr. Brian Meehan, he did appreciate that it had significance as exculpatory evidence. 
See Nifong Transcript, supra note 45, at 285–93. 
101. Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, paras. 203, 211, at 18–19. 
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was never charged.102 The third involved “a sperm fraction from  the 
vaginal swab that was consistent with the DNA profile of the alleged 
victim’s boyfriend.”103  The report, which was presented to the attorneys  
for the indicted players, did not state that DNA from other males who were 
not Duke lacrosse players was found. Its only reference to these results was 
the apparently misleading statement that “[i]ndividual DNA profiles for 
non-probative evidence specimens and suspect reference specimens are 
being retained at DSI pending notification of the client.”104 
Nifong had an ethical duty under Rule 3.8(d) to provide the exculpatory 
information in a timely fashion, and although the Rule does not elaborate on 
this duty, it nonetheless lacks any suggestion that prolonged unjustified 
delay is authorized. The constitutional duty should produce prompt 
disclosure, but is only violated if the information is not provided in time for 
effective use at trial.105 Nifong had no substantive reason for delay, and 
 
 
102. The second false fingernail was found in another room in the house, and the accuser 
had not in any way identified this player as being involved. Charges were not pursued 
against that other player. 
103. Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, paras. 217–18, at 20. 
104. DNA Security, Inc. Report, DSI # 20629, at 5, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 
DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) (on file with 
author). 
105. When Brady material must be disclosed is a function of the doctrine’s materiality 
requirement. The materiality requirement looks not to disclosure but to the retrospective 
impact on the outcome at a past trial, which is particularly unfortunate when Brady is 
considered as a discovery tool. See, e.g., John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy 
Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 Emory L.J. 437, 443 (2001) (describing the 
general conclusion of scholars regarding the unfortunate aspects of Brady’s retrospective 
“bad timing” on the doctrine as an effective disclosure device before trial). It also means  
that the disciplinary rule is more demanding in terms of timing, which for Brady is violated 
only if the information is provided too late for effective trial use. See, e.g., Stanley Z. Fisher, 
The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Seek Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons from 
England, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1379, 1421 n.221 (2000) (describing “in sufficient time to 
allow the defendant to use the evidence effectively” as the timing requirement of Brady); 
Robert G. Morvillo et al., Motion Denied: Systematic Impediments to White Collar Criminal 
Defendants’ Trial Preparation, 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 157, 169 (2005) (same). 
Nifong disagreed with the testimony of Assistant District Attorney Marsha Goodenow 
that he had an obligation to turn over exculpatory information immediately. See Nifong 
Transcript, supra note 45, at 255 (recounting discussion between cross-examiner recounting 
Goodenow’s testimony and Nifong, who disagreed that there was an obligation of immediate 
disclosure); see also Anne Blythe, Joseph Neff & Benjamin Niolet, Charlotte Prosecutor: 
Nifong Did It All Wrong, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), June 15, 2007, at 1A. 
Immediate disclosure may be the proper practice, but the interpretation of the timing 
requirement of the disciplinary rule would be a substantial issue under different facts in the 
absence of more concrete direction than the word “timely” in the rule. 
Certainly the general ethical rule can be broader than the constitutional requirement, but 
that rule appears to have grown from the constitutional doctrine, and North Carolina’s 
provision “make timely disclosure” is taken directly from the ABA’s Model Rule. See Model 
Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(d) (2006). If a definite meaning is to be given to that 
apparently indefinite term, a statement to that effect by the rule-drafting authority is 
warranted rather than the interpretation of an individual panel. See D.C. Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct R. 3.8(e) (2000) (using the language “[i]ntentionally fail to disclose to the defense, 
upon request and at a time when use by the defense is reasonably feasible”). 
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thus in not providing the defense with notice of the potentially exculpatory 
evidence in a reasonable period of time, he had clearly failed to fulfill that 
ethical duty. 
Under earlier discovery law, disclosure of such a failure and ensuing 
professional discipline would have been largely left to chance. However, 
because of the breadth of information that the prosecution is obligated to 
disclose under North Carolina’s relatively new open-file discovery law106 
and the high quality of defense counsel opposing Nifong, the disclosure 
process moved relentlessly forward. Disclosure requirements prompted 
additional specific discovery requests, which were incorporated into a court 
order and made even more specific through a series of in-court exchanges 
regarding discovery received and further discovery sought. In the end, 
Nifong produced the underlying DNA data, albeit without a report 
explaining its significance, which opened the road to the players’ 
exoneration and his disbarment. 
Two days after being indicted, on April 19, 2006, Reade Seligmann’s 
counsel filed a discovery motion requesting all DNA analysis and any 
exculpatory information.107 On May 17, 2006, Collin Finnerty’s counsel 
prepared a discovery motion requesting that any expert witness “‘prepare, 
and furnish to the defendant, a report of the results of any (not only the ones 
about which the expert expects to testify) examinations or tests conducted 
by the expert.’”108 On May 18, 2006, with regard to discovery, Nifong 
stated in a written pleading that “‘[t]he State is not aware of any additional 
material or information which may be exculpatory in nature with respect to 
the Defendant.’”109 And orally at the hearing conducted that day, when 
asked by the court about whether he had provided all the discovery 
materials to the defendants, Nifong responded, “‘I’ve turned over 
everything I have.’”110 
 
 
 
In general, the constitutional rule is both broader and narrower than the ethical rule. It is 
broader in not requiring materiality. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436–37 (1995) 
(noting that the obligations under rules of professional conduct and the ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice are broader than the due process doctrine); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary 
Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 693, 
714 (1987). The disciplinary rule is narrower in that it requires a knowing violation by the 
prosecutor, whereas the constitutional rule is violated by failing to disclose information held 
by other investigative agents even though entirely unknown to the prosecutor. Id. at 714. 
106. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903 (2004). The discovery law was enacted in the wake of  
the acquittal on retrial of Allen Gell, who had been sentenced to death at his initial trial but 
whose conviction had been reversed based on a violation of Brady. Joseph Neff, ‘Open File’ 
Law Gives Defense a Tool to Force Out Evidence, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 
12, 2007, at 18A (describing receipt of a handwritten letter from Alan Gell to The News & 
Observer in which Gell stated, “‘I feel like each [Duke lacrosse] player needs to send me a 
thank-you card for making the discovery law!!’”). 
107. Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, para. 207, at 18. 
108. Id. para. 224, at 21. 
109.  Id. para. 230, at 21. 
110. Id. paras. 234–35, at 22. 
 1362 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
 
On June 19, 2006, defense counsel, based in part on the discovery 
provided to that point, asked in writing for further information on what had 
transpired in Nifong’s meeting with Meehan.111 At the next court hearing  
on June 22, 2006, in response to counsel’s request and the trial court’s 
inquiry, Nifong represented that nothing beyond the information in the 
report was discussed with Meehan.112 The discovery order entered at that 
hearing required Nifong, inter alia, to provide “‘results of tests and 
examinations, or any other matter or evidence obtained during the 
investigation of the offenses alleged to have been committed by the 
defendant.’”113 
On August 31, 2006, counsel for the three defendants jointly filed a 
discovery motion. The discovery received to that point prompted more 
specific follow-up requests for disclosure. The motion asked, inter alia, for 
the complete file and all underlying data regarding DSI’s work and the 
substance of any discoverable comments made by Meehan during his 
meetings with Nifong on April 10, April 21, and May 12, 2006.114 At the 
hearing on that motion on September 22, 2006, counsel for one of the 
defendants specifically requested the results of any tests finding any 
additional DNA on the alleged victim even if it did not match any of the 
defendants or other individuals for whom DNA specimens had been 
provided to the expert.115 At that hearing, Nifong represented that the DSI 
report encompassed all tests performed and everything discussed at the 
meetings with Meehan. Nifong had an exchange with the trial judge: “‘So 
you represent there are no other statements from Dr. Meehan?’ Mr. Nifong: 
‘No other statements. No other statements made to me.’”116 
At the next court hearing on October 27, 2006, Nifong provided 1844 
pages of underlying data and materials related to DSI’s tests and 
examinations, but, critically, he did not add any explanatory material or 
otherwise point out the exculpatory results that the underlying data showed, 
if examined carefully and understood.117 Some of the most impressive 
testimony at the disciplinary hearing came from attorney Brad Bannon, one 
of the lawyers representing Dave Evans, as he described his discovery 
within the obscure data. He recounted spending between sixty and one 
hundred hours learning about the specialized tests used by DSI and slogging 
through the material. When he began his work, he was not focused on 
finding male DNA that did not belong to one of the defendants since he did 
 
 
111.  Id. para. 238, at 22. 
112. Id. paras. 239–41, at 22. 
113.  Id. para. 243, at 23. 
114.  Id. para. 244, at 23. 
115.  Id. para. 246, at 23. 
116. Transcript of September 22, 2006, Hearing at 27–28, State v. Finnerty, Nos. 06 CRS 
4331-33, 06 CRS 4334-36, 06 CRS 5581-83 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 2006) [hereinafter 
Transcript of September 22, 2006, Hearing] (on file with author); Amended Nifong Bar 
Complaint, supra note 10, paras. 247–48, at 23. 
117. Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, paras. 254–55, at 24. 
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not know that such evidence existed. Rather, he was examining the 
documents to understand the process that allowed the separation of male 
from female DNA on the false fingernail found in the bathroom trash can, 
which produced male DNA consistent with his client’s DNA and the 
significance of that incomplete match. He testified that he found the 
exculpatory information by accident.118 
On December 13, 2006, the defendants filed a motion to compel 
additional discovery related to the exculpatory DNA results, with Bannon’s 
understanding of the exculpatory results carefully detailed in the motion.119 
At the hearing on that motion, Nifong made statements to the effect that this 
was the first time he had heard of this information, which appeared to be an 
assertion that he was previously unaware of the potentially exculpatory 
results or of their exclusion from the report.120 
Nifong called Meehan to the stand and without asking any questions on 
direct, tendered him to the defense for cross-examination. At the end of the 
examination, first by Bannon and then by Jim Cooney, lead counsel for 
Seligmann, Meehan stated that he had been instructed by Nifong to omit 
those exculpatory results from the report.121 
The complaint and the bar’s findings set out five legal bases for Nifong’s 
duty to disclose the DNA test results: (1) the requirements of the 
Nontestimonial Identification Statute, which requires the disclosure of all 
 
 
 
 
118. Videotape: Testimony of attorney Bradley Bannon (June 14, 2007), at BB3 0:00– 
6:00 (on file with author). 
119. Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, paras. 260–62, at 25. 
120. Amended Nifong Bar Order, supra note 8, para. 96, at 17 (concluding that Nifong 
represented one or the other of these points by his comments and that they were intentional 
misrepresentations); Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, para. 264, at 25. 
Nifong stated, “‘The first that I heard of this particular situation was when I was served with 
these reports—this motion on Wednesday of this week.” Transcript of December 15, 2006, 
Hearing at 14, State v. Finnerty, Nos. 06 CRS 4331-33, 06 CRS 4334-36, 06 CRS 5581-83 
(N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Transcript of December 15, 2006, Hearing] (on 
file with author). 
121. In his testimony at the December 15, 2006, hearing, Meehan stated that the failure to 
report was the result of an intentional decision by Meehan and Nifong not to report. See 
Transcript of December 15, 2006, Hearing, supra note 120, at 85 (“Q. . . . And that was an 
intentional limitation arrived at between you and representatives of the State of North 
Carolina not to report on the results of all examinations and tests that you did in this case? 
A. Yes.”); see also Joseph Neff et al, Lab Chief: Nifong Said Don’t Report All DNA Data, 
News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 16, 2006, at 1A. Meehan softened that statement 
somewhat in his testimony before the Disciplinary Hearing Commission through widely 
varying testimony, which included contradictory versions. See Transcript of Testimony of 
Dr. Brian Meehan at 178, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing 
Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) (on file with author) (“I tried to make that  
clear in my testimony on December 15th, and it wasn’t heard . . . . Mr. Nifong never, never 
specifically requested that I include specific information or exclude specific information on 
this report, which was a [sic] interim report.”). The panel did not find that he requested 
Meehan to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party under Rule 
3.4(f), likely because of that change in testimony. Williamson Statement, supra note 1, at 10. 
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results;122 (2) the relatively new North Carolina open-file discovery law that 
requires memoranda to be prepared of witness interviews and the 
preparation and disclosure of expert witness reports;123 (3) the June 22, 
2006, discovery order; (4) the requirement under the U.S. Constitution to 
disclose exculpatory evidence; and (5) Ethical Rule 3.8(d), which requires 
immediate disclosure of evidence potentially favorable to the defendant.124 
The bar also charged Nifong with making intentionally false statements of 
material fact to the court and to the bar and alleged that his conduct 
involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. The Disciplinary 
Hearing Commission panel found that Nifong committed most of the 
violations charged, finding violations of eight disciplinary rules.125 
As to withholding the exculpatory DNA results, one of Nifong’s 
arguments was that this could not have been purposeful since he turned  
over the underlying data, which contained that material. Although one 
cannot know why he did what he did, a couple of points provide an 
interesting basis for speculation. He did not turn over the massive amount 
of material, 1844 pages, to the defense until October 27, 2006, only ten 
days before election day. That timing meant that any discovery of the 
significance of the data and disclosure thereof would likely occur after 
election day. Moreover, as disciplinary hearing panel chair Williamson 
suggested in his questioning during closing argument, there was no 
certainty that the exculpatory result would ever be deciphered from the 
mass of data but for Brad Bannon’s persistent efforts.126 If purposeful, 
which it appears to have been, the decision may have been made with the 
hope that the case would be dismissed before disclosure or discovery 
occurred. I believe it is absolutely clear that no conviction could reasonably 
be expected from the incredibly weak evidence in this case. Thus, there 
would never be any reason for examination of his files on postconviction 
review. Indeed, if the case had made it to the hearing on the motion to 
suppress identification evidence, the reliability of the identification was so 
shaky that it would have been dismissed at that point. 
 
 
 
122. Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, para. 227, at 21 (citing N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 15A-282 (2005)). 
123. Id. (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903(a)(1) (covering oral statements) and N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 15A-903(a)(2) (covering preparation and disclosure of expert reports)). 
124. Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 10, charges (d)(i), at 30–31. 
125. The panel found the DNA-related conduct and statements violated Rules 3.3(a)(1), 
3.4(c), 3.4(d), 3.4(d)(3), 3.6(a), 3.8(d), 3.8(f), 4.1, 8.1(a), and 8.4(c) of the Revised Rules of 
Professional Conduct before and/or after the 2006 amendments. See Amended Nifong Bar 
Order, supra note 8, conclusions of law paras. (a)–(g), at 20–22. As noted earlier, the panel 
found that Nifong made numerous false and deceptive statements to opposing counsel, the 
court, and the bar grievance committee. See supra note 9. Finally, it found that his conduct 
separately, and as a pattern, violated Rule 8.4(d). Amended Nifong Bar Order, supra note 8, 
conclusions of law para. (h), at 22. 
126. Videotape: Interchange between David B. Freedman and F. Lane Williamson (June 
16, 2007), at 12:07–08 p.m. (on file with author). 
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III. THE UNCHARGED ETHICS VIOLATION: THE FAILURE TO DO JUSTICE 
BY NIFONG’S INDICTMENT AND PROSECUTION OF THE INNOCENT 
 
A. The Prosecutor’s Duty to Do or to Seek Justice 
A fundamental ethical duty of a prosecutor is described generally as a 
“duty to seek justice”127 or “to ‘do justice.’”128 What this duty means in the 
myriad situations that arise in criminal cases is not clearly defined, and the 
duty would effectively be unenforceable as a rule of professional 
responsibility. However, as an aspirational statement and a moral guide for 
prosecutors, it is central to our conception of a public prosecutor. 
One of the best-known articulations of this basic duty is found in Berger 
v. United States129: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party 
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, 
but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very  
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt 
shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness 
and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, 
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain  
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it 
is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.130 
Within the Berger quotation and numerous others made over time by courts 
and commentators131 are two themes: (1) a duty not to prosecute or convict 
 
 
 
 
127. Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility EC 7-13 (1980) (“The responsibility of a public 
prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to 
convict.”). 
128. See generally Zacharias, supra note 14, at 46. 
129. 295 U.S. 78 (1935). 
130. Id. at 88. 
131. See generally Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 607, 613–18 (1999) (developing the historical outline of the prosecutor’s 
special duty). Green cites among his sources a series of cases from Michigan. See, e.g., 
People v. Cahoon, 50 N.W. 384, 385 (Mich. 1891) (describing the public prosecutor as 
acting in a “quasi judicial capacity”); Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99, 101–06 (1875) 
(contending that the duty of the public prosecutor is like that of the judge); Wellar v. People, 
30 Mich. 16, 22–23 (1874) (noting the public prosecutor differs from a plaintiff’s attorney in 
having a duty to protect the guilty as well as prosecute the guilty); Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 
405, 415–16 (1872) (including in the public prosecutor’s duty both the obligation not to 
convict the innocent and, regardless of the strength of the prosecutor’s belief in the guilt of 
the defendant, not to use improper means to achieve a conviction); see also George 
Sharswood, An Essay: Professional Ethics 92–94 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 5th ed. 1993) 
(1884) (arguing that while defense attorneys are entitled to defend someone they believe to 
be guilty, prosecutors, who are given broad discretion, should be impartial and should never 
seek to convict any defendant known or believed to be innocent). 
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the innocent,132 and (2) a duty to prosecute fairly those who are charged 
with a crime. 
In turn, the basis for the public prosecutor’s special duty is found in two 
propositions. One is the great power that the prosecutor commands as the 
representative of the sovereign, including the awesome power to bring 
criminal charges.133 The other is that, as the representative of  the  
sovereign, the prosecutor represents various constituencies. Although the 
prosecutor’s greatest practical duty as a litigant is to the accuser, the 
prosecutor’s duty also protects the public’s interest, which includes the 
interest of all those charged with fair treatment, and he or she should 
particularly consider the interest of those who, although innocent, are 
charged. Obviously, the public is not served by prosecuting or convicting 
the innocent.134 
However that duty is defined and whatever its precise origins, all agree 
that the prosecutor has a special duty not to prosecute the innocent.135 
Indeed, Doug Brocker, lead “prosecutor” for the North Carolina State Bar, 
began his closing argument by arguing that, as district attorney, Nifong “is  
a minister of justice and not simply an advocate” whose “most important 
duty and responsibility is to seek justice, not merely to convict” and that 
“this responsibility . . . is the most fundamental to our entire system of 
justice.”136 As is often the case, however, the devil is in the details, and 
 
 
132. Avoiding overly harsh sentences for the guilty is a component of this element of the 
special duty. See Green, supra note 131, at 637. 
133. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 58–59 (giving emphasis to the “power” justification, 
stating “the fear of unfettered prosecutorial power is the impetus for the special ethical 
obligation”); see also Green, supra note 131, at 629–33 (noting that the argument that the 
special duty derives from the great power of the prosecutor is particularly persuasive as to 
the powers to bring criminal charges or use the grand jury that only prosecutors possess, but 
otherwise contesting “power” as the prime justification for the special ethical duty); Peter A. 
Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: 
Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 399, 408 (noting both power and 
constituency justifications). 
134. See Green, supra note 131, at 633–37 (emphasizing the prosecutor’s special role as 
representative of the sovereign, whose interest is in achieving justice); see also Hurd, 25 
Mich. at 415 (making the specific argument that the “prosecuting officer represents the 
public interest, which can never be promoted by the conviction of the innocent”); Zacharias, 
supra note 14, at 57–58 (noting also the influence of the multiple constituencies argument). 
135. See Green, supra note 131, at 634–35. As discussed later, I do not list it as the most 
fundamental duty. I agree that for a prosecutor to prosecute someone that he or she knows is 
innocent is the gravest violation. However, I do not believe the duty to avoid such 
prosecutions is more fundamental than the duty to prosecute those believed to be guilty 
fairly. This is because in most situations, the prosecutor cannot know the truth. Thus, if the 
prosecutor makes a personal judgment on the suspect’s guilt before moving forward with the 
prosecution while conducting a good faith examination of the case, he or she acts only as a 
partial protector of justice. If a prosecutor concludes the defendant is guilty, he or she may 
be wrong. Thus, beyond their corrosive effect upon the justice system and the rule of law, 
using unfair methods to convict someone the prosecutor believes to be guilty may result in a 
miscarriage of justice. 
136. Videotape: Argument of Douglas J. Brocker (June 16, 2007), at 9:11 a.m. (on file 
with author). 
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particularly the details of how that basic ethics precept is embodied in an 
enforceable rule. 
Rule 3.8(a) of the North Carolina Revised Rules of Professional Conduct 
states that “[t]he prosecutor in a criminal case [shall] . . . refrain from 
prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable 
cause.”137 This provision is taken directly from the Model Rules and is 
identical to the rule in forty other states.138 Only a few variations exist 
among the remaining nine states, three that are clarifying,139 and the other 
six still using some variation of the very similar provision contained in the 
earlier Model Code.140 Only a single jurisdiction, the District of Columbia, 
has a significantly different standard.141 
 
 
137. Revised Rules of Prof’l Conduct of the N.C. State Bar R. 3.8(a) (2007). The 
commands of this Rule are clearly “not the same thing as prohibiting a prosecution of 
someone whom the prosecutor believes to be innocent.” Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. 
Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 40 (2005). 
138. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (1983). The identical provisions are 
Ala. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2007); Alaska Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) 
(2007); Ariz. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2003); Ark. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 
3.8(a) (2005); Colo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (1997); Conn. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 
R. 3.8(1) (2007); Del. Lawyers’ Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2005); Fla. Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct R. 4-3.8(a) (1993); Ga. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2001); Idaho Rules 
of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2007); Ind. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2005); Kan.  
Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2007); Ky. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (1997); La. 
Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2007); Md. Lawyers’ Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) 
(2005); Mass. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2007); Mich. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 
3.8(a) (2004); Minn. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2005); Miss. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 
R. 3.8(a) (2007); Mo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4-3.8(a) (2007); Mont. Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2007); Neb. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2007); Nev. Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2006); N.H. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2006); N.J. Code of 
Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2007); N.M. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 16-308(a) (2005); N.D. 
Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (1987); Okla. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (1997);  
Or. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2006); Pa. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2007); 
R.I. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2005); S.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2004); 
S.D. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2001); Tenn. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) 
(2007); Tex. Disciplinary Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.09(a) (2007); Utah Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2006); Vt. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2007); Wash. Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2007); W. Va. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2007); Wyo. 
Rules of Prof’l Conduct for Attorneys at Law R. 3.8(a) (2007). 
139. The rule clarification, in effect in three states, applies to both instituting and 
maintaining charges. See Ohio Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2007) (including the 
language “pursue or prosecute a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by 
probable cause”); Va. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2007) (including the language “not 
file or maintain a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause”); 
Wis. Rules of Prof’l Conduct for Attorneys R. 20:3.8(a) (2007) (“A prosecutor in a criminal 
case or a proceeding that could result in deprivation of liberty shall not prosecute a charge 
that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause.”). 
140. See Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5-110 (2005) (including the language “not 
institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when the [prosecuting attorney] knows or 
should know that the charges are not supported by probable cause”); Haw. Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2007) (including the language “not institute or cause to be instituted 
criminal charges when [the prosecuting attorney] knows or it is obvious that the charges are 
not supported by probable cause”); Ill. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(b) (2007) (including 
the language “not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when [the prosecuting 
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This generally followed standard is very limited indeed. First, it requires 
only that the prosecution be supported by probable cause. Second, it sets a 
very high standard on the mental element, imposing a duty to refrain from 
prosecuting only when the prosecutor “knows” that probable cause is 
lacking. Finally, it imposes no duty of thorough inquiry into the facts and 
no responsibility of independent investigation.142 
Occasionally, standards other than probable cause143 are suggested for  
the requisite support for guilt of the person to be charged and prosecuted. 
Two major alternatives are offered: sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction and the prosecutor’s personal belief in proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.144 
 
 
attorney] knows or reasonably should know that the charges are not supported by probable 
cause”); Iowa Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 32:3.8(a) (2005) (including the language “refrain 
from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows or reasonably should know is not 
supported by probable cause”); Me. Code of Prof’l Responsibility R. 3.7(i)(1) (2007) 
(including the language “not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when the 
lawyer knows, or it is obvious, that the charges are not supported by probable cause”); N.Y. 
Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 7–103 (2007) (including the language “not institute or 
cause to be instituted criminal charges when he or she knows or it is obvious that the charges 
are not supported by probable cause”). These provisions are variants on the ABA’s Model 
Code. See Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility Canon 7-103(A) (1969) (“A public 
prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal 
charges when he knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable 
cause.”). 
141. District of Columbia R. 3.8(b) tracks the basic Model Rule provision with a small 
variation. It states that the prosecutor shall not “[f]ile in court or maintain a charge that the 
prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause.” D.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 
3.8(b) (2007). More significantly, Rule 3.8(c) states that the prosecutor shall not  
“[p]rosecute to trial a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by evidence 
sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of guilt.” Id. R. 3.8(c). 
142. Professor Green has noted in a more limited context the lack of an “obligation on 
prosecutors to ensure the truthfulness of their evidence beyond advocates’ ordinary duty to 
avoid knowingly offering false evidence.” Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Professional 
Independence: Reflections on Garcetti v. Ceballos, Crim. Just., Summer 2007, at 4, 7. 
143. As Professor Uviller stated, “The standard of probable cause does not require 
exacting judgment from the prosecutor, for it does not entail great certainty concerning the 
underlying truth of the matter; ‘probable cause’ may be predicated on hearsay, and, indeed, 
does not even import a substantial likelihood of guilt.” H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous 
Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 
1145, 1156 (1973). 
Professor Fred Zacharias argues that rules, such as the prohibition in Rule 3.8(a) against 
pursuing charges that lack probable cause, involve areas of discretion and likely 
disagreement among reasonable observers. Thus, as to such rules, “so long as  some  
evidence supports a criminal charge, observers typically disagree over the propriety . . . .” 
Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 721, 736 
(2001). 
144. Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 309, 
337 (2001) (describing the source and nature of the prosecutor’s “duty to prejudge truth”); 
Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1573, 1588–89 
(describing the limited scope of the Model Rule 3.8(a) probable cause standard and noting 
alternatives). 
The United States Attorneys’ Manual effectively adopts the first of the two alternative 
standards set out above. It mandates that a federal prosecutor should commence or 
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Although a few of the alternatives use an objective standard,145 that is not 
the trend in the law, and the commentators who argue for a more vigorous 
protection for potentially innocent defendants do not advocate substituting 
an objective standard or modifying the knowledge requirement of the rule. 
Instead, in an apparent effort to set the aspirational duty at a high level—to 
emphasize the personal responsibility of the prosecutor—the suggestions 
typically state the prosecutor’s duty in subjective terms and emphasize the 
prosecutor’s moral judgment. For example, Professor Bennett Gershman 
argues for a very high standard, contending that “a responsible prosecutor 
should be morally certain that the defendant is guilty and that criminal 
punishment is appropriate.”146 An often used, less demanding formulation  
is that the prosecution should not proceed as an ethical matter unless he or 
she is “personally convinced of the defendant’s guilt.”147 
A third formulation, which requires the least of the prosecutor, introduces 
something of a responsibility of independent investigation as a partial 
constraint. Professor Richard Uviller argues that the prosecutor can 
prosecute a case without a personal belief in the guilt of the accused if the 
prosecutor determines that the jury could fairly find either way, letting the 
jury decide guilt or innocence.148  Uviller, whose aspirational standard is  
the least demanding, would effectively require additional scrutiny through 
 
recommend prosecution only “if he/she believes that the person’s conduct constitutes a 
Federal offense and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and 
sustain a conviction.” See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-27.220(A) 
(2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm#9-27.220. 
The reason a trial-related burden is used in making the charging decision is explained by 
the comment to this section, which is captioned “Grounds for Commencing or Declining 
Prosecution.” The comment explains that, “both as a matter of fundamental fairness and in 
the interest of the efficient administration of justice, no prosecution should be initiated 
against any person unless the government believes that the person probably will be found 
guilty by an unbiased trier of fact.” Id. § 9-27.220(B) cmt. The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual is an 
important internal directive by the preeminent prosecutor’s office in the United States. See 
Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too  
Little Enforcement?, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 69, 77 (1995) (noting that for the most part the 
manual usefully addresses issues not covered by the ethics codes but does not generally have 
an external effect). It does not, however, affect externally enforceable ethics rules and, as 
noted earlier, only the District of Columbia imposes a standard related to the sufficiency of 
the evidence at trial for continuing the prosecution after the defendant has been charged. See 
supra note 141. 
145. For example, the Model Code provision and the rules of the six states use that or a 
similar objective standard in addition to knowledge. See supra note 140. The later drafted 
Model Rules abandoned it. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (2007). 
146. Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the 
Charging Discretion, 20 Fordham Urb. L.J. 513, 524 (1993). 
147. Gershman, supra note 144, at 338. 
148. See Uviller, supra note 143, at 1159; see also Gershman, supra note 144, at 338–39. 
Professor Uviller has argued that, if the prosecutor, “from all he knows of the case, believes 
that there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant is innocent of the charge, he should, 
of  course,  not  prosecute.”  Uviller,  supra  note  143,  at  1159. However, as Professor 
Gershman suggests, it is not clear that the evidence being in equipoise and the prosecutor 
harboring a substantial doubt are not incompatible, and therefore under Uviller’s standard  
the prosecutor might ethically decide to go forward. Gershman, supra note 144, at 339. 
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his practically oriented description of a prosecutor’s proper perspective in 
deciding whether to charge the accused: the “mindset of the true skeptic,  
the inquisitive neutral.”149 The “alert prosecutor” will not automatically 
process what the police officer presents as ready for grand jury indictment 
or the filing of an information: “At the very least, the complainant should  
be interviewed first hand.”150 
By contrast, none of the adopted or proposed ethical standards imposes a 
requirement of investigation or inquiry to inform the prosecutor’s judgment. 
Although on a somewhat different dimension, the ABA Prosecution 
Functions Standards would impose one additional duty at the charging 
stage: a prosecutor shall not “knowingly fail to disclose to the grand jury 
evidence which tends to negate guilt or mitigate the offense.”151 Thus, it 
would require that in satisfying the formal burden of establishing probable 
cause to charge the defendant through the grand jury, the prosecutor provide 
the grand jury with information known to the prosecutor that would 
undercut that determination. 
Without a duty of systematic inquiry and of independent evaluation of 
matters such as witness credibility that will sometimes require  
investigation, crafting an effective and enforceable rule for avoiding 
prosecution of the innocent would be impossible. The North Carolina Rule 
has no requirement of investigation, and as a result it does not mandate that 
the prosecutor’s assessment of whether probable cause is lacking be based 
on a fair review of the evidence. 
Such a duty of investigation might seem reasonable to impose, but it is 
practically unworkable as a general standard in criminal cases. The Duke 
lacrosse case is obviously atypical in a number of ways, but one of the most 
mundane of those is that it commanded substantial attention, energy, and 
resources from the police and prosecutors. It might be possible to impose a 
duty of inquiry, evaluation, and independent investigation on prosecutors in 
high profile cases. However, if the ethical rule applied across the board to 
all cases, which includes a multitude of misdemeanor and low-grade felony 
cases, a requirement of due diligence by the prosecutor would have a major 
impact on prosecutorial resources. Generally, the vast majority of criminal 
prosecutions are brought in state courts where resources for prosecutors are 
 
 
149. H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a 
Passionate Pursuit, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1695, 1704 (2000). 
150. Id. at 1703. 
151. Standards   for  Criminal  Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function 
Standard 3-3.6(b) (3d ed. 1993). See generally Joy, supra note 133, at 419. In United States 
v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that the prosecutor had no duty even to present known 
exculpatory information to the grand jury as a matter of constitutional law. 504 U.S. 36, 44– 
45 (1992). Nevertheless, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual at that time required an obligation as a 
matter of policy to present “substantial evidence which directly negates the guilt of a 
subject.” See Uviller, supra note 149, at 1706 n.21, 1710–11 (discussing the possibility of 
appellate reference of violations of the policy to the Office of Professional Responsibility for 
review). 
 2007] THE DUKE LACROSSE CASE 1371 
 
stretched thin. The Duke lacrosse case is the extreme aberration in terms of 
attention and resources. 
Many misdemeanor cases are tried by prosecutors meeting witnesses for 
the first time shortly before trial, often just before they take the stand. The 
time for independent evaluation is virtually nonexistent. Many of these 
cases are effectively evaluated only by the police officer who handled the 
investigation of the case, an investigation which is also frequently quite 
limited. Many felony prosecutions have only slightly more prosecutorial 
oversight. I am confident there is currently nothing close to a baseline of 
independent prosecutorial evaluation of credibility of all critical witnesses 
in all criminal cases. To impose it would require a massive increase in 
resources. 
For policy reasons, we should aspire to far more in the most problematic 
cases—independent factual investigation by the prosecutor. The 
prosecutor’s possible civil liability conflicts with this policy preference. 
Although civil suits against prosecutors are rare, they are most likely in 
extremely problematic cases, such as the Duke lacrosse case. On October  
5, 2007, the three players filed suit against the City of Durham, various City 
officials and police officers, and Nifong.152 Immunity from civil liability 
may turn on whether the challenged conduct was prosecutorial or 
investigative in nature. As to true prosecutorial duties, a prosecutor has 
absolute immunity. Although the line between prosecution and  
investigation is unclear, when the prosecutor becomes involved in 
precharge investigation, the immunity is potentially qualified.153 The same 
is true for legal advice to the police about investigative practices.154 
 
B. Weakness of the Disciplinary Rule Based on the Duty to Seek Justice as 
Illustrated by the Duke Lacrosse Case 
Disciplinary proceedings against Nifong in the Duke lacrosse case 
demonstrate the weakness of the specific rule derived from the fundamental 
duty of the prosecutor to seek justice, and, under that duty, not to prosecute 
the innocent. As noted earlier, Doug Brocker, counsel for the North 
 
 
152. See Joseph Neff, Duke Lacrosse Players File Civil Rights Suit, News & Observer 
(Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 5, 2007, at 1A (describing the 162-page civil complaint alleging 
sweeping violations of players’ civil rights by Nifong, various Durham police officers and 
officials, and the DNA lab); Civil Complaint, Evans v. City of Durham, No. 07-739 
(M.D.N.C. Oct. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Nifong Civil Complaint] (on file with author). 
153. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (ruling that a prosecutor does not 
have absolute immunity for involvement in investigation to determine whether probable 
cause exists, which in that case concerned securing expert evidence that purported to find a 
match between the defendant’s boot and a bloody print left at the murder scene). In the civil 
suit, Nifong is sued individually and, for example, with respect to the claims of conspiracy to 
violate civil rights, “in his official capacity with respect to Durham Police.” Nifong Civil 
Complaint, supra note 152, at 118, 120, 122, 123. 
154. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) (ruling that a prosecutor does not have 
absolute immunity in giving legal advice to the police, in a case which involved the propriety 
of hypnotizing a suspect). 
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Carolina State Bar, began his closing argument with the statement that the 
“most important duty and responsibility is to seek justice, not merely to 
convict,”155 and much of the evidence presented by the bar in the 
disciplinary proceeding seemed directed to that issue.156 Although charges 
were brought against Nifong under eleven disciplinary rules, no charge was 
based on Rule 3.8(a), which commands that the prosecutor is to refrain  
from prosecuting a charge known not to be supported by probable cause. 
The absence of the charge, of course, does not mean that it could not have 
been proven if lodged, but it is likely it would have failed. 
If the charge could not be proven under the facts of the Duke lacrosse 
case, then we have strong evidence of the weakness of the standard as a 
basis for professional discipline. Again, this is not to diminish the 
importance of the ethical precept as central to the operation of our justice 
system or as a statement of an aspirational goal for prosecutors. Indeed, my 
judgment is that the tragedy of this case flows from Nifong’s basic failure 
to “do justice” at this fundamental level. 
On April 17, 2006, when testimony was presented to the grand jury and 
the first indictments were returned against Seligmann and Finnerty, the 
investigation had developed evidence, most of which Nifong was shown to 
have personally known: (1) the accusing witness, Crystal Mangum, had 
made a number of inconsistent statements about the event;157 (2) her 
medical records showed that she had a history of serious mental health 
problems, including a diagnosis that she suffered from bipolar disorder;158 
(3) at least three players had given statements to the police that the 
complainant’s version was wildly inconsistent with the facts and that none 
of the men at the party had provided statements indicating an assault 
 
 
155. Videotape: Argument of Douglas J. Brocker (June 16, 2007), at 9:11 a.m. (on file 
with author). 
156. See, e.g., Testimony of Benjamin Himan at 62–66, 97–106, N.C. State Bar v. 
Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) 
[hereinafter Himan Transcript] (on file with author) (describing Nifong’s statement, “You 
know, we’re f - - ked,” when first briefed about the case regarding its weaknesses and 
Himan’s own misgivings about indicting Seligmann, and [Himan’s] personal efforts to 
contact players’ attorneys to try to avoid an erroneous indictment); Amended Nifong Bar 
Order, supra note 8, paras. 14, 15, at 3 (describing weaknesses of the case discussed with 
Nifong along with the “we’re f - - ked” comment and the assessment that the case would be 
very hard to win in court); see also Anne Blythe & Sarah Ovaska, Nifong Had Doubts, 
Witness Says, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), June 13, 2007, at 1A. 
157. Amended Nifong Bar Order, supra note 8, para. 14, at 3 (noting weaknesses told to 
Nifong at his initial briefing by the investigating officers, which included the accuser’s 
inconsistent statements and changes in story, the fact that the other dancer disputed the story 
of the alleged attack, and the cooperation by the three team captains and their denial that an 
attack occurred). 
158. See Craig Jarvis, Mangum’s Life: Conflict, Contradictions; Accuser Struggled with 
Mental Illness, Alcohol, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 13, 2007, at 1A (describing 
a variety of contacts with mental health facilities and frequent bizarre behavior); Himan 
Transcript, supra note 156, at 66–69, 229 (describing University of North Carolina hospital 
records that showed her bipolar diagnosis and long psychological history and indicating that 
Himan kept Nifong informed about such information as he gathered it). 
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occurred; (4) no DNA evidence recovered from the rape kit matched any of 
the players; (5) although no blood, saliva, or semen was present, DNA from 
males other than the players (the players had been excluded as possible 
sources of this male DNA) was found on items from the rape kit, and 
apparently semen from the victim’s boyfriend that was likely several days 
old was found there; (6) the other exotic dancer had made one statement 
that the accuser’s statement was “a crock”—that the rape event did not 
happen; (7) the accuser had failed to identify Seligmann as a perpetrator at 
the first identification procedure on March 16, 2006, identifying him merely 
as someone who had been at the party; and (8) the accuser had a criminal 
conviction history. By May 15, 2006, when evidence was presented to the 
grand jury and an indictment was returned against Evans, the prosecutor 
had received rather substantial digital evidence that demonstrated 
Seligmann had a strong alibi, which did not go directly to Evans’s guilt, but 
it did undercut the accuracy of the accuser’s earlier identification of another 
defendant and thereby suggested her unreliability. 
In support of the charges, Nifong had (1) a finding by the examining 
doctor during the initial medical examination on March 14, 2006, of some 
vaginal swelling, and the SANE nurse’s perception that the accuser’s 
conduct was consistent with sexual victimization; (2) the accuser’s April 4, 
2006, “certain” identification of Seligmann and Finnerty and ninety percent 
certain identification of Evans;159 and (3) a partial DNA match of Dave 
Evans’s DNA with DNA on Mangum’s fake fingernail found in the trash 
can of the bathroom where she said the rape occurred. 
During his testimony before the Disciplinary Hearing Commission, 
Nifong did not deny that he had a duty of independent evaluation in cases 
he prosecuted. He made no admission with respect to a need to speak with 
the accusing witness; indeed, he had not spoken with Mangum until 
January, after his decision to recuse himself. Nor did he acknowledge an 
obligation to meet with defense counsel or their clients to evaluate their 
defense. However, he claimed that he operated under the policy that he had 
to be “personally persuaded” of the defendants’ guilt in order to go forward, 
and claimed that he was.160 He was not asked about and did not address the 
probable cause standard.161 
In terms of an evaluation of the evidence, he explained that despite all the 
contrary evidence, the testimony of the complaining witness that a rape  
took place would be sufficient to get the case to the jury. He rested his 
belief in the charge on the assessments of Officer Himan and Sergeant 
 
 
 
159. As discussed in Part III, the significance of these identifications was badly undercut 
by the fact that they were made from a group of forty-six photographs that Sergeant Gottlieb 
told Mangum contained those the police believed were at the party. 
160. See Nifong Transcript, supra note 45, at 196; see also id. at 304 (testifying that he 
personally believed the rape occurred based on views of Himan, Gottlieb, and Leyn). 
161. Id. at 304. 
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Gottlieb, who had interviewed Mangum,162 and the examining nurse, who 
completed the rape kit, that the accuser was credible. He generally 
explained away the inconsistent versions of the story given by the accuser 
on the basis of her postrape trauma or interviewer ineptitude or error.163 
In jurisdictions with grand juries, the standard of knowledge that 
probable cause is lacking would be difficult to establish conceptually as to 
the evidence actually presented to a grand jury that indicted the defendant. 
The probable cause standard should be met by the judgment of that body, 
which is given the responsibility to make the charging decision. Of course, 
reliance on the indictment is not apt if the grand jury was not presented with 
evidence that the prosecutor knows undercuts probable cause. 
North Carolina grand juries are very different from the better-known 
federal grand juries. Except when authorized by a three-judge panel for the 
prosecution of drug distribution or continuing criminal enterprises,164 North 
Carolina grand jury proceedings are not transcribed and the prosecutor 
cannot attend and examine witnesses.165 
Thus, disciplining Nifong for a lack of probable cause would have been 
particularly difficult in North Carolina because what was or was not 
presented at the grand jury is legally unknowable, and both Nifong and 
Investigator Himan testified that the prosecutor had given no instructions on 
what to say or not say to the grand jury. The grand jury returned a true bill, 
 
 
162. Nifong acknowledged that Sergeant John C. Shelton, who had early contact with the 
accuser, did not believe her allegations of rape. See id. at 170. 
163. See id. at 143–45 (describing his perception of her trauma when first meeting 
Mangum); id. at 150–52 (discussing the interviewer misunderstanding and error). 
164. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-622(h) (2005) (providing special grand jury proceedings upon 
the authorization of a panel of three judges for violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(h) (drug 
distribution) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95.1 (continuing criminal enterprise)). 
165. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-623(h) (authorizing in special grand jury proceedings for a 
prosecutor to be present to examine witnesses and a court reporter to transcribe the 
proceedings). This means that in a rape case, such as the Duke lacrosse case, a North 
Carolina prosecutor is not allowed to be present in the grand jury and does not question 
witnesses there. The statute does not permit a court reporter to be present to transcribe the 
proceedings. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-623(d). Moreover, all those who appear before the 
grand jury, including witnesses, are prohibited from revealing “anything which transpires 
during any of its sessions.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-623(e). In Nifong’s disciplinary hearing, 
the chair asked Investigator Himan what he said, in general terms, to the grand  jury. 
Himan’s attorney stopped the examination, informing Williamson that Himan could not 
answer without violating the statute. Himan Testimony, supra note 156, at 222 (“Other than 
saying he told the truth as he knew it, he can’t say anything else.”). The U.S. Supreme Court 
has ruled that a state may not, under the First Amendment, prohibit a witness from 
voluntarily revealing what he or she said before the grand jury after the grand jury’s term has 
expired. See Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990). Given that Himan did not assert his 
First Amendment interest in divulging the information, the issue does not appear to be 
answered by Butterworth. 
It is difficult to take a commitment not to prosecute the innocent very seriously when all 
that is required is probable cause and the probable cause finding comes in the form of the 
“rubber stamp” of a grand jury indictment. Taking the commitment seriously is particularly 
difficult under the North Carolina formulation of the grand jury, which makes determining 
the inadequacy of an indictment difficult if not impossible. 
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indicating that probable cause existed as a matter of law. Of course, 
information that the prosecutor learned that was unavailable to any witness 
appearing before the grand jury would be fair game for a contrary  
argument, but establishing what he knew that the investigating officer, who 
testified, did not know would be difficult. 
Yet, based on what Nifong knew, it is difficult to understand how he 
could have formed an independent belief in the players’ guilt. The attorney 
general’s lengthy list of reasons to question the accuser’s version of events 
makes objectively based belief in guilt quite difficult. Indeed, it appears  
that the attorney general’s report makes an effort to avoid overstatement  
and thus may be modest in its presentation. When one examines the mass  
of questions regarding the accuser’s reliability presented by the defendants’ 
motions to suppress identification, objective belief in guilt becomes even 
less supportable. 
For example, here is an advocate’s construction of the initial conflicts in 
statements by the accuser: 
Within the first 36 hours of the events in this case, the accuser denied 
being raped, claimed she was raped by 20 men, then 5 men, then 2 men 
and then 3 men, claimed that she was carried against her will from a car 
by Nikki and “Brett,” claimed that she was dancing with three other 
women, multiple other women and then only one other woman, denied 
ever being struck with fists, claimed that Matt was getting married, told 
the forensic nurse that Matt raped her vaginally and orally, that Adam 
raped her anally, and did not mention Brett raping her, while telling other 
personnel that Brett raped her vaginally without mentioning either Matt or 
Adam.166 
Thus, the reasonableness of any belief Nifong might claim in guilt is hard 
to accept, but he claimed it. He claims to have been “personally persuaded” 
of guilt upon the assessment by experienced professionals in the credibility 
of the accuser’s story of rape.167 I have found no extant rule that allows 
effective challenge to the subjective claim of belief in guilt that evidence 
shows to be objectively unsupportable. However, the standard is even more 
forgiving—in order to have violated Rule 3.8(a), Nifong had to know that 
probable cause did not exist. I doubt that proof of a violation of the ethics 
rule under that standard could have been sustained. My central point is that, 
if I am even arguably correct on these facts, the standard has virtually no 
practical impact as a source of potential discipline. 
 
 
166. Motion to Suppress the Alleged “Identification” of the Defendants by the Accuser, 
para. 16, at 7, State v. Seligmann, Nos. 06 CRS 4334-36, 06 CRS 4331-33, 06 CRS 5581-83 
(N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2006) [hereinafter Motion to Suppress Identification] (on file with 
author) (describing the multiple and varying descriptions given by Mangum during the first 
thirty-six hours after the alleged rape). 
167. See Nifong Transcript, supra note 45, at 196 (testifying that his standard for 
prosecution is being “personally persuaded” of guilt); id. at 304 (testifying that he personally 
believed a rape occurred based on the opinions of Himan and Gottlieb and through them the 
opinion of the SANE nurse). 
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C. A More Realistic but Still Practically Unenforceable Duty of Skeptical 
Evaluation in Appropriate Cases—And Nifong’s Failing Performance 
Professor Richard Uviller believed that the effective standard for 
prosecution allowed a prosecutor to move forward with a case where the 
evidence was in equipoise. However, he argued that in evaluating the case, 
the prosecutor should examine it with “the mindset of the true skeptic, the 
inquisitive neutral.”168 That is a very modest standard, and like the other 
standards, it is unenforceable but still an essential part of a fair justice 
system. It is a responsibility that Nifong failed miserably to fulfill. 
A prosecutor should have no duty to listen to all defense evidence nor to 
interview every important witness or even every complaining witness in 
every case. However, he or she should have that moral and ethical duty to 
do so in appropriate cases. The responsibility to exercise careful judgment 
binds those to whom our justice system gives such power and such 
discretion. 
Not the least in this group of “appropriate cases” are those where the 
actual prospect of an unjust prosecution is brought to the attention of the 
prosecutor. That Nifong knew no probable cause existed in this case is not 
clearly established. However, that he had abundant notice of the 
problematic nature of the case is undeniable. 
The accusing witness in the case was a witness with enormous, obvious 
flaws. She was known to have a criminal and mental health history. She  
had given wildly conflicting statements to various individuals during the 
first thirty-six hours after the alleged incident, as described above. Physical 
evidence of trauma supported the charge, but it was ambiguous evidence at 
best. The men who resided at the house all stated that absolutely no sexual 
activity took place, and their description of the events left no possible time 
for it to have occurred. All this was known to the prosecutor. Nifong was 
thus on notice that there was a real possibility that no crime occurred—the 
possibility that the allegations of a sexual assault was a hoax or a delusion. 
Nifong may have believed the accuser initially and may have had an 
admirable instinct not to abandon the prosecution simply because charges 
would be difficult to prove with such a compromised accuser—exotic 
dancers with criminal histories can be raped and deserve a prosecutor’s best 
effort at securing justice.169 Thus, absent the publicity campaign, pursuing 
the investigation further cannot be faulted. However, soon after Nifong 
became involved, chances for concrete corroboration began to disappear. 
After the order for nontestimonial evidence was executed, for example, the 
police knew that none of the Duke lacrosse players had incriminating 
 
168. Uviller, supra note 149, at 1704. 
169. After asserting that Nifong believed a crime had occurred at the party, David 
Freedman argued in his opening statement before the Disciplinary Hearing Commission, “It 
is not unethical to pursue what someone may believe may be an unwinnable case.” Blythe & 
Ovaska, supra note 156; see also Videotape: Opening Argument of David B. Freedman 
(June 12, 2007), at FO min. 1:14 (on file with author). 
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scratches on their bodies. Before Nifong’s conversation on March 30,  
2006, with the SBI lab technician and before he learned of the initial 
negative results on the rape kit items, he may reasonably have believed 
there was a good possibility that DNA evidence would show that a crime 
took place. Any DNA from the players linked to sexual activity with 
Mangum would have changed everything. It would have proven that the 
players’ overall version of events was a fabrication and provided an 
identification of those involved. A noncriminal explanation for sexual 
activity would have been possible, but a difficult “about face” would have 
been required to establish the defense of consent after the initial claim that 
no sexual activity whatsoever occurred. 
However, after his conversation with the SBI lab technician, the prospect 
of strong proof of guilt through DNA virtually disappeared. The SBI lab 
found no sperm or semen and would not send the rape kit items for DNA 
processing.170 Some hope existed for significant incriminating results from 
the items recovered in the search of the house at 610 North Buchanan, and 
perhaps more sophisticated testing could reveal DNA associated with the 
defendants on some significant evidence item, but initial SBI testing gave 
no reason to believe such evidence would be found. 
Accordingly, a hoax or delusion had not been ruled out, and at what is 
usually a more mundane level, the case was going to turn largely on 
Mangum’s identifications of the attackers. Indeed, during his testimony in 
his subsequent trial on criminal contempt charges, Nifong said as much. He 
acknowledged that after he talked with Jennifer Leyn he concluded, “This 
had been a non-ejaculatory event . . . . There was no semen left during the 
course of the assault . . . in which case it would become an eyewitness 
case.”171 
Eyewitness identifications, which are critically important to prosecutions, 
are sometimes inaccurate and are a notorious source of unjust 
convictions.172 In most cases, however, eyewitness identification evidence 
does not stand alone; it is corroborated by other evidence. The problems 
 
170. See Leyn Testimony, supra note 96, at 9–11 (describing the March 30, 2006, 
telephone conversation with Nifong in which SBI told him the rape kit items would not be 
submitted for DNA testing because no sperm or semen was found); Phone Logs of 
Conference Call on March 30, 2006, between SBI Technicians and Nifong, supra note 96, at 
102; Nifong Deposition, supra note 96, at 188–90. 
171. Ann Blythe & Joseph Neff, Nifong Gets 24 Hours in Jail for Contempt, News & 
Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 1, 2007, at 1A. 
172. A frequently quoted observation from the U.S. Supreme Court is that “the annals of 
criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.” United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218, 228 (1967). Compare Noah Clements, Flipping a Coin: A Solution for  the 
Inherent Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 40 Ind. L. Rev. 271, 271 
(2007) (observing that, “[b]y most accounts,” mistaken identification is the leading cause of 
unjust convictions in the United States), with Steven B. Duke et al., A Picture’s Worth a 
Thousand Words: Conversational Versus Eyewitness Testimony in Criminal Convictions, 44 
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 1–4 (2007) (describing the widespread claim among practitioners that 
eyewitness identification is the single largest cause of false convictions, but generally 
arguing that erroneous testimony as to conversations is likely a larger cause). 
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typically occur when that corroboration is ambiguous. I cannot say what 
Nifong knew, but my experience as a defense attorney with  the 
Washington, D.C., Public Defender Services was that everyone in the 
criminal justice system—prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel— 
understood the extraordinary dangers posed by a one-witness identification 
without clear corroboration. 
Many times the identification procedure will occur when the prosecutor 
has no control in setting up the procedures. In other situations, a prosecutor 
might assume he or she has solid, independent corroboration and therefore 
does not worry greatly about an upcoming identification procedure.173 
The description of the lack of independent evidence of guilt set out above 
is a prelude to the discussion in the next part of the identification  
procedures that resulted in the indictments of the defendants. My  
contention is that Nifong’s organization of the identification procedure and 
use of the evidence developed in it constituted a failure of his duty to do 
justice. On March 30, 2006, Nifong was informed by the SBI that DNA 
evidence on the rape kit did not reveal the presence of saliva, blood, or 
semen. He then knew it was likely he would get no solidly incriminating 
scientific evidence. The next day, Nifong directed the police on how to 
perform the identification procedures. 
As of that date, Nifong knew the basic point that the police had already 
shown the accuser thirty-six of the forty-six Caucasian lacrosse players,174 
and she had picked no one. As a matter of chance, since she had seen over 
two-thirds of the players, she should have seen two of the attackers, and 
indeed, she ultimately identified two whose photos she had already 
viewed.175 Any identification procedure at this point was  likely 
problematic, but Nifong directed the police to put the forty-six photos of the 
 
 
173. Often, even if corroboration does not presently exist, it might be forthcoming. The 
police often do not know when they conduct a showup shortly after a crime occurred, or 
when they put together a less than ideal photographic array to get an arrest warrant, that 
other solid evidence of guilt will not be found. For example, physical evidence linking the 
defendant to the crime may be discovered on his person or in his home; some forensic 
evidence, such as fingerprints, may be produced; he may confess to the police; and while not 
ideal corroboration, he may make an incriminating admission to a jailhouse informant. 
174. See Deposition of Mark D. Gottlieb at 118, 128–29, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No.  
06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) [hereinafter 
Sgt. Gottlieb Deposition] (on file with author) (stating that Nifong knew that arrays A 
through F had been shown and no one had been picked); Nifong Transcript, supra note 45, at 
45–46 (acknowledging that he knew that a number of arrays of photos had been shown and 
that Mangum had picked no one as her attacker, but that he was uncertain as to how many 
arrays or photos had been displayed). In fact, none of the suspects or “fillers” were repeated, 
so Mangum had been shown thirty-six separate players. Durham Police Dep’t Sequential 
Photographic Identification at array A–F, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 
(Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007). It is unclear whether 
Nifong knew that no picture was repeated, but he clearly knew that a substantial majority of 
the players on the team had been displayed without Mangum making any selection. 
175. She viewed a photograph of Seligmann on March 16, 2006, and a photograph of 
Evans on March 21, 2006. 
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players “into a group,” show them to the accuser, and “see if she recalled 
seeing the individuals at the party.”176 
A prosecutor with “a mindset of the true skeptic, the inquisitive neutral” 
would not have organized the procedure that was utilized. Regardless of 
whether it was suggestive, it provided the investigation with no real test of 
the accuracy of the accuser’s identification. Furthermore, it did nothing to 
rule out a hoax or delusion. Indeed, it enabled the hoax or delusion to 
proceed.177 
The facts show that the “do justice” precept was violated in the most 
fundamental way in this case, and our ethical rules to enforce it are 
completely inadequate. The next section shows that, in the main, the 
constitutional doctrines constraining suggestive identifications are a 
mismatch for the true injustice that occurred in the Duke lacrosse case and 
are so toothless that they offer no protection except in the truly 
extraordinary case. The critical importance of the “do justice” concept and 
its unenforceability, as illustrated by this case, should move us to 
implement enforceable rules for identification that speak to reducing 
erroneous identifications. 
 
IV. PROSECUTOR’S DUTY TO DO JUSTICE AND IDENTIFICATION 
PROCEDURES IN THE DUKE LACROSSE CASE 
The final identification procedure used in the Duke lacrosse case is 
rightfully subject to criticism. It was outrageous. However, the most 
powerful criticism requires a careful dissection of the facts. 
 
A. Analyzing a Counterfactual Situation 
The constitutional doctrine that covers identification evidence under the 
Due Process Clause is largely a mismatch for the Duke lacrosse case 
because it is designed to prevent suggestive police procedures from creating 
irreparable mistaken identification. That doctrine is predicated on the 
premise that a crime occurred and that the victim’s memory of it is subject 
 
 
 
176. Sgt. Gottlieb’s Supplemental Report, supra note 35, at 8 (describing Nifong’s 
instructions on March 31, 2006, for conduct of identification procedure). 
177. As discussed further below, it is fortunate that the police were inaccurate in their 
statement that the pictures were of those at the party. Some of those in the forty-six 
photographs were not at the party, and although Nifong ignored the information, it helped 
show that the accuser was inaccurate. For example, Mangum stated both during the March 
16, 2006, and the April 4, 2006, identification procedures that she recognized one player 
(Brad Ross) as being at the party. However, he was in Raleigh on that evening. Motion to 
Suppress Identification, supra note 166, para. 39, at 12 (indicating photo numbers selected 
on March 16, 2006); id. (stating he was at the party and was seen talking to the other 
dancer); Letter from Robert C. Ekstrand, Attorney, to Michael B. Nifong (Apr. 6, 2006), 
N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State 
Bar July 31, 2007) [hereinafter Ekstrand Letter to Nifong] (on file with author) (providing 
documentation of presence in Raleigh). 
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to   distortion   by police  procedures. Those are assumptions that are 
counterfactual to this case. 
We now know that there was no rape. It was therefore impossible for the 
police to conduct procedures to create an irreparable mistaken 
identification; there was no identification to be made. The accused has no 
true image of her attackers in her mind that could be distorted by police 
procedures so that the image shown by the police replaces the true image.  
If this was a hoax rather than a delusion, Mangum was selecting people to 
accuse falsely. None of the U.S. Supreme Court case law remotely 
addresses such a situation. The established doctrine can provide some aid if 
the procedures are extremely ineptly conducted or if, as in this case, factors 
indicating the witness’s reliability are absent, but the doctrine is designed to 
fit facts that are fundamentally counterfactual to those here. 
Why Mangum had so much difficulty making the bogus178 identification 
is something of a mystery on the facts as we now understand them. All 
agree that she and a number of Duke lacrosse players were at the party 
together on March 13 to 14, 2006. Thus, in terms of picking out three men 
to accuse, she should have been able to do so relatively easily since she had 
been there and had conversations with several players. Despite the fact she 
had seen many of their faces, she did not make identifications of anyone 
until the third time she looked at photographs. Why this is the case, we will 
likely never know. Perhaps her memory of the night was badly distorted by 
alcohol or drugs. She misidentified the player who made the broomstick 
comment, which all agreed was made.179 Perhaps she was ready to allege a 
false assault generally but reticent to accuse any particular person. 
Perhaps rather than a hoax, she was delusional, as suggested by the 
attorney general’s comments. As a layman with regard to mental 
abnormalities, I have no way to know whether delusions generally or 
Mangum’s likely delusion was particularly susceptible or particularly 
impervious to suggestion. Although for different reasons than for a hoax, 
the due process identification suppression doctrine is not tailored to control 
the formulation of a delusional memory or designed to ensure that a 
delusional witness is revealed. 
 
B. The General Dimensions and Woeful Inadequacy of Due Process 
Identification Doctrine 
The constitutional doctrine generally applicable to identification 
procedures focuses on suggestive identification procedures; it is housed in 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This 
 
 
178. I use the term “bogus” rather than “false” because “false identification” is often used 
to describe misidentifications by real victims. 
179. Motion to Suppress Identification, supra note 166, para. 78(f), at 19. Mangum 
identified another person as the source of the broomstick comment. She thought the person 
who investigators had identified as having made the comment had been sitting in the kitchen 
making a drink. Id. 
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doctrine provides extremely weak protection. It focuses on police 
misconduct that suggests to the crime victim or witness which suspect to 
pick. The chief impermissible agent is the suggestiveness of the procedure 
used by the police to indicate to the witness which suspect or suspects to 
select. 
As will be discussed in Part IV.D, aspects of the Duke lacrosse case 
identification procedure were suggestive. However, the most troubling 
failing, which is likely the source of critics’ intuitive sense of unfairness, 
was the failure of those procedures to meaningfully separate an accurate 
identification from an inaccurate one and to guard against giving a 
nonvictim the opportunity to perpetuate a hoax or to proceed with a 
prosecution based on a delusional belief of guilt. 
The due process doctrine is largely a mismatch for that problem. Its  
focus is instead on preventing the police from purposefully or inadvertently 
suggesting to a willing but honest victim or witness of a real crime that a 
particular individual should be picked. The law’s test has in mind the 
accepted psychological process whereby a true but imperfect human 
memory of a stranger’s face is replaced by another image seen during 
identification procedures that the victim/witness subsequently believes is 
genuine. 
1. The Due Process Doctrine Against Impermissibly Suggestive 
Identification Procedures 
The due process doctrine was born in 1967 with Stovall v. Denno.180 
There the Court recognized a basis for attacking an identification separate 
from the ground it announced in United States v. Wade.181  In  Stovall, 
which involved admission of testimony regarding an out-of-court 
identification as well as an in-court identification,182 the Court recognized 
that an identification should be suppressed if the confrontation with the 
witness was “so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable 
mistaken identification that he was denied due process of law.”183  
However, while it recognized the doctrine, the Stovall Court applied it 
under a totality of the circumstances test and denied relief even though the 
procedure was clearly suggestive. 
Theodore Stovall was presented to the victim while handcuffed to one of 
five police officers who brought him into the victim’s hospital room. 
Moreover, the Court noted that he was “the only Negro in the room.”184 
Despite the suggestiveness of the procedure, the Court denied relief because 
 
 
180. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
181. 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (finding a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at lineups); see 
also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (developing some dimensions and 
recognizing some limitations of the Sixth Amendment right). 
182. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 296. 
183. Id. at 301–02. 
184. Id. at 295. 
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it concluded that conducting the identification procedure quickly was 
imperative. The victim was the only person who could identify the 
perpetrator and, having received eleven stab wounds during the assault that 
had killed her husband,185 no one knew how long she would live. Under 
these circumstances, arranging a lineup at the police station was not 
feasible,186 and under the totality of the circumstances, the identification 
was found to be constitutionally proper.187 
The next year, the Supreme Court decided Simmons v. United States, 
which involved only the admission of in-court indentifications.188 In 
Simmons, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents obtained a number of 
snapshots of Thomas Simmons and another man, William Andrews, the day 
following a bank robbery. Later that same day they showed six pictures 
“consisting mostly of group photographs of Andrews, Simmons, and 
others” separately to five bank employees.189 Pictures of Simmons and 
Andrews each appeared several times in the series.190 Each of  the  
witnesses identified Simmons and no one identified Andrews.191 The Court 
noted that the chance of mistaken identification increases if the picture of a 
single individual recurs,192 and it found the identification procedure to have 
fallen “short of the ideal” in that it would have been preferable for there to 
have been “proportionally fewer pictures of Simmons” among the photos 
shown.193 The Court nevertheless found that the identification procedure 
used did not violate due process, which it articulated as requiring exclusion 
of the in-court identification “only if the photographic identification 
procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”194 
The standard articulated was almost the same as in Stovall but changed 
the degree of linkage between suggestiveness and irreparable mistaken 
identification from “conducive to” in Stovall to “as to give rise to a very 
substantial likelihood of” in Simmons.195 The Court listed a number of 
 
 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 302. 
187. Id. 
188. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 381 (1968). 
189. Id. at 382. 
190. Id. at 385. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 383 (citing Patrick M. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases 
(1965)). 
193. Id. at 386 n.6 (citing Wall, supra note 192; Williams, Identification Parades, 1955 
Crim. L. Rev. 525 (1955)). 
194. Id. at 384. 
195. This subtle shift effectively provided the foundation for a systemic restriction of the 
doctrine later in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). Lower courts for a time 
explained the more exacting Simmons standard based on its consideration of only an in-court 
identification, which involved at least a determination of whether such identification rested 
on an independent source and thus included reliability factors. See, e.g., Brathwaite v. 
Manson, 527 F.2d 363, 370–71 (2d Cir. 1975), rev’d, Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 
(1977). 
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factors, such as the opportunity of the witnesses to view the suspects in a 
well-lit bank for five minutes, the certainty of the five witnesses, the fact 
pictures were shown to the witnesses separately, and the freshness of their 
memories, which the Court stated “leave little room for doubt that the 
identification of Simmons was correct.”196 
In 1969, the Court decided Foster v. California,197 the only case in which 
it excluded an identification based on due process. Walter Foster was 
charged with armed robbery. After he was arrested, the lone witness to the 
robbery was called to the police station to view a lineup, which consisted of 
three men.198 The Court stated that Foster “stood out from the other two 
men by the contrast of his height and by the fact that he was wearing a 
leather jacket similar to that worn by the robber.”199 After viewing this 
suggestive lineup, the witness could not positively identify the robber but 
“‘thought’” Foster was the man.200 
As the Court stated, 
When this did not lead to positive identification, the police permitted a 
one-to-one confrontation between petitioner and the witness. . . . Even 
after this the witness’ identification of petitioner was tentative. So some 
days later another lineup was arranged. Petitioner was the only person in 
this lineup who had also participated in the first lineup. . . . This finally 
produced a definite identification. 
The suggestive elements in this identification procedure made it all but 
inevitable that David would identify petitioner whether or not he was in 
fact “the man.” In effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, “This  
is the man.” . . . This procedure so undermined the reliability of the 
eyewitness identification as to violate due process.201 
Foster does not tell us anything about the quality of the witness’s 
opportunity to observe, but its suggestiveness is rather outrageous.  As 
noted earlier, Foster is the only case where the Supreme Court has 
suppressed an identification on this theory.  It is thus the high-water mark  
of due process suppression in the Supreme Court, and its extreme character 
has not been helpful. One article written not long after Foster noted that 
thus far the “courts’ performance has been very disappointing” in 
suppressing suggestive identifications with only the “most flagrantly unfair 
procedures” invalidated and observed that “courts generally have displayed 
a marked unwillingness to condemn any procedure where the suggestion 
 
 
 
196. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 385. 
197. 394 U.S. 440 (1969). 
198. Id. at 441. 
199. Id. at 443. The Court described Walter Foster as a relatively tall man—close to six 
feet in height—whereas the other two were short—five feet five or five feet six inches tall. 
Id. at 441. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 443 (emphasis added). 
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was any less blatant than” in Foster.202 That observation seems accurate as 
well today.203 
The subsequent Supreme Court cases have, if anything, made the 
prospects for exclusion even worse. Neil v. Biggers204 and Manson v. 
Brathwaite,205 decided more than thirty years ago, ended the development 
of the law.206 In both, the identification procedures were extremely 
suggestive and in neither was conducting such procedures necessary. In 
Biggers, approximately seven months after the victim was raped, the police 
called her to the police station where she viewed the defendant presented 
alone. There was some justification for the failure to arrange a multiperson 
lineup in that the police expressed a difficulty in finding others who 
generally fit his “unusual physical description.”207 However, because 
Biggers was being held on other charges, there was no urgent need for 
quick action as in Stovall, and the district court found that the use of the less 
reliable showup was unnecessary.208 
In Brathwaite, the witness was an undercover officer who had bought 
drugs through a door that had been opened approximately twelve to 
eighteen inches.209 In response to the undercover officer’s description, 
another officer obtained a photograph of the defendant from police records 
and left that single picture on the undercover officer’s desk. The  
undercover officer viewed the photograph alone when he returned to his 
office two days after the purchase and identified the defendant as the drug 
seller.210 The state agreed that the procedures in the case were suggestive 
because only one photograph was shown and unnecessary because there 
was no emergency or exigent circumstances.211 
Because the Biggers identification procedures and trial had occurred 
before Stovall was decided, it might have been based on less exacting 
doctrines, as the police lacked notice that suggestiveness was 
 
202. Felice J. Levine & June Louin Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification:  
The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1079, 1126–27 (1973). 
203. See generally Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite 
Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness 
Identification Procedures, 41 Val. U. L. Rev. 109, 126–32 (2006) (describing the lax state of 
contemporary enforcement of the due process suggestiveness doctrine under Brathwaite). 
204. 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
205. 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
206. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981), is technically the Court’s last word on due 
process suggestiveness. It dealt only with a procedural issue, but made the law worse. It 
ruled that the identification suppression issue need not be conducted as a separate hearing 
outside the presence of the jury, as required for confession suppression, rather than in the 
trial itself. Id. at 346–49. 
207. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 195. 
208. Id. at 198–99. A showup generally involves the display of the suspect or suspects 
without others to the witness, as was done in Biggers by two detectives walking the suspect 
past the victim, who had been called to the police station for the purpose of viewing the 
suspect. Id. at 195. 
209. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 100. 
210.  Id. at 101. 
211.  Id. at 110. 
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constitutionally problematic at the time the identification procedure was 
conducted. By contrast, Brathwaite was a post-Stovall case, and thus in a 
different procedural posture, and further it involved both out-of-court 
identification evidence and an in-court identification.212  Brathwaite 
adopted the Biggers standards and made them generally applicable. 
In Biggers, the Court, quoting Simmons, saw the key legal issue as 
whether “there is ‘a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification.’”213 Brathwaite declared the Biggers test to be the 
standard for testing all identifications: 
We therefore conclude that reliability is the linchpin in determining the 
admissibility of identification testimony . . . . The factors to  be 
considered are set out in Biggers. . . . These include [1] the opportunity of 
the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, [2] the witness’ 
degree of attention, [3] the accuracy of his prior description of the 
criminal, [4] the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and 
[5] the time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these 
factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive 
identification itself.214 
Under this balancing test, the Court found both identifications 
constitutionally permissible despite the suggestive procedures. Accepting 
the suggestivity, the Court went through the five factors. Because Biggers, 
like the Duke lacrosse case, involved a rape, I note some of the specific 
factors from that case. The Court’s treatment of these five factors is set out 
below: 
The victim spent a considerable period of time with her assailant, up to 
half an hour. She was with him under adequate artificial light in her  
house and under a full moon outdoors, and at least twice, once in the 
house and later in the woods, faced him directly and intimately. She was 
no casual observer, but rather the victim of one of the most personally 
humiliating of all crimes. Her description to the police, which included 
the assailant’s approximate age, height, weight, complexion, skin texture, 
build, and voice, might not have satisfied Proust but was more than 
ordinarily thorough. She had ‘no doubt’ that respondent was the person 
who raped her. . . . The victim here, a practical nurse by profession, had 
an unusual opportunity to observe and identify her assailant. She testified 
at the habeas corpus hearing that there was something about his face ‘I 
don’t think I could ever forget.’ . . . 
There was, to be sure, a lapse of seven months between the rape and the 
confrontation. This would be a seriously negative factor in most cases. 
Here, however, the testimony is undisputed that the victim made no 
 
212. Id. at 102–03. The prosecution’s introduction of the out-of-court identification 
distinguishes Brathwaite from Simmons. See Simmons, 390 U.S. at 381; supra note 195 
(discussing the potential significance of this distinction). 
213. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 116 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 
(1968)). 
214. Id. at 114. Numbers are added in brackets to the five factors for clarity. 
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previous identification at any of the showups, lineups, or photographic 
showings. Her record for reliability was thus a good one, as she had 
previously resisted whatever suggestiveness inheres in a showup. 
Weighing all the factors, we find no substantial likelihood of 
misidentification.215 
Beyond establishing a general standard, the Brathwaite Court ruled that 
lower courts were not to automatically exclude out-of-court identifications 
based on unnecessary suggestivity and that suppression of such 
identifications based on suggestivity alone was not necessary to deter 
improper police conduct in conducting these procedures.216 The Court 
concluded that the only basis for exclusion is “a very substantial likelihood 
of irreparable misidentification,” which looks to reliability. The upshot of 
the ruling is that suppression is an all-or-nothing proposition. Either the 
suggestive procedures lead to “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification,” under which both the out-of-court identification and the 
in-court identification are suppressed, or neither is suppressed.217 
The balancing process is between the suggestiveness of police procedures 
and a group of factors that indicate the identification is nevertheless not 
unreliable. It means, as Brathwaite and Biggers demonstrate, even a very 
suggestive procedure will be saved if the victim had a good opportunity to 
observe the perpetrator(s). The list of factors and the totality of 
circumstances approach mean that all the indicators of reliability (or 
unreliability) can be counted upon and combined. It makes the decision 
process very much a discretionary judgment by the trial judge. 
2. The Difficulty of Imposing the Draconian Remedy of Excluding All the 
Victim’s Identification Testimony 
The practical result of the broad discretion of the trial court inherent in 
the multifactor balancing process in combination with the all-or-nothing 
approach to exclusion is a paucity of decisions finding a due process 
suggestivity violation and excluding the identification evidence. If a 
violation is found under Brathwaite, the witness or, most poignantly, the 
victim is not allowed to identify the defendant in the courtroom. 
As Professor Rich Rosen has written, 
This places an almost intolerable burden on an (often elected) trial judge 
who must not only find that the identification procedure was so flawed 
that the witness cannot be believed, but then has to tell the witness, often 
the victim of the crime, that she will not even be allowed to tell the jury 
 
 
215. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 200–01 (1972). 
216. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 109–114. 
217. The Court does not put this conclusion into so many words, but it is the 
unmistakable result of its rejection of the per se approach that some courts previously used to 
exclude out-of-court identifications because they were obtained by unnecessarily suggestive 
procedures, id. at 110–14, and its embrace of a single standard of reliability in determining 
admissibility. Id. at 116 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1908)). 
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what she honestly believes she saw. This would be a difficult thing to tell 
any witness, but imagine looking a rape victim in the eye, one who swears 
that she can identify the man who violated her, and telling that woman she 
will not even be allowed to tell her story to a jury. It is no wonder that  
few identifications have been suppressed for due process violations.218 
 
3.  The Prohibition Against the “Pick This Man” Suggestion 
The archetype for the due process suggestiveness doctrine is an encounter 
that occurs between strangers over a brief period of time and under 
conditions of poor visibility and high stress. The individual may be only a 
witness or she may also be a victim—let us assume the latter. If a weak 
opportunity to observe is combined with police identification procedures 
that suggest the perpetrator, as illustrated by Foster’s figurative statements 
“this is the man,” the identification may be suppressed. 
This scenario assumes that the victim has a memory of the person’s face, 
but that the memory is weak because of the circumstances of the encounter. 
The accepted psychological view, upon which the suggestiveness doctrine 
is based, is that this memory is not only weak but is malleable.219 The fear 
is that in the identification process, if that process is suggestive, the  
memory of the victim of the perpetrator’s face will be replaced with the 
face of a person she has been shown as suspect during the identification 
procedures. 
In addition to the draconian nature of the only remaining remedy, due 
process suppression is likely inhibited by the recognition that virtually all 
police-organized identifications have some suggestive elements. In 
Coleman v. Alabama,220 the Supreme Court recounted that the witness 
testified that, when the police asked him to go to the city jail for a lineup, 
“he ‘took [it] for granted’ that the police had caught his assailants.”221 In 
part for this reason, courts have found little reason to suppress when the 
police merely add to that suggestivity their statement that the suspect is in 
 
 
218. Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 237, 251. 
219. Human memory is not as fully reproductive as a videotape of an event would be but 
instead is partially constructive and as a result malleable. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus & 
James M. Doyle, Eyewitness Testimony: Civil and Criminal ch. 2–3 (3d ed. 1997); C.A. 
Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence: Co-Witness 
and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. Applied Psychol. 714, 720 (1994) (“The confidence that 
eyewitnesses express in their identifications is extremely malleable as a function of what 
they are led to believe about the identification decision of a co-witness.”); O’Toole & Shay, 
supra note 203, at 118 (describing human memory and perception for identification purposes 
as unlike a video recorder and instead as both subjective and malleable); Gary L. Wells & 
Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts 
Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. Applied Psychol. 360, 374 (1998) (“[A] 
casual comment from a lineup administrator following eyewitnesses’ identifications can 
have dramatic effects on their reconstructions of the witnessing and identification 
experience.”). 
220. 399 U.S. 1 (1970). 
221. Id. at 6. 
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the array, which most socially adept witnesses already assume when they 
are called to the police station to view a formally organized in-person lineup 
or when the investigating officer drives to their home or office to display a 
set of photographs.222 
There are, of course, degrees of difference between the strength of the 
suggestion. Some scholars argue, for example, that witnesses likely feel 
more pressure to pick someone at a lineup identification procedure where a 
group of suspects are assembled for viewing than they do at what is called a 
“showup,” which typically involves display of one or more suspects 
individually to the witness shortly after the crime occurs.223 Moreover, it is 
clear that a statement to pick someone from a photo display or lineup is 
suggestive. However, the moderating argument is that the chances of 
picking the wrong person are distributed across the number of participants 
in a multiperson display.224 
In Foster, the one case where the Court suppressed the witness’s 
identification, the message of the police by the way the suspect stood out in 
the first array, his presentation alone, and then repeating him alone in a 
subsequent multiperson display was to “pick this man.” Although the Court 
has not ranked suggestiveness or described officially its archetypal case, 
such repeated suggestion focused on a particular suspect is the prime 
candidate for due process condemnation. 
 
C. The Innocence Movement’s Alternative to the Due Process Paradigm 
The due process doctrine is triggered by police procedures that are 
suggestive. In this context, the due process suggestiveness doctrine  
provides some modest help in ensuring reliability, but because of its 
constitutional base, it is centered on protecting against government action 
that denies such reliability. A wide variety of practices may be suggestive, 
 
 
222. See, e.g., United States v. Gambrill, 449 F.2d 1148, 1151 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“Law 
enforcement personnel should avoid telling a witness that a definite suspect is in a lineup but 
it is not absolutely impermissible. Such statement has some degree of suggestiveness and, 
depending upon the surrounding circumstances, may be a factor to be considered in 
determining whether the lineup was unduly suggestive. It must be recognized, however, that 
any witness to a crime who is called upon to view a police lineup must realize that he would 
not be asked to view the lineup if there were not some person there whom the authorities 
suspected. To ignore this fact is to underestimate average intelligence. Thus, telling this to a 
witness may in many instances be relatively harmless.”); State v. Reed, 757 A.2d 482, 491– 
92 (Conn. 2000) (employing this reasoning and treating a statement regarding presence of 
suspect in group as minor suggestiveness factor). 
223. See Richard Gonzalez, Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Maceo Pembroke, Response Bias in 
Lineups and Showups, 64 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 525, 536 (1993). In both laboratory 
studies and in the field, subjects are far more likely to pick out a member of a lineup than of 
a showup, speculating that witnesses approach showups more cautiously. Id. The authors 
found that, as to lineups, witnesses see their task as picking the person who most resembles 
the suspect rather than the absolute judgment of whether the person shown is the same 
person, and that the real-world pressure from the police that is somehow communicated to 
pick someone at the later-stage lineup is substantial. Id. 
224. See, e.g., id. at 527. 
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but the very suggestive procedures in Foster, Brathwaite, and Biggers that 
focused on a single individual would be the type of action that would 
presumably most warrant suppression. 
The innocence movement, fueled by the exoneration of a large number of 
convicted defendants shown by DNA evidence to be innocent, took the 
discussion and analysis in a different direction. It focused on 
misidentifications and on accuracy in identification procedures. Sometimes 
those errors are caused by improper police conduct, and generally police 
procedures play some role, but an incorrect identification can easily occur 
in the absence of much, if any, governmental suggestivity. This movement 
leads to an alternative way of examining the propriety of identifications. 
This discussion is therefore not an extension of the criticism developed 
above of the due process identification doctrine. Rather, it is largely an 
alternative perspective. 
1. The General Illustration of the Preference for Sequential as Opposed to 
Simultaneous Display of Photographs 
Professor Gary Wells participated in shaping the reforms that came from 
the DNA exonerations, and he is a frequent and prominent commentator on 
its theoretical underpinnings.225 His treatment of the difference between 
simultaneous displays of photographs and sequential displays, the 
superiority of the latter, and the centrality of that distinction to this new 
focus is revealing. 
Imagine a group of six photographs. Assume that they are assembled in 
as nonsuggestive a manner as possible. Those shown in the photographs all 
generally match the victim’s description of the perpetrator given shortly 
after a criminal offense, and the format and general appearance of the 
photos are similar. Assume also that the photos are shown by a person who 
has no knowledge of the case or of the suspect’s identity (double-blind 
procedure) and that the witness is cautioned that the perpetrator may not be 
in the array. 
This procedure contains precious little suggestiveness. As described 
below, psychological studies show that whether the array is shown 
simultaneously rather than sequentially increases in a subtle but important 
way the pressure on the witness to make a selection. However, it is hard to 
imagine a court would suppress this otherwise exemplary procedure if 
challenged under the Due Process Clause if the photos were shown 
simultaneously rather than sequentially. Nevertheless, Wells sees the 
distinction between simultaneous and sequential as very important because 
it affects the accuracy of the identification. 
 
225. For example, he was a member of the National Institute of Justice Planning Panel 
whose work resulted in the U.S. Department of Justice’s Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for 
Law Enforcement. See Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law 
Enforcement (1999) [hereinafter NIJ Guide], available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf. 
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Wells explains that when a witness looks at a simultaneous display, he or 
she has a tendency to select the person who looks most like the offender in 
the group. On first examination (and certainly for due process purposes), 
this “relative-judgment” process seems sensible and  nonproblematic.226  
The problem, however, is that in every array, one person looks more like 
the perpetrator than the others as a matter of relative judgment; witnesses 
have a tendency to pick someone; and if the perpetrator is not present, they 
continue to pick the person in the group that most resembles the victim’s 
memory of the perpetrator. Moreover, they often confuse this relative 
judgment with recognition memory.227 Controlled studies show that the 
process of the witness actually selecting someone, the person who looks 
most like the perpetrator, continues at a relatively high, although 
diminished, rate when the perpetrator is not among those displayed.228 
Examination of DNA exonerations has shown that in a majority of the cases 
the actual perpetrator was not in the array when the innocent person was 
selected.229 
The psychological process of identification is quite different for 
sequential displays of photographs where the subject is shown one 
photograph at a time and must give a “yes,” “no,” or “not sure” answer 
before the next photograph is displayed. Under that process, the witness is 
not able to compare the photos to one another and sets higher criteria for 
making an identification.230 The process of selection is more of an absolute 
judgment of match with the memory of the perpetrator rather than a relative 
one of greatest similarity among those displayed. 
Wells argues that sequential procedures are particularly important and 
that field studies have shown the procedure is not very costly in terms of 
identifications lost as compared to simultaneous presentations, some of 
which would have been accurate in identifying perpetrators. Moreover, 
those identified in a sequential array are more likely to be the actual 
culprits.231 
 
 
226. See Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 
615, 618. 
227. Id. at 618–19. 
228. Id. at 619. Wells describes one controlled experiment in which 38% of witnesses 
picked the person not the perpetrator but looking most like the perpetrator when the real 
perpetrator was not present, as opposed to 13% of the time when the perpetrator was present. 
Id. In addition, 21% picked no one in the procedure where the perpetrator was present, and 
32% picked no one when the perpetrator was removed. Id. 
229. Id. at 620. 
230. Id. at 625–26. The witness can mentally compare the photograph to those presented 
before, but does not know whether the next photograph will be a better match. Under the 
sequential procedures, the witness is not supposed to be told he or she is viewing the final 
photograph. Id. Professor Wells notes that if a witness is allowed to go through the photos a 
second time, it effectively turns a sequential presentation into a simultaneous process since 
the witness can presumably largely remember and therefore mentally compare them during 
the second viewing. Id. at 627. 
231. Id. at 626–27. 
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If the identification procedure is only mildly suggestive or not suggestive 
at all, suppression under the Due Process Clause will not be a real prospect, 
particularly if a witness professes certainty of her identification, which 
Brathwaite recognized as a factor supporting reliability. Unfortunately, 
psychological studies show that certainty is only weakly correlated with 
accuracy.232 Moreover, certainty can be the product of the identification 
procedure itself and can grow over time without the victim realizing it.233 
Based on the problems of false identifications and building from 
empirical research on ways to improve identification procedures, 
recommendations were made for proper protocols for conducting 
identification procedures. In 1999, the National Institute of Justice guide 
was published.234 It recommends recording all descriptions given and all 
identification procedures; providing witness instructions, which include a 
statement that the suspect may not be in the group; and sequential 
presentation of suspects or photos. It also suggests moving toward a 
situation where the person administering the process does not know the 
suspect.235 
 
 
 
232. Id. at 620–21 (recounting that the combination of large numbers of studies shows 
that the correlation between accuracy and certainty is only .40 (1.0 indicting perfect 
correlation), showing that while a confident witness is more likely to be accurate than an 
unconfident witness, the relationship is not very strong). 
233. Id. at 621 (describing how positive feedback on the results of the identification 
procedure can cause the witness to become confident of what was initially only a tentative 
identification without recognition of that process). The psychological literature on 
eyewitness identification is extraordinarily extensive. I have only touched the surface and  
did so largely through one prominent figure, Professor Wells. My point was to illustrate a 
vastly different perspective on identification procedures linked to the message from DNA 
exonerations and the heightened concern with innocence. The innocence movement brought 
attention to misidentifications, whether or not resulting from highly suggestive procedures. 
The emphasis was not on the improper governmental conduct, which was not necessarily 
even present. It focused instead on accuracy and the avoidance of some miscarriage of 
justice by following better procedures. 
234. NIJ Guide, supra note 225; see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nat’l Inst. of Justice, 
Eyewitness Evidence: A Trainer’s Manual for Law Enforcement (2003), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/nij/eyewitness/188678.pdf. 
235. NIJ Guide, supra note 2255, at 9; Rosen, supra note 218, at 257–58. 
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Researchers have generally236 settled on six recommendations: (1) only 
one suspect should be in each lineup or photo array; (2) the suspect should 
not “stand out”; (3) the witness should be cautioned that the perpetrator 
might not be in the lineup or array; (4) those in the lineup or array should be 
displayed sequentially rather than simultaneously; (5) the person who 
administers the identification procedure should not know whether the 
suspect is in the lineup or array and certainly should be ignorant of the 
identity of the suspect (“double-blind testing”); and (6) a statement 
regarding the witness’s confidence should be collected at the time any 
identification is made.237 
In 2001, the attorney general of New Jersey directed all law enforcement 
agencies in the state to adopt procedures based on guidelines that 
incorporated these basic principles.238 Wisconsin’s attorney general has 
proposed similar procedures.239 In 2003, after consulting with experts and 
New Jersey officials, the North Carolina Commission on Actual Innocence 
proposed similar guidelines.240 As with the others, the North Carolina 
guidelines are stated as only promoting more accurate procedures and are 
not intended to create legally enforceable standards or result in exclusion of 
identification evidence.241 
 
 
 
236. Not all experts agree on all these features. In particular, some question the 
superiority of sequential to simultaneous display procedures. See, e.g., Brian L. Cutler & 
Steven D. Penrod, Mistaken Identification: The Eyewitness, Psychology, and the Law 127– 
36 (1995) (reviewing a dozen experimental studies “involving more than 1,800 participants 
[that] have compared the impact of sequential versus simultaneous presentations on 
identification performance” and concluding “the traditional method of simultaneous 
presentation carries no benefit in terms of correct identifications when perpetrators are 
present in an array”); Roy S. Malpass, A Policy Evaluation of Simultaneous and Sequential 
Lineups, 12 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 394 (2006) (arguing that simultaneous procedures are 
superior to sequential procedures under many policy assumptions). This limited debate 
should be resolved as research continues, including analysis of results of practices in the 
field. See, e.g., Amy Klobuchar et al., Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin 
County’s Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 381, 
410–13 (2006) (finding field results consistent with laboratory research indicating 
superiority of sequential identification procedures). Despite the criticisms, the  
overwhelming weight of scientific opinion remains that in most situations double-blind 
sequential methods are superior to simultaneous ones in avoiding wrongful convictions, and 
I see no reason to alter that view until and unless further research demonstrates otherwise. 
237. Wells, supra note 226, at 623–31. 
238. See Dep’t of Law and Pub. Safety, Office of the Att’y Gen. of N.J., Attorney  
General Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup Identification 
Procedures (2001), available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf. 
239. Wis. Dep’t of Justice Bureau of Training and Standards for Criminal Justice, Office 
of the Att’y Gen. of Wis., Model Policy and Procedure for Eyewitness Identification 3 
(2005), available at http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/EyewitnessPublic.pdf. 
240. N.C. Actual Innocence Comm’n, Recommendations for Eyewitness Identification 
(2003), available at 
http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/ids/News%20&%20Updates/Eyewitness%20ID.pdf. 
241. Id. at 1. The guidelines state, “The recommendations made herein are not intended  
to create, do not create, and may not be relied on to create, any rights, substantive or 
procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal.” Id. 
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2. The Specific Illustration of the “All Suspects” Photo Display 
The identification procedure used in the Duke lacrosse case involved a 
so-called “all-suspects” photograph procedure, and in the next section, I 
examine the specifics of that procedure. Here, I examine generally the 
problems with an all-suspect identification procedure. 
Professor Wells has particular criticism for procedures in which multiple 
suspects are included in the array or where the array is composed entirely of 
suspects.242 As he approaches the subject, the criticism is not because an 
all-suspect model violates due process.243 Although he does not say so 
explicitly, Wells’s analysis assumes that the fact that the array is composed 
only of suspects is not communicated to the witness. As developed below, 
the procedure creates additional damage if its all-suspect nature is 
communicated to or known by the witness, as occurred in the Duke lacrosse 
case procedure. 
Let us first consider such an all-suspects array where that fact is not 
communicated to the witness. In their analysis of the problematic nature of 
the all-suspect procedure, Wells and John Turtle assert that such a 
 
 
242. Wells, supra note 226, at 618. 
243. A handful of cases has examined multiple- or all-suspect identification procedures 
and has found no violation of due process suggestiveness for various reasons. Only one case 
clearly involved communication to witnesses of the fact that multiple suspects would be 
displayed. In United States v. Rodriguez, 363 F. Supp. 499 (D.P.R. 1973), after the arrest of 
twenty-nine people in a courtroom altercation, all those arrested were displayed in lineups of 
four individuals. A police officer filler was added to each lineup, but the court assumed it 
likely that many of the fillers were known to the witnesses and treated the lineups as 
effectively all-suspect identifications. At the end of the process, six of the twenty-nine were 
identified and indicted. The court relied in part on the need for fast action to sort the guilty 
from the others who had been arrested, and while it “frown[ed]” upon the practice, it did not 
find a violation of due process. Id. at 500–03. 
McNeary v. Stone, 482 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1973), is ambiguous on the witness’s 
knowledge. A bartender who had been robbed by three men was shown only the pictures of 
three men arrested in a nearly identical robbery and picked the defendant some time later. 
The facts do not indicate whether the victim was told that the photos came from another 
robbery arrest. The court found the final showing of three photos improper but not alone 
sufficient to find that the entire process gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification. Id. at 805–06. 
The facts of United States v. McCray, 948 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Tex. 1996), present a 
display that is most similar in terms of the preparation of the array, but there is no indication 
that the composition was communicated to the witness. There, an all-suspect photo array  
was used and the defendant was selected. The court was troubled by the concept that anyone 
selected would be the “‘right choice,’” and treated the all-suspect character of the array as 
suggestive. After the balancing process, however, it found no violation of due process. Id. at 
622–24. 
In United States v. Snead, 447 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1978), the court stated, 
without any suggestion that the witness knew of the practice, that placing photographs of 
four suspects along with photographs of ten other individuals of similar age and appearance 
to the suspects was not impressibly suggestive. The treatment of the issue in United States v. 
Reid, 527 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1975), is extremely brief. Without giving any reason to believe 
the witness knew the presence of another suspect in the lineup, it stated the practice did not 
“negate the propriety of the procedure.” Id. at 384. 
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construction of the array has no impact on suggestiveness.244 Rather, the 
problem they criticize is in the inferiority of the multiple- or all-suspect 
lineup in producing information.245 
Compare in your mind three photo arrays each containing six individuals. 
As with the imaginary array described earlier, make it as nonsuggestive as 
possible in appearance and arrange the procedures for the display to be fair 
and nonsuggestive. Assume the crime is a liquor store robbery in a major 
city. Assume three photographic arrays containing one common photo, 
which is picked each time, and five other photos that are of different men in 
each array but are indistinguishable in that they all equally match the 
description and equally resemble the common photo. Assume the police  
tell the victim nothing about any of those whose pictures are in the arrays. 
Assume the same suspect is in each array based on criminal record, 
residence nearby, and a general match to the relatively general description. 
In the first array, all but the man whose photo was picked are nonsuspect 
fillers in that the officer has checked and found that all have airtight alibis 
since they were in jail at the time of the robbery. In the second, all the other 
photos are of suspects as well in that all have criminal records of having 
committed an armed robbery in the general vicinity of the liquor store, have 
no apparent alibi, and match the general description of the robber. In the 
third, the other individuals are not suspects in the officer’s mind; he just 
picked them from the robbery section’s file pool of photos, but he has no 
idea whether they have alibis. 
In the first procedure—the single-suspect procedure—if the witness picks 
a filler, the error is harmless in that the person picked will not be 
prosecuted.246 Indeed, one can see the purpose of the lineup as being a test 
of whether the witness can pick the suspect as the perpetrator rather than 
identifying a filler.247 The police do not know independently whether a 
person picked is guilty or not. Thus, the selection of the suspect may be an 
 
 
244. See generally Gary L. Wells & John W. Turtle, Eyewitness Identification: The 
Importance of Lineup Models, 99 Psychol. Bull. 320, 326, 329 (1986). Wells and Turtle 
state, 
It is interesting to note the implications of the fact that the lineup models differ 
profoundly at the level of lineup-wise error rate but not at the level of posterior 
probabilities of false identification for a given suspect. One implication of this is 
that a defendant has no argument for his defense on the basis of police having used 
an all-suspect model rather than a single-suspect model. It cannot be said that the 
individual suspect’s degree of protection or due process is jeopardized by the 
lineup model being used. Perhaps this is why courts have never addressed the 
issue. 
Id. at 329. 
245. The authors state, “[T]he fact that the single suspect model partitions eyewitness 
identification errors into foil identifications and false identifications (whereas every 
identification error is a false identification with the all-suspect model) has important 
implications for the overall expected rate of false identifications.” Id. at 326. 
246. Professors Wells and Turtle use the term “foil” rather than filler to describe this 
function. Id. at 321. 
247. Wells, supra note 226, at 618 & n.13. 
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accurate or an inaccurate identification. In single-suspect procedures, 
however, many errors of mistaken witnesses are detected as the result of 
picking someone who could not have committed the crime. Every pick of a 
filler is recognized as a mistake and is harmless, not a misidentification, 
since the person mistakenly chosen will not be prosecuted. 
In the second array, the all-suspect identification procedure, there is no 
test in the sense of determining whether the witness can pick the suspect or 
will pick a filler. The witness cannot get a wrong answer. Anyone picked 
would be presumed to have committed the offense and would be 
prosecuted. As a result, an error by a witness who “is merely guessing or 
has a weak memory” will not be discovered through the picking process 
when that person picks a filler, as he or she is likely to do.248 
The third array shows something of the ambiguity of what constitutes a 
“suspect.” The officer had no specific reason to suspect any one of these 
individuals but he did not know they were eliminated from commission of 
the offense, and in coming from robbery squad files, the photos had a 
somewhat higher than ordinary likelihood of being of the perpetrator. My 
experience from practice in Washington, D.C., was that occasionally there 
was other evidence, after investigation, supporting the guilt of fillers who 
were picked and charged. Wells describes the function of a “foil” as one 
who will not be prosecuted if selected, thereby producing information on 
accuracy. This function of the “filler” or “foil” suggests that fillers should 
not only not be prime suspects but also should be individuals entirely 
eliminated from suspicion.249 
Note that these procedures differ none at all with respect to 
suggestiveness. However, they differ extraordinarily with regard to how 
much information they potentially provide regarding accuracy and whether 
they imperil the innocent. 
 
D. The Identification Procedures in the Duke Lacrosse Case 
 
1. Procedures and Police Justification 
Effective February 1, 2006, the Durham Police Department adopted 
General Order 4077, which was based on the North Carolina Actual 
Innocence Commission guidelines.250 According to the Durham Police 
 
 
248. Id. at 618 n.13. 
249. My experience, albeit dated, was that many times the circumstances of picking the 
photos would produce this result. For example, while the suspect’s photo was generally 
taken at the time of an arrest, the filler photos were often accumulated over a period of time, 
meaning that those individuals were often much older than the person described by the 
victim and many had been convicted of earlier offenses and were in prison with an “airtight” 
alibi. 
250. General Order 4077, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary 
Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) (on file with author); see also 
Memorandum from Steven W. Chalmers, Chief of Police of Durham, to Patrick W. Baker, 
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Department, they complied with the protocol for the first two identification 
procedures on March 16 and March 21, 2006.251 
Crystal Mangum had stated the names used by her attackers were “Brett,” 
“Adam,” and “Matt.” On March 16, 2006, Sergeant Gottlieb directed the 
police to put together photo arrays based on potential suspect names of 
Adam, Brett, and Matt.252 The police examined the Duke lacrosse team 
photos for individuals with those names. They found one with the name of 
“Brett,” one with a similar sounding name of “Breck,” one with the name of 
“Adam,” and three with the name of “Matt.” However, they focused on 
Matt Zash, who was a tenant of the house.253 
They assembled four photo arrays with one suspect in each and five 
“fillers.” However, all of the fillers were Duke lacrosse players whose 
photos were taken from the Duke lacrosse team photo. Whether Mangum 
knew or presumed these were all Duke lacrosse players is not known. No 
Duke name or logo appeared on the V-neck, which was all the clothing 
shown in the photo,254 so there was no direct indication. On the other hand, 
the clothing was identical, and the V-neck and fabric suggested the  
common uniforms of a team. The police department defended the selection 
on the basis that it meant all were similarly dressed. The department claims 
that the fillers were selected to resemble the targets.255 
The arrays were identified by the letters A through D with photo array A 
for “Matt,” B for “Adam,” C for “Brett,” and D for “Matt” again,256 since 
three of the lacrosse team members were named Matt.257 Reade Seligmann 
was a “filler” in A. According to Investigator Michelle Soucie’s report, the 
accuser remarked that “this is harder than I thought.”258 According to 
Investigator Richard Clayton’s report, “[I]n photo array (A) she stated that 
the people in the photos looked alike.”259 From photo array A, she selected 
Seligmann’s photo, stating she was seventy percent sure that she recognized 
 
City Manager of Durham 4 (May 11, 2007) [hereinafter Chalmers Memorandum] (on file 
with author). 
251. Chalmers Memorandum, supra note 250, at 3–4; see also Memorandum from  
Patrick W. Baker, City Manager of Durham, to Steven W. Chalmers, Chief of Police of 
Durham 3 (May 11, 2007) [hereinafter Baker Memorandum] (on file with author). 
252. Sgt. Gottlieb’s Supplemental Report, supra note 35, at 3 (describing instructions to 
Investigator Michelle Soucie to assemble photo arrays on March 16, 2006). 
253. Chalmers Memorandum, supra note 250, at 3. 
254. See, e.g., Durham Police Dep’t Sequential Photographic Identification, N.C. State 
Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 
2007) (photos of array A used on March 16, 2006). 
255. Chalmers Memorandum, supra note 250, at 3–4. 
256. Joseph Neff, Duke Lacrosse Files Show Gaps in DA’s Case, News & Observer 
(Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 6, 2006, at 1A. 
257. Chalmers Memorandum, supra note 250, at 3. 
258. Investigator Michelle Soucie’s Supplemental Report, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 
06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) (on file with 
author). 
259. Supplemental Case Report of Investigator R.D. Clayton at 1, N.C. State Bar v. 
Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) 
[hereinafter Clayton’s Supplemental Report] (on file with author). 
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him from the party, but was not sure “where exactly she saw [him] at the 
party.”260 The accuser picked out four others whom she said she was certain 
were at the party.261 The result was that after displaying pictures of over 
half the team to Mangum—a total of twenty-four photos—the police had no 
identification of anyone allegedly involved in the rape. 
The Durham police explained that they then focused on the two other 
team members who were tenants of the house and who were at the party, 
Dave Evans and Dan Flannery, as suspects. A picture of the third tenant, 
Matt Zash, had been shown in array A, and Mangum had said nothing about 
him.262 They had become suspicious that false names had been used, 
understanding that Flannery had used a somewhat altered name in hiring the 
dancers (“Flanagan”).  They put together two more photo arrays, which  
they showed on March 21, 2006. The fillers were selected in the same way, 
from the Duke lacrosse team photo, with five fillers per array. Neither of  
the other individuals ultimately picked, Seligmann and Finnerty, were in 
these arrays.263 
Although she viewed his photo twice, Mangum did not identify Evans 
nor anyone else from these arrays.264 At this point, Mangum had been 
shown thirty-six of the forty-six Duke lacrosse players’ photographs and 
had not identified anyone.265 
On March 31, 2006, Investigator Hinman and Sergeant Gottlieb met with 
Nifong. During that meeting, Nifong suggested showing Mangum the 
photos taken as a result of the nontestimonial identification order under 
which the forty-six white players on the team were required to be 
photographed.266 According to the police, Nifong suggested that the 
 
 
260. Id. at 1–2. 
261. See Neff, supra note 256; see also Clayton’s Supplemental Report, supra note 259, 
at 2. The four were Fred Krom, Nick O’Hara, Kevin Meyer, and Brad Ross. See Motion to 
Suppress Identification, supra note 166, at 12 (pictures in array). Investigators would later 
learn that Ross was not at the party, being in Raleigh on that night. See Ekstrand Letter to 
Nifong, supra note 177, at 1–3 (providing documentation of presence in Raleigh). 
262. Motion to Suppress Identification, supra note 166, para. 37, at 11 (indicating only 
her pick of photo number five, which was of Seligmann). 
263. Id. para. 43, at 12. 
264. See Attorney General’s Report, supra note 16, at 10; Clayton’s Supplemental 
Report, supra note 259, at 2 (explaining that during the March 21, 2006, procedure Mangum 
asked to look at both of the photo arrays a second time but was unable to identify anyone). 
265. As noted earlier, none of the photos was repeated. See supra note 174. 
266. Many explanations for use of these photographs were given. Among them was that 
the initial photos from the team web site were so “military like” or so similar that it was 
difficult to see them as individuals. See Sgt. Gottlieb Deposition, supra note 174, at 118 
(referring to “‘military like’ appearance”); Nifong Deposition, supra note 96, at 169–70 
(indicating that Investigator Himan or Sergeant Gottlieb had informed Nifong that “they 
could not really tell one player from another” in the photographs they had); Nifong 
Transcript, supra note 45, at 45 (recounting that one officer told him that the pictures of the 
players the police had obtained from the Duke web site all “looked alike”); Himan 
Transcript, supra note 156, at 200 (explaining that one of the reasons for securing the photos 
through the nontestimonial identification order was that the players looked different at the 
time of the incident than they did in the photos the police had at that moment). 
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pictures be shown to Mangum to “see if she could provide any additional 
information or details about the night in question. Investigators hoped that 
this would develop some leads, such as potential witnesses . . . .” They 
claimed they also wanted to use the photos and her memory of that evening 
to “help establish that she was not impaired by a memory altering substance 
which would then assist in gauging the reliability of [her] allegations.”267 
The police admitted that the procedure did not comply with department 
policy regarding identification procedures but explained that they did not 
intend nor expect her to positively identify her attackers during this 
procedure.268 They claimed in essence that they did not intend it to be an 
identification procedure and therefore did not attempt to comply with 
General Order 4077.269 
This excuse is weak. Mangum was instructed that she would be viewing 
the people the police “had reason to believe attended the party” and that she 
was to indicate “any type of interactions she may have had or observed with 
a particular individual,”270 which includes interaction during the rape. 
Moreover, the procedures were being videotaped with two cameras,271 
which were visible to Mangum,272 and might have suggested to her that her 
identification of the attackers was expected. The police may have been 
surprised that she identified anyone since she had previously failed to do so, 
but nothing about their conduct indicated this procedure did not have the 
potential to be an identification procedure. 
On that occasion, the police did not use double-blind procedures.  
Gottlieb is the person who instructed Mangum that she would “look at 
people we had reason to believe attended the party.”273 
Mangum made four identifications of photos that she connected to the 
rape: 
 
 
 
267. Chalmers Memorandum, supra note 250, at 5. 
268. Baker Memorandum, supra note 251, at 2–3. 
269. Sergeant Gottlieb lamely offered the explanation that General Order 4077 was not 
applicable because they had no individual suspects. See Sgt. Gottlieb Deposition, supra note 
174, at 123. Also, he gave an explanation for showing large numbers of individuals from the 
same group that in other circumstances has some validity. It is the same concept as using a 
yearbook as the basis of an identification if the victim of an armed robbery states that the 
perpetrator wore a particular school’s jacket. Id. 
270. Sgt. Gottlieb’s Supplemental Report, supra note 35, at 8, 9 (describing in notes for 
March 31, 2006, suggestions from Nifong and his rationale for showing photos). 
271. Gottlieb indicated in his notes that the procedures were being videotaped for court 
purposes (“so potential Jurors . . . could witness both the victim, her reactions, and the 
photographs in real time”), which is at least apparently contrary to his contention that he was 
not conducting an identification procedure. Sgt. Gottlieb’s Supplemental Report, supra note 
35, at 9. 
272. See Sgt. Gottlieb’s Deposition, supra note 174, at 125 (answering that Mangum 
could see the camera and observing that it was behind him); Himan Transcript, supra note 
156, at 77 (stating that Mangum was aware of the camera photographing her during this 
procedure). 
273. Sgt. Gottlieb’s Supplemental Report, supra note 35, at 9. 
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• First, she made a tentative identification of photo number four, 
Matthew Wilson, stating, “He looked like Bret[t] but I’m not 
sure.”274 Gottlieb asked whether this Brett was one of the guys 
that assaulted her and she responded, “Um hum.”275 
• She picked the next photo shown to her, number five, Dave 
Evans, stating that “[h]e looks like one of the guys who assaulted 
me sort [sic].” Sergeant Gottlieb asked how sure she was, and 
Mangum responded, “He looks just like him without the 
mustache.” After asking for and getting confirmation that “the 
person had a mustache,” Gottlieb asked her for her degree of 
certainty (“percentage wise”). Mangum said, “About 90%.”276 
• Only two photos later, number seven, she picked Reade 
Seligmann, stating that “[h]e looks like one of the guys who 
assaulted me.” In response to a question about “how sure,” she 
said, “100%.”277 Gottlieb then asked how he assaulted her, to 
which Mangum answered, “He was the one that was standing in 
front of me . . . that made me perform oral sex on him.”278 
• Finally, thirty-three photos later, she picked photo number forty, 
Collin Finnerty: “He is the guy who assaulted me.” When asked 
by Gottlieb what he did, Mangum asserted, “He put his penis in 
my anus and my vagina.” Gottlieb inquired whether he was the 
first or second to do that, to which she answered, “The second.” 
Mangum indicated in response to another question from Gottlieb 
that Finnerty was not the one who strangled her.279 
 
2. Due Process Analysis 
a. Suggestiveness of Procedures 
The procedures used involved two types of suggestivity in the classic 
sense. The first applied to all three of the individuals picked. Mangum was 
informed that she would be viewing people the police had reason to believe 
attended the party.280 Thus police stated directly that she would be viewing 
partygoers and implicitly only partygoers—thus only potential suspects.281 
Statements or suggestions by the police that the suspect is among those 
displayed obviously makes it more likely that the witness will select 
 
274. Id. at 11. 
275. Id. 
276. Id. 
277. Id. at 12. 
278. Id. 
279. Id. at 20. 
280. Id. at 9. Nifong knew that Mangum would be informed that she was viewing the 
people whom police believed were at the party. See Sgt. Gottlieb Deposition, supra note 174, 
at 120–21, 126. 
281. The police statement suggests that Mangum would be viewing a set of people who 
were all suspects and that she would be viewing the entire group of suspects. 
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someone. This type of suggestivity is present in most procedures, although 
it was communicated explicitly and therefore more strongly in  this case.  
On the other hand, the suggestivity as to any particular individual was 
reduced because all the pictures looked identical in format and were very 
similar in many aspects of physical appearance, such as age, and thus gave 
no indication that the police suspected any one or ones in specific. This 
procedure differed strongly from the “pick this man” aspect of Brathwaite’s 
one-photo display of a single suspect. 
The other type of suggestion came from the repetition of some of the 
pictures shown. Repetition did not, however, point toward a narrow 
subgroup. On March 16, 2006, Seligmann’s photo was shown to Mangum 
as a “filler” in array A, one of the “Matt” arrays. At that time, Mangum 
selected his photograph, stating she was seventy percent confident 
Seligmann was at the party, and she selected four other players as definitely 
attending the party.282 Evans’s picture was included as a suspect photo in 
one of the arrays shown on March 21, 2006. She looked at those arrays 
twice, but picked no one.283 Finnerty’s photo had not been previously 
shown to Mangum, and as to him, this type of suggestion was absent. Thus, 
Mangum had been shown Seligmann’s and Evans’s photos previously, but 
they stood in similar positions to many other members of the team whose 
photos were included in these same photo arrays.284 
Since the Supreme Court has not described in detail what psychological 
theory of suggestiveness its due process analysis embraces,285 a careful 
comparison of levels of constitutionally cognizable harm or suggestiveness 
in various procedures cannot be confidently done. However, if the 
 
282. See Clayton’s Supplemental Report, supra note 259, at 1–2. 
283. Id. at 2. 
284. Like Seligmann’s photo, the photos of twenty-three others had been shown to 
Mangum on March 16, 2006; she had picked a total of five individuals on that day that she 
recognized as attending the party, and she had been 100% sure of seeing the other four. Like 
Evans’s photo, the photos of eleven others had been shown to Mangum on March 21, 2006. 
Id. at 1–2. 
285. The Court has frequently stated its concern with the almost inherent unreliability of 
eyewitness identification. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (“The 
vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with 
instances of mistaken identification.” (citations omitted)). The Court has occasionally cited 
scholars about general factors that make an eyewitness more suggestive. In Simmons v. 
United States, the Court noted that the danger of misidentification is increased if the police 
repeatedly show a picture of the same person or it is emphasized in some way or if they state 
they have other evidence indicating that one of the persons pictured committed the offense. 
390 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1968) (citing Wall, supra note 192, at 74–77, 82–83); see also Moore 
v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 229 (1977) (stating that “a one-on-one confrontation generally is 
thought to present greater risks of mistaken identification than a lineup”) (citing, inter alia, 
Glanville Williams & H.A. Hammelmann, Identification Parades-I, 1963 Crim. L. Rev. 479, 
480–81); Wall, supra note 192, at 27–40). The Court has also recognized that, “[r]egardless 
of how the initial misidentification comes about, the witness thereafter is apt to retain in his 
memory the image of the photograph rather than of the person actually seen, reducing the 
trustworthiness of subsequent lineup or courtroom identification.” Simmons, 390 U.S. at 
383–84 (citing Wall, supra note 192, at 68–70). However, it has not gone further in 
providing a way to calibrate improper suggestiveness. 
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reliability factors had been strong, I contend this degree of suggestivity on 
April 4, 2006, would not have resulted in suppression. The strength of the 
direction to pick a particular suspect is hardly in the category of 
Brathwaite’s showing of one suspect’s photo to the witness or Foster’s 
repeatedly presenting the same suspect to the witness. 
On the other hand, the procedures did clearly involve some level of 
police-organized suggestiveness. Suppression under the Due Process  
Clause would have depended on the other factors. Brathwaite establishes 
those as (1) opportunity to observe the criminal, (2) degree of attention, (3) 
accuracy of prior descriptions of the criminal, (4) level of certainty in 
picking the suspect, and (5) time between the event and the identification. 
In a rape case that in fact occurred as Mangum described, her testimony 
could have been very strong on factors (1) and (2), opportunity to observe 
and attention level, as they were in Biggers, also a rape case. Her level of 
certainty, factor (4), was stated at 100% for Seligmann and Finnerty, and 
90% for Evans. The period of time, factor (5), between the event and the 
identification was a little over two weeks, far less than the eight-month span 
in Biggers, but still not immediate. This factor likely would not count 
strongly in either direction. In the ordinary case with a confident witness, 
the victim’s strong opportunity to observe three men at close range in a 
lighted bathroom while she was raped would provide the type of reliability 
that would allow the prosecution to prevail. 
 
b. Factors Showing the (Un)Reliability of the Identification 
The identification procedure in this case differed from most, likely not in 
suggestivity, but rather in the lack of reliability factors that generally swing 
the balance against suppression but would have had the opposite effect in 
this case. Disciplinary Hearing Commission panel chair Williamson stated 
in his closing comments that he believed it “reasonably clear” that 
Mangum’s identification would have been suppressed had the motion to 
suppress been litigated in February 2007 as initially scheduled.286 The 
defense motion to suppress is masterful. While it describes  the  
suggestivity, it concentrates on the shifting versions given by the accuser of 
the events and the strong reasons to doubt a rape took place at all. The 
burden of the argument is that the story, which includes the identification, is 
simply not reliable. 
The Brathwaite factors do not directly invite such an argument, but they 
leave room for it. Some of the defense evidence clearly fits under factor  
(3), the accuracy of descriptions. Mangum apparently gave no description 
of her attackers until March 16, 2006, when she was interviewed by Himan 
and Gottlieb. Himan’s handwritten notes give descriptions of three men.287 
 
 
286. Williamson Statement, supra note 1, at 22. 
287. All were described earlier as white males. “Adam”—“short, red cheeks,” brown 
“fluffy hair,” and “chubby face”; “Matt”—“heavy set,” “260–270,” “short hair cut”; 
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None fit Finnerty well at all. “Matt” is described as weighing 260 to 270 
pounds, which fits none of the three.288 Gottlieb took no notes of the 
interview and typed his notes regarding it as late as July 2006.289 His typed 
notes gave almost completely different descriptions from Himan.290 These 
descriptions better match the suspects. One of them could be Finnerty,291 
and no one is described as being 260 and 270 pounds.292 In Gottlieb’s 
version, these descriptions are not associated with particular names. At the 
minimum, Mangum seems to have given two very different sets of 
descriptions. Her statement when picking Evans that the man who raped  
her had a mustache293 adds a descriptive feature that had not previously 
been given. Moreover, that feature does not match Evans’s actual 
appearance at the time of the party. His defense produced photographs 
taken shortly before and after the party showing Evans without a mustache 
either time.294 
On December 21, 2006, an investigator for the district attorney’s office, 
Linwood Wilson, interviewed Mangum.295 The defense based  a  
supplement to the suppression motion on the victim’s radically different 
version of the events that came out of that interview. That interview, which 
the defense alleged conveniently modified the victim’s time line of events 
 
 
 
“Brett”—“chubby,” “saw a picture of him” [apparently in the house]. Handwritten Notes of 
Investigator Benjamin W. Himan at 3–4, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 
(Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) (on file with author). 
288. Id. 
289. See Joseph Neff, Lacrosse Probe Has Much Fodder, News & Observer (Raleigh, 
N.C.), July 1, 2007, at 1B; see also Sgt. Gottlieb Deposition, supra note 174, at 26 (testifying 
he had only three pages of handwritten notes); id. at 28 (testifying that sometimes he wrote 
notes on a board, of which he assumed Himan was taking photos before they were erased but 
photos were not being taken); id. at 29 (testifying that his typed notes were in part prepared 
“initially” and part done “afterwards”); id. at 34 (testifying that he first typed up his notes 
from the early contact with Mangum after the indictment); id. at 39 (testifying that he “did a 
lot of typing during that last week” when the notes were turned in). 
290. No names were given. “She described the three men as 1) W/M, young, blonde hair, 
baby faced, tall and lean, 2) W/M, medium height (5’8”+ with Himan’s build), dark hair 
medium build, and had red (rose colored) cheeks, and the third suspect as being a W/M, 6+ 
feet, large build, with dark hair.” Sgt. Gottlieb’s Supplemental Report, supra note 35, at 2 
(describing the conversation on March 16, 2006, with Mangum). 
291. Gottlieb’s description of suspect number one matches Finnerty’s general description. 
See Joseph Neff, Cop Says Nurse Found Trauma in Duke Case, News & Observer (Raleigh, 
N.C.), Aug. 27, 2006, at 1A (noting that the description of the tall, lean, baby-faced attacker 
in Gottlieb’s typed notes matches Finnerty but that police did not show his picture to 
Mangum in displays presented on March 16 and 21). 
292. Sgt. Gottlieb’s Supplemental Report, supra note 35, at 2. 
293. Id. at 11. 
294. Motion to Suppress Identification, supra note 166, para. 138, at 34–35 and 
accompanying photographs. 
295. Investigative Report, Interview of Crystal Mangum by Investigator Linwood E. 
Wilson at 1, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the 
N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) [hereinafter Wilson Interview of Mangum] (on file with 
author). 
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in a way that avoided Seligmann’s alibi evidence296 and altered Evans’s 
mustache to a “5 o’clock shadow,”297 also changed the roles given to the 
three attackers. However, with regard to the due process test, the interview 
arguably obliterated any reliability that might be based on correspondence 
between Sergeant Gottlieb’s description of the attackers because, in 
changing and confusing roles of the attacker, it was now impossible to 
know what past descriptions meant.298 
Since the motion to suppress identification was never heard, we cannot 
know how it would have been decided. The trial judge is the finder of fact, 
which includes determining the credibility of the witness. Based on  
medical history and the description of Mangum given in the attorney 
general’s report,299 there is strong reason to believe that the judge would 
have found her version of events lacking credibility. If he so found, or if he 
otherwise found the evidence regarding reliability to be deficient, he had a 
doctrinal basis in due process suggestibility law to suppress Mangum’s out- 
of-court and in-court identification. Then the case would have to be 
dismissed. 
3. Failure of Procedures to Fulfill the Prosecutor’s Duty to Do Justice 
The due process-based analysis misses the more significant flaw in the 
identification procedure.  It was toward this other type of problem that most 
of the implicit criticism was focused, even if it sometimes couched the 
objections in terms of suggestiveness. The attorney general’s report notes 
that due to failure to use nonsuspect fillers, the procedures used violated 
Durham Police Department policy.300 Psychologists Wells and  Brian  
Cutler criticized the process for the failure to include nonsuspects or fillers 
and  having  the  critical  identification  procedure  conducted  by  someone 
 
 
 
296. Videotape: Testimony of Reade W. Seligmann (June 15, 2007), at RS 55:00–56:30 
(on file with author) (describing how the new version appeared to the defense team to 
conveniently reduce the significance of his announced alibi and eliminated the significance 
of the lack of DNA evidence); Joseph Neff, To the End, the Account Continues to Change, 
News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 18, 2007, at 1A (describing Linwood Wilson as 
emerging “with a story rich with new or previously unknown details that were, at first 
glance, favorable to the prosecution”). On June 25, 2007, the new acting district attorney, 
Jim Hardin, terminated Wilson’s employment with the Durham County district attorney’s 
office. See Anne Blythe, Durham DA’s Investigator Jobless, News & Observer (Raleigh, 
N.C.), June 26, 2007, at 3B. 
297. See Wilson Interview of Mangum, supra note 295, at 5. 
298. First Supplement to Motion to Suppress the Alleged “Identification” of the 
Defendants by the Accuser, paras. 64–73, at 17–18, State v. Seligmann, Nos. 06 CRS 4333- 
36, 06 CRS 4332-33, 06 CRS 5582-83 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2007) (on file with author) 
(arguing that with the confusion of roles it is hopeless to make sense of the descriptions 
previously given). 
299. See Attorney General’s Report, supra note 16, at 14–15 (noting serious credibility 
issues). 
300. Id. at 11. 
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directly involved in the investigation.301 They criticized the procedure’s 
poor execution primarily for tending to yield “uncertain or misleading 
results”302 and for not helping to “rule out the other nuisance or extraneous 
results.”303 
The Durham Police Department’s internal analysis of its role in the Duke 
lacrosse case, which was issued in April 2007, is properly criticized for 
many failings.304 However, I find the department’s own perspective on the 
most serious flaw in the identification procedure to be quite perceptive: 
[R]egardless of our intentions, the April 4 photo process created the 
opportunity for the false allegations to be specifically linked to Evans, 
Seligmann and Finnerty . . . . Given the ultimate use of the results of 
showing the witness those pictures on that day, we regret the . . . creation 
of the opportunity to perpetuate false charges against these individuals.305 
The due process suggestiveness doctrine has a goal of reliability, but it is 
focused on avoiding irreparable mistaken identification that is created by 
police action that purposefully or inadvertently suggests to the witness 
whom to pick. It presumes that a crime took place and that the victim or 
witness is honestly attempting to pick the perpetrator. It is not principally 
designed to test witness honesty. 
The procedures developed by the innocence movement go further and 
attempt to avoid mistakes even when they are not based on suggestiveness 
by the police. Again, these procedures are not focused on the witness who  
is falsely attempting to perpetrate a hoax or the deluded and delusional 
witness, but in ensuring accuracy they have that effect. 
Telling most witnesses that the suspects are among the photos to be 
displayed would have the impact of encouraging identification and is 
therefore damaging to all those in the array.306 Giving this information to a 
questionable witness is a recipe for the disaster that occurred. 
As to the earlier identification procedures, the Durham Police 
Department got its argument about fillers only partially right. I believe the 
 
 
301. Joseph Neff, Experts: Lacrosse IDs Likely Tainted, News & Observer (Raleigh, 
N.C.), Oct. 8, 2006, at 1A. 
302. Id. (quoting Professor Wells). 
303. Id. (quoting Professor Cutler). 
It is not so clear that the use of Gottlieb, who was associated with the investigation, to 
conduct the process provided much potential to taint it as is sometimes the case because 
there were no clear suspects here, in contrast with many cases. The police seemed to have 
little basis to suspect one member of the team over another, although they did have some 
information regarding players who were not in attendance. Where a clear suspect exists, the 
danger of suggestion is strongest. 
304. The City of Durham created a committee to review the conduct of the police during 
the investigation and prosecution. See Neff, supra note 289. 
305. Baker Memorandum, supra note 251, at 3. I omitted “inadvertent” as in “inadvertent 
creation of the opportunity” from the second sentence and inserted ellipses because I am not 
confident the word is totally accurate if applied to all those involved. 
306. In this case, the statement was likely understood that all the Duke lacrosse players at 
the party were suspects and therefore all of that group and only that group was included. 
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definition of fillers based on Wells’s theory of separating harmless mistakes 
from misidentifications is that a filler should be someone who will not be 
charged if identified.307 Even though they had a theory under which one 
person was a suspect, the theory was so weak, particularly as to the March 
21, 2006, arrays where the two men who lived in the house were the 
“suspects,” that anyone picked, including those intended to be fillers, had a 
good chance of being charged. Whether that would have been the police 
position, that is certainly what Nifong’s later conduct shows he would have 
done. Thus, these purported fillers were not appropriately selected by the 
police. 
Fortunately for justice, there were fillers in the strong functional sense of 
the term—people who could not have done the crime—both in the earlier 
arrays and in the final group of forty-six photos shown to Mangum on April 
4, 2006. All forty-six photos were of Duke lacrosse players, but not all of 
those players attended the party.308 Even though they were all lacrosse 
players, those who were not in attendance were functionally fillers. 
Mangum incorrectly picked one of those fillers, Brad Ross, not as an 
attacker but as someone who she remembered was at the party. Information 
about her lack of accuracy was gained. However, even though there may 
have been some photos that functioned as fillers, their number was 
inadequate.309 
In terms of Nifong’s ethical responsibility to “do justice,” he did not give 
full play to the function of the filler, which was demonstrated by his 
disregard for Seligmann’s alibi. Wells’s assumptions for innocent fillers  
did not occur: when the error is demonstrated, the prosecution does not 
pursue the charges. Seligmann had been at the party, but at the relevant  
time when the rape was alleged to have occurred, he was absent. Thus, his 
 
 
307. See Wells & Turtle, supra note 244, at 321. 
308. A handful of team members did not attend. The three team captains gave statements 
to the police, and each listed those he remembered being present. Those numbers varied. See 
Exhibit 12, 3/17/06 Voluntary Statements, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 
(Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 31, 2007) (on file with author) 
(indicating that Matthew Zash listed thirty-three, that David Evans listed forty, and that 
Daniel Patrick Flannery listed thirty-six). Cumulatively, they indicated six of the Caucasian 
players did not attend the party. See Wilson & Bernstein, supra note 62. They omitted 
Seligmann, who was at the party for a period of time. Sgt. Gottlieb Deposition, supra note 
174, at 146–47 (explaining that only after the indictment did they learn of Seligmann’s 
presence from a photo of the party displayed by a local attorney). 
309. The Durham identification procedure protocol, General Order 4077, makes no 
exception for cases with a large number of suspects. See General Order 4077, supra note 
250, at 1 (permitting the placement of more than one suspect in an array but requiring at least 
the addition of five more fillers for each suspect added). Wells, in a theoretical article about 
the need for fillers, suggested flexibility when a number of suspects are involved. He gave 
the example of the practical difficulty in a case with six suspects of conducting six separate 
lineups and argued that a “mixed model” with six suspects and six foils could improve the 
“lineup-wise error rate” significantly. Wells & Turtle, supra note 244, at 326–28. Also, at 
some point, with thirty- or forty-member lineups, a form of interference more profoundly 
affects “hit rates,” and although he does not develop the implications, he suggests such 
situations be treated as “a mugshot task” and not as a live lineup. Id. at 328. 
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photo should have been recognized as an inadvertent filler. He was indicted 
anyway, and the prosecutor refused or showed no interest in the alibi.310 
Appropriate skepticism would have resulted in further investigation and no 
indictment and prosecution. 
The systemic error in this case, however, occurred earlier: it was in 
showing a group of photos that included all Duke lacrosse players, the vast 
majority of whom were at the party and therefore potential suspects.311 If,  
as a matter of chance, the accuser picked three players who attended the 
party, they would be charged. The procedure permitted a hoax or false 
allegation based on delusion to continue. Nifong did not yet know that no 
incriminating DNA evidence would be found, particularly if special testing 
were used. However, on March 30, 2006, the day before he suggested the 
unusual identification procedures,312 he had been told in a phone call from 
the SBI lab that, as to the primary testing, no incriminating semen or sperm 
was present on the rape kit items and that these items would not be 
submitted for DNA analysis.313 He should have been on alert that  he 
needed corroboration for a witness with a challengeable background and, 
more importantly, to give him assurance that a crime occurred. Precisely 
what information Nifong knew cannot be determined, but he was told that 
 
 
310. Attorneys Kirk Osborn and Jim Cooney, both representing Seligmann, described 
being rebuffed by Nifong or his assistant when they offered or began discussing their client’s 
very substantial alibi evidence. See Benjamin Niolet & Michael Biesecker, DA: I Haven’t 
Heard Accuser’s Account, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 28, 2006, at 12A 
(describing Osborn’s unsuccessful efforts shortly after the indictment to meet with Nifong to 
discuss the alibi); see also Joseph Neff, Undisclosed DNA Results Go Public in Courtroom, 
News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 17, 2007, at 1A (describing Cooney’s encounter). 
Instead, Seligmann testified that Nifong sneered or chuckled when Osborn mentioned his 
alibi at an early hearing. Videotape: Testimony of Reade W. Seligmann (June 15, 2007), at 
RS 49:00–53:00 (on file with author). Finnerty also had substantial alibi information that he 
presented to the special prosecutors for the attorney general’s investigation. I do not include 
him above because he did not present it to Nifong, but he likely would have done so had 
Nifong shown a willingness to be persuaded that he, too, was effectively an innocent “foil.” 
311. At this point in the investigation, the police had a list of names from three of the 
players of those who were and were not at the party. However, the police did not fully credit 
that information as accurate and so, while they believed some were absent, they did not 
know at the time of the April 4, 2006, photo display that any of them were clearly excluded 
as suspects. 
312. On March 31, 2006, Nifong gave directions regarding this identification procedure  
to Sergeant Gottlieb. See Sgt. Gottlieb’s Supplemental Report, supra note 35, at 8 
(describing Nifong’s instructions on March 31, 2006, for conduct of identification 
procedure). The previous day, on March 30, 2006, Nifong was given these results in a 
conference call with SBI technicians. See Leyn Testimony, supra note 96, at 9–11 
(describing a March 30, 2006, telephone call in which she provided these results to Nifong); 
Phone Logs of Conference Call on March 30, 2006, between SBI Technicians and Nifong, 
supra note 96; Nifong Deposition, supra note 96, at 188–90; see also Joseph Neff, DNA 
Tests Provide Clues Nifong Never Pursued, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 16, 
2007, at 1A (assuming Nifong was informed on March 30 of the results given his suggestion 
the next day in a public forum that condoms may have been used). 
313. See Amended Nifong Bar Order, supra note 8, para. 36, at 6 (finding that SBI 
notified Nifong on this date that it was unable to find semen, blood, or saliva on any of these 
items). 
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Mangum had given conflicting versions of the event and that she had 
diagnosed mental problems. She had given no physical description of the 
three (or more) attackers before March 16, 2006, and after that date, the 
descriptions had not been used to focus on any suspects. She had viewed 
over two-thirds of the team without making identifications, including all 
those with the same names as the attackers used and all three of the players 
who lived at the house. 
Nifong clearly had to know that, if possible, he needed identification 
evidence that was at least somewhat independently reliable, and the 
procedure he set in motion could not provide it.314 Indeed, given that he  
had been informed by the attorney for Seligmann that his client had 
documentary evidence of an alibi, not to mention the other errors by the 
accuser regarding others at the party, the integrity of all the results should 
have been understood to have suffered serious damage.315 
 
V. CONCLUSION—A LIMITED BUT IMPORTANT REMEDY: LEGAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF IDENTIFICATION PROTOCOLS DESIGNED TO ENSURE 
ACCURACY AND PROTECT THE INNOCENT 
The identification procedure and ensuing indictment is a concrete 
example of Nifong’s failure to follow the essential ethical command of 
prosecutors “to do justice”: not to continue a prosecution unless the 
prosecutor has sufficient assurance of the guilt of the accused. Whatever  
the level of assurance or personal commitment required, Nifong’s conduct 
should be found lacking in this case. The identification had no independent 
standing. When he secured it, he need not have expected it to be suppressed 
under due process, but he should have recognized that it had virtually no 
real value as evidence of any player’s guilt because of the badly flawed 
procedures used. 
As the Durham Police Department noted in defending its practices, the 
identification procedures are based upon recommendations of the North 
Carolina Actual Innocence Commission, which states that the procedures 
are “not intended to create, do not create, and may not be relied on to create, 
any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any 
matter civil or criminal.”316 As a consequence, deviation from them does 
 
 
314. As noted earlier, Nifong knew that Mangum would be informed she was viewing the 
people whom police believed were at the party. See Sgt. Gottlieb Deposition, supra note 174, 
at 120–21, 126. 
315. For example, Mangum on two separate occasions identified one player as being at 
the party who was in fact in Raleigh on that night and misidentified the person who made the 
crude remark regarding the use of the broom as a sex object. Neff, supra note 301; see also 
Motion to Suppress Identification, supra note 166, para. 78(f), at 19. She placed the person 
whom investigators had identified as having actually made that comment instead as sitting in 
the kitchen making a drink. Id.; see Sgt. Gottlieb’s Supplemental Report, supra note 35, at 
15, 18. 
316. Chalmers Memorandum, supra note 250, at 5 (quoting N.C. Actual Innocence 
Comm’n, supra note 240, at 1). 
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not mean suppression should occur; indeed, a violation of the policies 
apparently does not even have evidentiary value. 
Regardless of its aberrant facts, the Duke lacrosse case teaches an 
important lesson regarding identification procedures: more than just actions 
that relate to the due process standard can deny justice. I assume that 
prosecutors generally do not violate their most basic duty to “do justice” 
and accusers do not often attempt to perpetuate frauds or suffer from a total 
and persistent delusion,317 and it should be rare that both happen 
simultaneously in the same case. But here we have one such case. 
This case demonstrates the paramount need for concrete, enforceable 
rules. As bad as Nifong’s conduct was, he was not charged with and likely 
could not have been found to have violated the most fundamental ethical 
principles that should guide prosecutorial conduct. These precepts are 
extremely difficult or impossible to enforce since they are either very 
general in nature or not directly incorporated in any disciplinary rule. This 
case should give impetus to change identification guidelines into 
enforceable rules with the consequence that violation results in suppression 
of the out-of-court identification that results.318 
Indeed, shortly after the conclusion of the Nifong disciplinary case, the 
North Carolina legislature enacted legislation that wrote the innocence 
commission’s procedures into affirmative law.319 The bill’s easy passage 
 
317. Among the many who suffer from this fiasco are the victims of rape, whose reports 
will likely now be viewed more skeptically. I have focused here on the innocent.  The  
justice system must protect victims and efforts should be made not to let Nifong’s reckless 
action harm sexual-abuse victims in an overreaction. See generally Aviva Orenstein, Special 
Issues Raised by Rape Trials, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1585 (discussing the difficulties of 
protecting rape victims while insuring justice to the defendant). 
318. See Andrew E. Taslitz, What Remains of Reliability: Hearsay and Freestanding  
Due Process After Crawford v. Washington, Crim. Just., Summer 2005, at 39, 53 (arguing 
that violation of certain well-documented identification procedures should presumptively 
constitute a due process violation); see also Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)formulating 
Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1030, 1063–65 (2001) (arguing that the new procedures to help 
ensure accurate identification are prime candidates for new prophylactic rules of exclusion). 
319. Titled the Eyewitness Identification Reform Act, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 421 (to be 
codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-284.52), which will become effective March 1, 2008, 
establishes detailed identification procedures for displaying a group of people or photos to a 
witness. Section (b) mandates that “[l]ineups conducted by State, county, and other local  
law enforcement officers shall meet all of the following requirements.” Those requirements 
include (1) use of “an independent administrator” or a specified alternative method, 
including an automated or random display system, that achieves neutrality, id. §§ (a)(3), 
(b)(1), (c); (2) sequential display of people or pictures, id. § (b)(2); (3) predisplay 
instructions to the eyewitness, which includes a warning that “[t]he perpetrator might or 
might not be presented in the lineup,” “[t]he lineup administrator does not know the 
suspect’s identity,” and “[t]he eyewitness should not feel compelled to make an 
identification,” id. § (b)(3); (4) inclusion of at least five fillers who generally resemble the 
eyewitness’s description of the perpetrator, id. § (b)(5); (5) placement of only one suspect in 
a display, id. § (b)(10); (6) documentation by the person administering the procedure of the 
eyewitness’s own words as to the degree of certainty of the eyewitness as to any 
identification made, id. § (b)(12); and (7) videotaping of procedures unless not practical, 
with audio taping then required unless it too is not practical, in which case written 
 2007] THE DUKE LACROSSE CASE 1409 
 
was attributed to the reactions to the Nifong case, but it grew out of broader 
concerns with misidentifications and punishment of several innocent 
defendants who were exonerated by DNA evidence.320 
The legislation is at least a good first step and probably much more. 
Similar legislation should be adopted in other jurisdictions to give concrete 
form to part of the prosecutor’s duty to “do justice” in the context of 
identification evidence. By converting what had previously been only 
guidelines into required procedures that all state, county, and local law 
enforcement officers must follow,321 the law takes the most important step. 
It mandates fairer and more accurate police procedures that not only help to 
control suggestiveness but also to increase accuracy. If the change in law 
enforcement conduct described in the legislation actually occurs, which 
should be assumed given the broad support for the reforms and the 
mandatory nature of the charge, the most important step will have been 
taken. For instance, the law requires a “double-blind” identification 
procedure,322 which by itself eliminates much potential for inadvertent or 
purposeful coaching. 
The one substantial question that remains for the North Carolina 
legislation is whether its three remedies are specific enough and go far 
enough. These remedies are (1) a requirement that failure to comply with 
any of the procedures is to be “considered by the court in adjudicating 
motions to suppress eyewitness identification”; (2) admission of evidence 
of such failure as evidence for the jury to consider regarding a claim of 
misidentification; and (3) a requirement that, where evidence of compliance 
or noncompliance has been presented, the court is to instruct the jury that it 
may consider such evidence to determine reliability of the identifications.323 
 
 
 
documentation is to be provided both of the reasons for lack of mechanical recording and of 
the details of the procedure, id. § (b)(14). The statute defines a “filler” as a “person not 
suspected of an offense.” Id. § (a)(2). 
320. See Titan Barksdale, New Lineup Rules Pass, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), 
July 24, 2007, at 1A (describing legislation passed in response to the wrongful convictions of 
Darryl Hunt, Ronald Cotton, and Lesly Jean—a bill sponsor’s client who had spent ten years 
in prison as a result of mistaken identification before he was exonerated by DNA—and as 
affected in timing and aided in gaining consensus by the Duke lacrosse case). 
321. See 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 421 (to be codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-284.52(b)). 
In 2007, other states adopted legislation creating or requiring the formulation of similar 
identification procedures to be used throughout the enacting state. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., 
Pub. Safety § 3-506 (2007); W. Va. Code § 62-1E-1–3 (2007)). However, unlike the North 
Carolina statute, none of the enacted procedures that I have located specify any legal 
consequences for their violation. 
322. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-284.52(a)(3), (b)(1) (to be codified Mar. 1, 2008). 
323. The remedies provision, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 421 (to be codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 15A-284.52(d)), states, 
All of the following shall be available as consequences of compliance or 
noncompliance with the requirements of this section: 
(1) Failure to comply with any of the requirements of this section shall be 
considered by the court in adjudicating motions to suppress eyewitness 
identification. 
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My main concern is with the first of these remedies, consideration of 
noncompliance in connection with a motion to suppress identification. 
However, I begin with the last two, which are simple but important. When 
the required procedures are not followed, admission of evidence about the 
failure coupled with an instruction to the jury should have an impact. Of 
course, we cannot be confident that juries will be affected, but the fairness 
and accuracy message delivered by the evidence and the instruction would 
be one that should intuitively appeal to the jurors’ common sense, and it 
should resonate with any other uncertainties regarding guilt present in the 
evidence. Courts should also go further and allow admission of expert 
witnesses when the procedures have been violated to explain to the jury 
dangers inherent in improper practices.324 Expert explanation combined 
with instructions has in other areas been shown to be critical to juries’ 
giving appropriate attention to flaws in the circumstances of the 
identification.325 
The exclusionary remedy should be understood to include two elements 
that are not part of current suggestiveness law under the Due  Process 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.326 First, the remedy for a violation of the 
statute should alter Brathwaite’s rule of an all-or-nothing approach to 
identification suppression, which too often results in nothing being 
suppressed despite a suggestive out-of-court identification procedure. 
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Brathwaite, some courts employed 
 
 
(2) Failure to comply with any of the requirements of this section shall be 
admissible in support of claims of eyewitness misidentification, as long as 
such evidence is otherwise admissible. 
(3) When evidence of compliance or noncompliance with the requirements of this 
section has been presented at trial, the jury shall be instructed that it may 
consider credible evidence of compliance or noncompliance to determine the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications. 
324. Psychological research indicates that the traditional jury instructions on the 
weaknesses of eyewitness identification have virtually no impact on the jury’s actual 
evaluation of problematic characteristics of an identification, whereas expert testimony has 
some appreciable effect in sensitizing jurors to the relevant issues. See, e.g., Cutler & 
Penrod, supra note 236, at 264, 268; Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and 
Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 817, 834, 
840–41 (1995). Where the defendant is indigent, the court should provide funds to secure 
expert assistance. 
325. There is some suggestion that jury instruction is an important supplement to expert 
testimony in educating jurors on the weaknesses of eyewitness identification. See Michael R. 
Leippe et al., Timing of Eyewitness Expert Testimony, Jurors’ Need for Cognition, and Case 
Strength as Determinants of Trial Verdicts, 89 J. Applied Psychol. 524, 537–38 (2004) 
(finding importance in jury instructions summarizing expert’s points). 
326. The North Carolina legislation is not clear on this point. Legislatures in other 
jurisdictions should make clear that noncompliance with required identification procedures 
stands as an additional ground for suppression. In North Carolina, courts should adopt this 
same interpretation. There is solid basis to do so in the clearly mandated procedures and the 
failure of the statute to specify that due process suggestiveness is the sole basis for exclusion. 
Indeed, interpreting the statute to limit suppression to the U.S. Constitution would be 
illogical. The North Carolina legislature has absolutely no ability to affect the interpretation 
of the U.S. Constitution by establishing mandatory identification procedures. 
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what was called a “per se approach,” under which an out-of-court 
identification was suppressed automatically if it had been obtained through 
unnecessarily suggestive confrontation procedures, even if the court ruled 
the in-court identification admissible under reliability analysis. The per se 
approach was justified under a dual rationale of eliminating evidence of 
uncertain reliability given the “awful risks of misidentification” and 
deterring misconduct by police and prosecutors.327 
Exclusion of the out-of-court identification should be reestablished as the 
automatic or per se remedy for a material violation of the procedures set out 
in the bill. This remedy would be, of course, only of limited value to the 
defendant if the in-court identification is still admitted,328 but it is of some 
benefit in denying the prosecution admission of the often more impressive 
out-of-court identification,329 and the occasional suppression of some 
evidence for violations of mandated procedures will have the salutary effect 
of encouraging compliance. Perhaps Due Process Clause suggestibility law 
would still be as much of a wasteland as it currently is if the per se remedy 
had been maintained, but there is strong reason to believe that it would have 
been marginally more effective. The mistake of eliminating that partial 
remedy, which is correctable under the new grounds provided by the 
statutory command, should be remedied. 
Importantly, the new legislation should be understood to create an 
additional statutory basis for exclusion that goes beyond due process 
suggestiveness. If suggestiveness under the Constitution remains the only 
legal basis for exclusion, then the suppression remedy is likely to be 
ineffective after including consideration of the violation of the mandated 
procedures in most situations. This is because of the fundamental difficulty 
of meeting the onerous requirements of the due process suggestivity 
doctrine. The new legislation should instead be understood to authorize 
exclusion of more than just identifications that are so impermissibly 
 
327. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110 (1977) (quoting Brathwaite v. Manson, 527 
F.2d 363, 371 (2d Cir. 1975)); see supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
328. Exclusion of the out-of-court identification does have the benefit to the defense of 
taking away the more impressive evidence of identification. An in-court identification of the 
defendant sitting at counsel table may make for a dramatic moment, but picking the 
defendant out while (typically) he sits with counsel at the defense table is figuratively like 
“shooting fish in a barrel.” It has little probative value and is assumed to receive a discount 
by jurors. 
329. Out-of-court identifications are admitted under the hearsay rule as independent 
evidence and stand as an exception to the general principle that a party may not bolster its 
own witness until attacked. The rationale flows from the self-impeaching quality of an in- 
court identification of the defendant sitting at counsel table, which is usually similar to 
“shooting fish in a barrel.” See, e.g., People v. Gould, 354 P.2d 865, 867 (Cal. 1960) (noting 
the basis for admission of an out-of-court identification in the absence of impeachment and 
over a hearsay objection is its superior quality to the in-court identification); 2 McCormick 
on Evidence § 251 (6th ed. 2006) (recognizing the unsatisfactory nature of an identification 
in the courtroom). The out-of-court identification typically provides more  independent 
value. Thus, denying the prosecution that evidence of the out-of-court identification, even if 
the weaker in-court identification is permitted, should be of some value to the defense and its 
avoidance should be of interest to the prosecution. 
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suggestive as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable mistaken 
identification. It should also authorize exclusion of  identification 
procedures that clearly violate the legally mandated procedures and, as a 
result, threaten accuracy and fairness, imperiling the innocent. At least 
exclusion of the out-of-court identification should be authorized even if due 
process is not violated. 
In appropriate cases, as with the due process suggestiveness doctrine, 
exclusion of all identification evidence (the in-court as well as the out-of- 
court identification) from the affected witness should be the authorized 
remedy for violation of the procedures as well. Such a remedy would likely 
remain a rarity for the practical reason, if no other, that, as noted earlier, 
courts find difficulty excluding the identification testimony of a victim or 
key witness.330 These practical pressures will continue to operate in much 
the same way even if suppression is considered under a new rationale. 
However, at least to some small extent, exclusion of all identification 
evidence from a witness may be more palatable when done to protect the 
innocent and guard against inaccuracy. The finding required to support 
suppression may be easier in that it will not require a conclusion that the 
witness’s memory is likely irreparably distorted so as to lead to 
misidentification, but only a recognition that the process that violated the 
statute’s commands was one known to have a very high likelihood of 
producing mistakes. 
If the identification suppression hearing had been held in the Duke 
lacrosse case, Mangum’s entire identification testimony might well have 
been suppressed, as a rare exception in the body of due process suppression 
law. Thus, in a truly extraordinary case, current doctrine is capable of 
yielding such a result. However, suppression would have been more 
appropriate on the new ground that the faulty identification procedure posed 
a threat to accuracy and to the innocent. Ensuring better identification 
procedures, a new way to examine the propriety of those procedures, and a 
varied set of remedies should be one of the lasting consequences of the 
Duke lacrosse case to take a limited but important step toward justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
330. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
